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ABSTRACT 
MORAL EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF 
THE CONFUCIAN, PLATONIC AND KOHLBERGIAN APPROACHES 
February, 1989 
YOUNG IL SHIN, B.D., YONSEI UNIVERSITY 
B.A., LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE 
S.T.M., ANDOVER-NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Dr. Robert R. Wellman 
This study examines the philosophies and practices of moral education 
of three groups of thinkers, two classical and one modern. To attain this goal, it 
first compares the philosophy and practice of moral education of Confucius and 
Mencius of Chou China with those of Socrates and Plato of Athens based on 
the Confucian Four Books and the Platonic Dialogues. Then, it examines the 
theory and practice of moral education of Lawrence Kohlberg of the United 
States in light of the classical wisdom of the Chinese and the Athenian thinkers. 
The ultimate purpose of this study is, first, to see the similarities and differences 
in their approaches to moral education and secondly, to gain some fresh ideas 
to suggest for the improvement of our own approaches. 
The first five chapters are devoted to the study of the two classical 
groups. Chapter I surveys the histories of Chou China and the City-State of 
Athens to see what existing human conditions prompted our thinkers of two 
separate worlds to found moral education, and explores their reasons for 
thinking that moral education was the only way to improve their worlds. 
Chapter II studies the Confucian and the Socratic/Platonic conceptions 
and analyses of human nature and their theories on man’s educability in moral 
excellence. 
Chapter III examines the aims of moral education given by both groups 
and their justification for designating moral education a special education in 
moral excellence. 
Chapter IV studies certain qualities and qualifications identified by both 
groups as essential in their teachers and students for moral education. Then, it 
compares the methods they used and their reasons. 
Chapter V examines the curriculum selected by each group and the 
reasons for including only certain courses in it. The chapter also examines 
many virtues defined and discussed by both groups. 
Chapter VI explores the theory and practice of moral education of 
Lawrence Kohlberg against those of the classical thinkers. It also assesses 
Kohlberg's contributions to modern day moral education. 
Chapter VII summarizes the study and offers my own conclusion. 
VII 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine, first, two of the world's most 
influential and enduring theories and practices of moral education, which have 
shaped the minds of East Asians and Europeans for over two thousand years; 
second, the most publicized and controversial modern theory and practice of 
moral education of Lawrence Kohlberg of the United States; and then, to 
compare all three in the hope of getting some fresh ideas and methods to enrich 
and improve our own moral education in a pluralistic society such as the United 
States. 
The first five chapters are devoted to the study of the classical thinkers. 
Chapter I surveys the histories of Chou China and the City-State of Athens to 
see what existing human conditions, moral and political, made Confucius and 
Mencius in China and Socrates and Plato in Athens emerge as the founders of 
moral education for a special group of people. Chapter II examines the 
Confucian and the Socratic/Platonic conception of man and his nature and 
compares their views on man's capacity to learn to be moral. Chapter III studies 
the aims of moral education given by both groups of people. Chapter IV 
compares natural and acquired human qualities considered as essential by 
both groups in their teachers and students for moral education. Various 
methods used by each group and the degrees of effectiveness and danger they 
saw are also discussed. 
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Chapter V examines the courses of study each group used and the 
reasons for including them in their curriculum. Many important virtues, private 
and public, which both groups expected to have their students acquire are also 
discussed. 
Chapter VI explores the theory and practice of moral education of 
Lawrence Kohlberg and measures his contribution, as compared to the 
classical thinkers' of China and Athens, to moral education today. Chapter VII 
presents this student’s concluding reflections and suggestions for further 
studies. 
Significance of the Study 
Living in a world where, since the last World War, all sorts of barriers, 
which had kept human races and their cultures isolated from each other for 
millennia, are fast coming down at ever increasing speed, we are now 
compelled to coexist with all human races on this planet whether we want to or 
not. It is now imperative that we discover and define some universal values that 
must be learned by all human races to live as one civilized human family, 
sharing their cultural fruits and enjoying the good life the wonders of technology 
can provide. The author of this study believes that moral education must 
assume a major portion of that effort. And also, he feels strongly that in the 
United States, a dynamic moral education for the future and the world must 
start, for there is no better place in the world to start it. 
The United States is a microcosm of the world in every sense of the word, 
and it is here that a universal human dream, such as that of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., of enjoying equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal freedom can be and 
has become a reality, however slowly but surely. 
A slim but fascinating book just published by the MIT Press, An Agenda 
fpr the 21 §t Century, which is a collection of interviews conducted by Christian 
Science Monitor columnist Rushworth Kidder with twenty-two thinkers of 
distinction - philosophers, politicians, economists, social scientists, educators, 
artists, business people, physicists, and authors - asking each one question: 
What are the major issues that humanity will face in the 21 st century? 
According to Kidder, the following six items or areas of concern "to which 
humanity must devote its full attention and its unstinting resources," in the 21st 
century are: 
1. The threat of nuclear annihilation. 
2. The danger of overpopulation. 
3. The degradation of the global environment. 
4. The gap between the developing and the industrial worlds. 
5. The need for a fundamental restructuring of educational 
systems. 
6. The breakdown in public and private morality. 
Kidder points out that "the list is not in order of priority although the nuclear 
issue appears to to rank first." (p. 195) The question is: Which of the six agenda 
items should be most urgently dealt with? The answer is impossible, for all 
items are interconnected. But the author of this study believes that the last two 
items are fundamental and urgent, because all improvements and problem¬ 
solving must be carried out by educated and moral individuals, who draw upon 
values that are universal and human to guide their specialized works and 
actions for the welfare of all mankind. 
Many of the interviewees mention that such universally necessary values 
- trust, compassion, dignity, and obedience - must be restored to expect a 
happier 21 st century. Kidder’s statement at the conclusion of the book agrees 
with what the classical thinkers of China and Athens had stated all along. 
Kidder writes: 
At bottom, then, this book asks a single question: How can we 
have a better 21 st century? Part of the answer lies in the work that must 
be done by the relatively small number of people in leadership positions 
acting both locally and globally on the major items on the formal agenda! 
But the other part of the answer lies in the willingness of each individual 
to act on the personal agenda. 
If we are to make the next century an age worth inhabiting, we will 
not do it simply by resolving, from the top down, the issues on the formal 
agenda. We will do it because individuals everywhere, taking to heart 
the personal agenda, are building within themselves a sounder society 
from the ground up. The act of building, happening within private lives 
across the world, ultimately charts a way to resolve the issues on the 
agenda for the 21 st century, (pp. 204-205) 
The problems exist and they must be resolved. The human individuals who are 
endowed with special affinity to be leaders or governors of all human 
institutions - political, economic, cultural, religious, and educational - must be 
educated in universal moral values in order to resolve the problems most 
satisfactorily for all of mankind. 
A study such as that of this author is significant, because it examines 
human minds of different races, cultures and times and proves their equal 
power to reason, their equal concern with human problems, and their equal 
commitment to solve the problems. It can also help man overcome racial and 
cultural myths of natural superiority of one race over others; help him embrace 
the truth that there exists a common humanity of all races, equal in spiritual, 
intellectual, and creative powers, if all are given an equal chance for 
development; and help him do his share of the work, guided by universal 
human moral values, to make the world a better place for all mankind. 
Literature, Methods, and Limitations of the Study 
The volume of literature that separately includes studies of the many 
aspects of Confucianism or the philosophy of Socrates and Plato is enormous. 
However, a comparative study of the philosophies and practices of moral 
education of the two groups, based on the primary sources, has not yet 
appeared. This study is a humble contribution to fill that need. 
The primary sources for this study were the Confucian Four Books and 
the Dialogues of Plato. The Four Books - the Analects of Confucius, the Great 
Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Mencius - were read in 
their Chinese originals and in Korean, Japanese, and English translations. 
Of the Dialogues of Plato, only those relevant to this study were read 
thoroughly. They are: the Apology, the Protagoras, the Meno, the Gorgias, the 
Republic, the Laws, and the Timaeus; and they were read in English 
translations. Many different translations were helpful in grasping the real and 
pure meaning of the sources and in selecting short and long passages from the 
sources to be quoted in the text of this study. The unavoidable task of 
comparative reading of different translations was most of the time rewarding, but 
frustrating and tedious, too. Sometimes, when the reading involved extended 
discussions on the meaning of a certain virtue in the Dialogues, for example, it 
seemed to go nowhere. 
Books and articles listed in the Bibliography were read in full or in part, 
mainly to check the accuracy of this author's own reading of the primary 
sources. They were also sources to tap information useful in understanding the 
milieu from which the primary sources emerged and through which they have 
survived for so many centuries. 
The scope of this study is limited to include two classical and one modern 
theories and practices of moral education. There should be more studies of this 
nature that compare the educational foundations of other great civilizations - 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic - and identify ideals, values, and 
methods in them all to enrich the educational wisdom of our days and the future. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS OF 
THE FOUR BOOKS AND THE DIALOGUES 
The purpose of this chapter, which reviews historically the socio-political 
experiences of the Chou Chinese and the classical Athenians, is to see why the 
most outstanding classical thinkers of China and Greece were also the major 
theorists and practitioners of moral education. 
In reviewing the history of Chou China and that of the City-State of 
Athens, the following questions will be asked: 1) On what moral grounds or 
principles did the rulers of Chou and Athens want to build their states? 2) What 
major historical experiences and events were responsible for the deterioration 
of social morality in Chou China and in Athens? 3) What were the problems 
caused by the absence of moral principles in the China of Confucius (551-479 
B.C.) and Mencius (372-289 B.C.) and in the Athens of Socrates (469-399 B.C.) 
and Plato (428-348 B.C.), and how did these thinkers propose to resolve them? 
The Chou Dvnastv (between 1027 and 211 B.C.)1 
The Chou dynasty was founded by a frontier Chinese tribe who called 
themselves Chou, whose origin is now traced to the Shensi Province area in 
the northwestern part of China along the Wei River valley. In the latter part of 
the 11th century B.C., they moved eastward and conquered the Kingdom of 
Shang (ca. 1500-1027 B.C.), whose territory encompassed a good portion of 
North China along the Yellow River by the time of its downfall. 
i 
Being the products of the rugged frontier regions of China, the Chou 
were understandably less civilized than the ethnically identical Shang people 
now under their rule, and they were dynamic and progressive people who 
adopted some important social customs and religious rituals of the Shang and 
moved on to create their own culture and social values.2 The essentials of this 
culture provided the foundation for the guiding principles of the Chinese 
people's thought and action down to the present day. Even Communist China 
is Confucian under a new name!3 
After establishing their own royal domain in Shensi near today's Siam, 
the founders of the Chou dynasty divided up the conquered land out of 
administrative necessity and awarded it to their own relatives and to the heads 
of other tribes who had collaborated in the conquest. A territory was awarded 
even to a Shang prince, thus making him a feudal lord under the Chou. Some 
one thousand feudal states, great and small, were created, and the lord of each 
state was left virtually free to rule in whatever way he wanted. The feudal lords 
governed their states for the Chou kings, and the kings expected them, first, to 
see that the land was put to productive cultivation; second, to send periodic 
tribute to the court; third, to present themselves periodically at the court to show 
their loyalty to the throne; and fourth, to raise an army in defense of the king 
when required.4 
The feudal system so instituted was a success, for it produced unbroken 
political stability for at least two and a half centuries. Although the highly 
idealized period of the Western Chou (1028-771 B.C.) was not without armed 
conflicts between some of the territorially ambitious feudal lords and the 
barbarians on the border regions, there was unity and cooperation among the 
lords under the powerful and saintly kings who had the Mandate of Heaven. It 
is important to note that for over twenty-five centuries, the traditional account of 
2 
this period has been accepted as the official model of the Chinese empire or 
state and it has been taught to all those who were preparing to be members of 
the ruling class. Loewe explains this further. 
The house of Chou had been invested by a beneficent Heaven with 
religious authority and moral qualities, and that it was only under the 
auspices of Heaven, a superhuman and supernatural being, that the 
house had been established. It was thus only the head of the Chou 
house who was entitled to bear the title of King. Chinese moralists from 
an early time claimed that the fortunes of Chou depended directly on the 
moral qualities of the presiding rulers and their servants, and even 
explained the dynastic history of Chou in such terms. It was believed that 
the early rulers had been saintly kings, fully justified in expelling the last 
tyrannical ruler of Shang, and that their excellent government was 
operated over an increasingly wider area as the world became more 
civilized.5 
As the dynasty entered the last third of the Western Chou period, the 
house of Chou began to lose its royal prerogatives, having enthroned some 
incompetent and immoral men as kings. By that time, some feudal lords had 
become more powerful than others, including the kings, having absorbed some 
and made alliances with some others through diplomatic and military 
maneuvering. Preoccupied by the tasks of protection, survival, and expansion 
of their own individual states, the feudal lords were no longer reliable defenders 
of the royal state when it came under attack. So it happened in 771 B.C. that 
one of the lords, aided by non-Chinese nomadic tribes, rebelled against the 
king and killed him. The royal remnants fled eastward to Loyang where the next 
king was installed and the Eastern Chou period (771-221 B.C.) began. There 
the king and all his successors for the next five hundred years were kept as the 
titular heads of the kingdom without a territory large enough to base their own 
political, military and economic powers. They were kept for the following 
possible reasons. 
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First, at least in theory, the Mandate of Heaven remained with the house 
of Chou, and the kings were the sole custodians of the rites to commune with 
Heaven and to legitimize any of the feudal lords' right to rule any part of the 
kingdom. Obviously, the Chou lords were not inclined to discard these religious 
and ceremonial functions which only the royal Chou heirs had the knowledge 
and power to perform. 
Second, all feudal lords considered themselves the inheritors of the 
Chou culture and were proud of it in spite of the endless political and military 
rivalries among themselves. In order to perpetuate this sense of cultural unity, it 
was necessary to keep the symbol of the Chou culture, the royal house of Chou. 
At any rate, the Eastern Chou period, which is further divided into two 
sub-periods of the "Spring and Autumn" (772-481 B.C.) and the "Warring 
States" (403-221 B.C.),6 began without a controlling authority to ensure the 
political unity of the kingdom. The once numerous Chou states merged and 
absorbed each other into fewer and more powerful political units through 
diplomatic maneuvering during the Spring and Autumn period, but through 
more violent means in the Warring States period.7 
The political tradition of Chou seemed to perpetuate war, for it demanded 
that all Chinese live in harmony under one culture and the sovereignty of the 
Chou kings. Obviously feeling the need for a unified kingdom to save it from 
self-destruction and from ever increasing alien menace, some powerful feudal 
lords organized a league of states on the authority of the Chou king, 
superintended by pa (hegemon or overlord). The first pa was the head of the 
most powerful Ch'i state, then succeeded by the heads of other powerful states 
to substitute the role formerly played by the Chou kings. The institution of 
hegemon appears to have worked during the reign of the first hegemon for 
about four decades (between 685 and 643 B.C.), but simply faded away by the 
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late 5th century B.C.8 There was no single state powerful enough to exercise 
control over other states. 
Those states whose borders were shared with the barbarians were, in 
general, militarily stronger and territorially bigger than the inner or central 
states, and the latter were often compelled to take sides with one or the other of 
the peripheral states and often change sides as the fortunes of war shifted. 
Even the interstate alliances, though sealed by rigidly worded covenants and 
religious ceremonies, became unreliable as the tempo of the contest for 
supreme political power among the states accelerated. Breaking covenants 
and entering new ones between states shattered the kingdom’s religious and 
moral foundations. Mencius described the state of affairs of his time as follows: 
The world was fallen into decay, and right principles had dwindled away. 
Perverse and oppressive deeds were again waxen rife. Cases were 
occurring of ministers who murdered the rulers, and of sons who 
murdered their fathers. (III. B. 9. vii: Legge) 
He goes on to report that in the Spring and Autumn period, there were no 
righteous wars.9 
As China entered the Warring States period around 400 B.C., there were 
only seven powerful and a handful of small states besides the powerless royal 
state of Chou. The struggle among surviving states became intense and 
violent, and China was in a hopeless state of political and social disorder. "It 
was win or lose, absorb or be absorbed, kill or be killed; the chaos could not be 
resolved until one state eliminated all rivals."10 The people were victimized, 
and so were the members of the feudal aristocracy when their states were lost 
to the victorious. H.G. Creel reports: 
Aristocrats had little enough security. The people had none. They were 
chiefly farmers, commonly virtual serfs. They had few if any rights as 
against the nobility; in practice, they were taxed, worked, expropriated, 
scourged, and killed by the aristocrats, with almost no check save the fact 
that, if goaded too far, they might rebel. The penalty for unsuccessful 
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rebellion, however, was death by torture... The frequent wars brouqht 
more dramatic sufferings. In 593 B.C., for instance, the capital of the state 
of Sun was besieged for so long that the inhabitants were reduced to 
eating the flesh of the children. Since they could not bear to eat their 
own, they exchanged children before killing them.11 
The scale of war was no longer small, as it had been in the Spring and 
Autumn period. Having absorbed many small states, the states which made it 
into the Warring States period were big in territory and population. Huge and 
mobile armies of foot-soldiers, equipped with deadlier new weapons of 
crossbows and iron spears, dramatically increased the misery of human 
suffering. By the 4th century B.C., cavalry replaced the war chariots driven by 
feuding aristocrats, followed by a small number of their foot-soldiers.12 
To equip, feed, and move big armies, the heads of the remaining states 
encouraged agricultural and industrial productivity. As the demands for the 
services of specialized crafts and industries grew, the size and number of cities, 
too, grew rapidly. To attract farmers from other places, the contending heads of 
various states advertised new land policies, such as the encouragement to 
reclaim the waste land for ownership. 
The construction of new roads and waterways, too, went on briskly during 
this period, primarily for military purposes, but also to promote commercial and 
industrial activities. It is not difficult to imagine that a great number of people 
were on the move, either voluntarily or through force, in search of a safer place 
to live, new land to till, new jobs in the cities.13 It is ironic to note that the 
Warring States period was a time of socio-political chaos and endless human 
misery, yet it was also a period of technological progress and economic 
opportunity for many people. 
In a way, China’s political tradition, which demanded that all Chinese live 
unified under one sovereignty and one culture, kept an ever diminishing 
number of states at each other's throat, although the house of Chou was gone 
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in reality and the Chou culture was hardly definable. In the end, the state of 
Ch'in succeeded in unifying China absolutely with determined ruthlessness 
unprecedented in the history of China. Rene Grousset describes the way this 
was done. 
The struggles between the Warring States were implacable. Instead of 
nobly holding their prisoners to ransom, from now on conquerors put 
them to death in mass executions. The soldiers of the kingdom of Ch’in 
the most bellicose of the Warring States, received their pay only on the 
presentation of the severed heads of the enemies. In towns taken by 
assault, or even in those that capitulated, the whole population, women, 
old men, and children, were often put to the sword... In 331 Ch'in 
captured the arm of Wei and decapitated 80,000 men... in 260, in a 
major success against Chao, although he had promised to spare the 
lives of the conquered, more than 400,000 were decapitated...14 
The number of enemies killed by the Ch'in warriors through the years between 
331 and 260 B.C. totalled 1,132,000ns 
The time was finally ripe for some reflective human beings to come 
forward, exercise their creative and constructive imaginations, and make 
proposals for certain reforms and changes. A small number of educated men of 
China made their appearance in the middle of the 5th century B.C. 
Throughout the history of ancient China, the scholars had played an 
indispensable role in the government, but only as subservient experts on the 
ritual and the techniques of government. Although they were aware of their 
intellectual superiority over the martial class, the scholars were politically 
powerless. Even so, they were important in Chou China, for example, for 
performing the following functions, among others. First, they were responsible 
in ordering ceremonies to bring together the Chou rulers and their enfiefed 
lords of the feudal domains with the spirits of the Chou ancestors in order to 
make their mandate to rule the people legitimate. Second, as the observers of 
astronomical phenomena and the changing seasons, the scholars were 
responsible for adjusting and proclaiming the calendar, which was the supreme 
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royal prerogative. They had to keep detailed and accurate records of their 
observations and calculations. Third, the scholars were depended upon as 
advisors by all those who possessed political legitimacy, derived from the royal 
house of Chou, for their expertise. Fourth, they educated the sons of Chou 
kings and feudal lords.16 
As the Chou dynasty was founded by military conquest, it is 
understandable that the military men exercised most decisively their political 
power, especially during the Warring States period. But gradually the scholars 
came to play more important roles in the government with their ability to provide 
reasoned analyses of the existing human problems caused by socio-political 
disorders. Moreover, they began to present theories to solve the problems 
which had demoralized the life of the people for far too long. 
Confucius (551-479 B.C.), "China's first self-conscious philosopher"17 
and the most learned man of his time, became the first thinker who openly 
expressed his distress with the existing state of human affairs and proposed to 
restore China to its ancient glory and moral excellence through education. 
Having failed to secure for himself an influential government post as an expert 
in statecraft in a number of states, Confucius returned to his native state of Lu 
and began to share his vision of an ideal Chou state which would be humane 
and just with anyone who came to him. Impressed by his broad and profound 
knowledge of the literatures of the past, his sincere concern for the future of the 
Chou kingdom, and his single-minded quest for the knowledge of moral 
principles which he firmly believed would solve human problems and raise the 
quality of China's socio-political life to new heights, the number of his students 
and followers grew rapidly and the Confucian school of philosophy was a reality 
in his lifetime. His school was the forerunner of the "Hundred Schools of 
Philosophers" which followed it and flourished between 500 and 250 B.C., the 
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Golden Age of Chinese thought or the "greatest period of intellectual flowering 
of ancient China."18 
The scholars before Confucius, too, taught, but only the sons of the 
nobles in poetry, histories, ceremonies, and music, using the books on these 
subjects long since in existence, and their lessons were privately arranged by 
fathers who felt the need to provide some cultural exposure for their sons. The 
only formal schools for the aristocratic youth mentioned in any of the pre- 
Confucian documents are the schools of archery according to Creel.19 
Confucius changed all of this. First, declaring that "In teaching there should be 
no class distinction,"20 he was the first in the history of China who freed 
education from all barriers of privilege and social class. In his view, the aim of 
government was to ensure the welfare and happiness of the whole people, and 
the administration of the government ought to be carried out by men of high 
intelligence, deep sympathy, and broad learning regardless of what the social 
position of their families might have been. He wanted to see the future rulers 
and their officials come for a right education from all walks of life.21 Second, for 
Confucius, a right education was an education which could help the learner's 
life and character, shaped by the knowledge of the highest moral principles, not 
by martial arts such as archery. A few opening passages in the Great Learning 
articulate what Confucius wished to accomplish in his school. 
...Things have their roots and their branches. Affairs have their end and 
their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to 
what is taught in the Great Learning. 
The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the 
kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their 
states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their 
families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their 
persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, 
they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in 
their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such 
extension lay in the investigation of things. 
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Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their 
knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thouahts 
being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts beinq 
rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated 
their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states 
were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole 
kingdom was made tranquil and happy. 
From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must 
consider cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.22 
Creel, in one of his studies, indicates that 
...the founder of the Confucian tradition is commonly considered to be the 
Duke of Chou. Confucius was not, as is often supposed, its founder. As 
a matter of fact, there is very little in the philosophy of Confucius which 
cannot be found in the utterances of men who lived before 
him...Confucius was only the last and most famous of such men. It is in 
part because he came at the end of the early development of this 
tradition, and summed it up, that he has become its representative par 
excellence.23 
Confucius himself said: "I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say 
and devoted to antiquity."24 Nevertheless, he was the first professional teacher 
in China and gave his utmost to the education of men in his unflinching belief 
that the knowledge and practice of the highest moral values alone could solve 
the problems of his world. Although many of his utterances addressed to his 
students, who included rulers and others in power, sound like pedantic and 
casual homilies, when the world of his time is understood, some of his remarks 
were, as Needham points out, "pointed denunciations of weaknesses, not to say 
crimes, made directly to men who would have felt as much compunction about 
having Confucius tortured to death as about crushing a fly."25 In a world where 
endless war between the feudal states made the life of the common people 
cheap and burdened while the life of the contending lords was ruthless in their 
pursuit of power and extravagance at the cost of their subjects, Confucius' fresh 
and penetrating exposition of moral values and principles was definitely 
inspirational and efficacious. Mencius, the chief exponent and advocator of the 
Confucian philosophy of the classical period, played an important role in 
instituting Confucianism as China's dominant philosophy of life. Lin Yutang 
explains this with the following words: 
In the study of the character of Confucian thought, it is important to 
have some ideas of its chief developments in Mencius, because of the 
clearer exposition of philosophic values in Mencius and because of their 
actual influence. Mencius represents the "orthodox" development of the 
Confucian school. The Book of Mencius... is incomparably better prose 
than the Analects- Mencius was an eloquent writer and speaker, good at 
debates, and the passages often consist of long and sustained 
discourses, and there are so many brilliant passages... 
...The most important ideas in Mencius are the goodness of human 
nature, consequently the importance of revering that original good 
nature, the recognition that culture or education merely consists of 
preventing the good nature in us from becoming "beclouded" by 
circumstances, the theory of nourishing that amounts to an equivalent of 
Bergson’s elan vital (the hao jan chih ch'i), and finally the declaration that 
all men are equal in their inherent goodness, and that since the 
Emperors Yao and Shun were also human beings, "any man could 
become Yao or Shun."26 
In his search for a better and more perfect human society, Mencius 
touches upon the whole range of human needs and capacities. Included in his 
discussions are not only subjects on man’s physical well-being, his needs for 
food and sex, the feelings of beauty, poetry and music; but also on the systems 
of taxation, agriculture, and government. By far, however, the greatest and most 
persistent emphasis is on man himself, whose growth in moral excellence is the 
ultimate condition to having an ideal society. 
The Citv-State of Athens (between 1023 and 347 B.C.)27 
The construction of a definitive history of the early period of the city-state 
of Athens has been and still is a tantalizing dream for scholars. However, the 
following account of the period should sum up the findings of modern 
scholarship. 
The formation of the Athenian state was a direct result of the movement of 
the lonians from the north into Attica in late Mycenean days beginning around 
1023 B.C. These Ionian Greeks were successful in absorbing the numerous 
independent villages and towns of Attica into a central state called Athens 
under a powerful monarchy.28 The Greeks, now establishing themselves in 
Attica, were composed of many different families or clans, and they seem to 
have shared the newly conquered territory among themselves. The problem of 
the division of the land among themselves in a mutually satisfying way was not 
an easy one to solve. Moreover, settling in a land already inhabited by people 
with their own customs and heritage presented yet another problem and 
required of the Athenian leaders some active thinking and a willingness to 
experiment with various forms of government. Athenian aristocrats, politically 
ambitious and innovative, began to try their varied devices in the hope of 
realizing political unity and economic prosperity for the entire state. 
In the years between 1000 and 687 B.C., which will be called the archaic 
period hereafter and approximately coincides with the first three centuries of the 
Chou dynasty known as the Western Chou (1027 to 771 B.C.), the Athenian 
monarchy was supplanted by the members of hereditary aristocratic families, 
Eupatridae, to whom all power was appropriated, while the native population of 
Attica were left to live in their own villages and towns, with virtually no political 
rights. According to A.R. Burn, the election by the aristocrats of a separate War- 
Chief, Polemarch, at a time when the king was not a great fighting man, and the 
appointment of the Archon over the king were two decisive blows to the royal 
power. The king was kept, as in China during the Eastern Chou period, as the 
city-state's chief priest, but the real power was in the hands of the Archon. 
For religious purposes, the king was kept even in classical, democratic 
Athens, but he was only the second man in the state.29 The real governing 
power rested in the office of the Archon, and the War-Chief was the third many 
in the Athenian political hierarchy. Later in the archaic period, as population 
and judicial workload increased, six Judges, thesmothetai, were added, and 
they were collectively called the Nine Archons or Rulers. They together 
controlled every aspect of the political and judicial life of the Athenian 
population. All archons had to be from the Eupatridae, and their term of office 
was one year. The Eupatridae also became powerful economically by 
appointing themselves sole owners of the land, thus reducing the native and the 
rest of the population to the position of serfs. 
Their scheme to assert Athenian sovereignty over the entire population of 
the state beyond the city of Athens was to be challenged later by rival 
Eupatridae and the people connected with them in one way or another in their 
respective regions. In Sealey's words, 
In many parts of Attica there were local traditions, local cults and locally 
powerful families, and factors of this kind commanded the primary loyalty 
of the locality. In terms of political power, local ties had the effect that 
different families predominated in different parts of Attica and had the first 
claim on the devotion of humbler families and persons in their several 
regions.30 
With this system of government, the city-state of Athens was destined to be 
plagued with politico-economic rivalry and struggles among the Eupatridae of 
different regions from the beginning of its formation. 
The first recorded rebellion against the establishment was led by Cylon 
in or near the year 632 B.C., and it ended in a bloody massacre of his besieged 
followers on the Acropolis by the Nine Archons. Although the motives of his 
rebellion are nowhere documented, it is clear that it was a radical expression of 
the resentment of his and other leading families in the same region toward the 
other regional families then in power.31 
About a decade later in 621 B.C., Dracon introduced a set of homicide 
laws. The surviving text, which was reinscribed in 409/8 B.C., indicates the 
need for laws harsh and exact enough to discourage homicidal crimes, 
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probably occurring too frequently for the state to ignore. The promulgation of 
the laws also implies the social unrest of the time.32 
In spite of the severity of the Draconian laws, maybe because of it, the 
social, economic, and political injustice continued to distress the people. In 
particular, the agricultural population of Attica, whose land and political rights 
had been steadily taken away since the unification, was profoundly agitated. 
The people were also paying dearly for the protracted war with the neighboring 
Megarians for the possession of Salamis. Beyond doubt, the Athenian state 
was in deep trouble with domestic and inter-state problems as it entered the 
sixth century B.C. 
The war with the Megarians ended with the capture of Salamis under the 
command of Solon, and in 594 or 592 B.C., Solon was elected Archon. In 
electing him to the state's highest political office, the Council of Areopagus gave 
him exclusive and almost dictatorial powers to correct the problems of the 
States, and Solon used them most productively without wasting time. 
His first legislative act was to put the Athenian economy on a sounder 
agricultural footing by introducing an economic reform known as the 
seisachtheia, meaning "the shaking off of burdens," which freed the debtors and 
their land by cancelling all debts. This radical measure liberated the enslaved 
Athenian farmers from their creditors, the Eupatridae. He also forbade the 
export of corn to ease the life of the many and stimulated the cultivation of the 
vine and the olive for export, thus laying the foundation of Athens' material 
prosperity. He is also known to have encouraged commercial enterprises, 
especially the manufacture and export of Attic black-figure vases, to supplement 
the source of wealth, which had depended almost totally on the land. 
His next major work was the codification of a constitution aimed to 
safeguard the civil rights of the people. The new constitution outlawed contracts 
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in which a person's liberty might be pledged, thus putting an end to serfdom in 
Attica. It then divided the Athenians into four classes on the basis of property. 
This made property the qualification for political privilege and office, which had 
been granted exclusively to the members of hereditary aristocracy, the 
Eupatridae.33 
Solon then made the Assembly of the People, Ecclesia, open to all 
freemen and founded the Council of Four Hundred, drawing a hundred men 
from each class. Although no detailed information about the Council's structure 
and activity is available, one of its main tasks appears to have been that of 
preparing the agenda for the Assembly.34 Understandably, there was civil strife 
between 589 and 580 B.C. as a result of these radical reforms, but his reforms 
remained the basis of the Athenian state from then on. At any rate, there is no 
question that Solon attempted to make Athens a more democratic state while he 
was in power, and the Athenians enjoyed comparative peace for the next two 
decades. 
The next major political upheaval was caused by a friend of Solon, 
Peisistratus, who was also a war hero for leading his men to capture Nisaea in 
the wars with the Megarians. Being a native of Brauron, which is in eastern 
Attica and is separated from the city of Athens by hills, he became the leader of 
the party of "the men from beyond the hills." His party was in a power struggle 
with two other parties, one representing "the men of the plains" and the other 
representing "the men of the shore."35 
It appears that the people "from beyond the hills" or of the outlying plains 
were not totally satisfied with the reforms introduced by Solon. The regional 
rivalries, compounded by economic inequalities, seem to have generated the 
political struggles led by the personally ambitious heads of different groups for 
ultimate power. What exactly these separate parties wanted is still debated 
among scholars.36 
In 561 or 560 B.C., Peisistratus moved first. He led his followers "from 
beyond the hills" to Athens; occupied the Acropolis, the seat of political power 
and the home of the kings, by force; and installed himself as tyrant. His rivals 
rallied, and he was driven out of Athens after a few months. Within five years, 
he tried again at tyranny, but his second attempt to power, too, failed. 
Thereupon, he withdrew from Attica and settled in Thrace to prepare for his next 
move. It took him almost ten years to raise necessary funds, organize a well- 
supported army, and hire mercenaries. In 546 B.C., he brought down his army 
to Athens, captured the Acropolis without much bloodshed, and established 
lasting tyranny in Athens. 
According Jean Hatzfeld, the term "tyranny" by which the reign of 
Peisistratus and his sons had been identified 
...carried no implication of arbitrary or oppressive rule but simply meant 
that power was wielded by one man, not according to principles of divine 
right and heredity as had been the case with the old monarchy, but 
based on personal prestige, the favour of the lower orders, and a strong 
military organisation.37 
Peisistratus, who had support from the rising non-aristocratic class of the 
wealthy and the increasing city population of merchants and artisans besides 
his own men "from beyond the hills," did not abolish Solon’s laws and 
constitution. He followed the economic policy introduced by Solon by 
promoting agricultural productivity and commercial activities both at home and 
abroad through his friendly and expansive foreign policy. 
He brought some decisive changes for the future of Athens, such as the 
introduction of uniform taxation, the building of temples, and the fostering of 
national festivals. The Athenians seem to have enjoyed peace and prosperity 
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through his despotic implementation of the Solonian constitution. Throughout 
his reign, his extraordinary powers were confirmed without murmur from either 
the Council of Areopagus or the Assembly of the People, and he was able to 
place his friends and relatives among the Nine Archons each year in order to 
maintain his political power. 
His policies brought the people of Attica toward a more perfect union. 
After his death in around 527 B.C., his two sons, Hipparchus and Hippias, 
carried on his established order for more than fifteen years. However, they 
were unable to handle the two problems troubling them almost simultaneously 
during the reign. One was the mounting Persian military threat in the Aegean: 
the other was the old enmity of the exiled aristocrats often supported by anti- 
Athenian Greek states. Suspicions, plots, and counterplots ensued among the 
powerful aristocrats both in and out of Athens after the death of Peisistratus. 
The tyranny ended with the assassination of Hipparchus in 514 B.C. and the 
expulsion of Hippias in 510 B.C. 
After a short period of civil war, the Athenians saw the rise of Cleisthenes 
as the most powerful political figure in the state in 508 B.C. Though an 
aristocrat himself, Cleisthenes was for more democracy and against both 
tyranny and oligarchy. His most important contribution was the administrative 
reorganization of Attica into the demes which he grouped together into ten 
tribes or phylaie. Each tribe was composed of three sections of territory, one- 
third city dwellers, one-third inhabitants of the coastal regions, and one-third 
peasants living in the interior. In this way, every Athenian now belonged only to 
the deme where he was domiciled and to the tribe to which the deme belonged. 
Four objectives for the reorganization were: first, to make each phylae 
comparatively equal in population; second, to make each phylae to a great 
extent equal in geographical representation of the people; third, to make 
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possible a more equal distribution of civic burdens, such as military service, 
among all ten phylaie; and fourth, to do away with the regional spirit that had 
made the powerful regional aristocrats conspire for their regional supremacy 
and their prejudicial laws.38 
His next contribution to Athenian democracy was the introduction of the 
Council of Five Hundred, drawing fifty men of thirty years of age or above from 
each of the ten tribes. They were chosen by lot to serve in the Council for a year 
or, at most, two annual terms. How this Council actually functioned, with those 
who had no particular administrative talent or training serving such short terms, 
is questionable. It was not the supreme decision-making body. Its primary 
function was to prepare laws and decrees to be ratified by the Assembly of the 
People, which was now given the real legislative power. This whole system, 
though very complex and confusing, obviously worked somehow and gave a 
greater number of Athenian citizens a political education and experience.39 
Another measure introduced by Cleisthenes to protect his scheme of 
democracy from tyranny and oligarchy was that of the law of ostracism. By this 
law, individuals with excessive political power, so judged by the Assembly, 
were sent into exile for ten years without losing either their citizenship or their 
property.40 Through these new devices, the progress for more democracy for 
Athens was positively made under Cleisthenes over Solon's constitutional 
reforms of a century earlier. Yet, it must be remembered that the most powerful 
civil and military offices of the state were still reserved for the members of the 
most powerful and old aristocratic families. Though their social prestige, 
political power and wealth, too, were reduced somewhat over the many 
decades since Solon, the Athenian aristocracy did not fade away from the 
political stage. They kept their social and political inheritance with pride and 
asserted themselves whenever they had a chance, as we shall see in more 
detail in this chapter. 
With the beginning of all-out Persian expeditions against Greek states, 
the history of Athens cannot be separated from the general history of Greece. 
Two of the most powerful Greek states, Athens and Sparta, came together with 
their allied states and were successful in defending not only their own city- 
states, but the whole of Greece from the two Persian assaults between 492 and 
479 B.C. 
The Greek land force under the Spartan command and the naval force 
under the Athenian command, the allied Greek states successfully destroyed 
the Persian forces both on land and sea. Once the "barbarians" were repulsed, 
intrastate jealousies and competition for dominant leadership positions for the 
whole of Greece ensued. In spite of the heroic and brilliant roles the Athenians 
played in the GrecoPersian wars, Athens was not free from domestic power 
struggles among its leading political leaders. Two of its most outstanding 
wartime heroes, Themistocles and Cimon, were ostracized from their ruling 
posts, and one of their political rivals, Ephialtes, who took Cimon's seat, was 
murdered.41 
Having played an important role with her navy in the wars with Persia, 
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Athens proposed an all-Greek defense alliance composed of the coastal cities 
in the Aegean under her leadership. The proposal was accepted, the Delian 
League was organized in 478/7 B.C., and an empire was born. The Athenian 
hegemony over the member states was absolute, and the Athenian leaders 
demanded and received almost absolute loyalty from them, as well as funds 
which the member states paid as their membership obligation. The funds so 
collected were used to enlarge and strengthen the Athenian navy, to expand 
the Athenian sphere of dominance by military conquest if necessary, and to 
provide the Athenians with more jobs and markets abroad. 
The Athenian empire was spectacular in power, wealth, cultural 
splendor, and arrogance, especially under Pericles between 461 and 429 B C 
Its domestic policy gave Athenians more democracy than ever before, but its 
policy toward the member states of the Delian League and other Greek states 
and neighboring nations was imperialistic and ruthlessly exploitative. Its 
tyrannical foreign policy, which humiliated and threatened the security and 
independence of many, later drew the accumulated wrath not only of the 
member states of the Delian League, but also of other Greek states, especially 
Sparta and its allies, and caused its own downfall in 404 B.C. 
To be more specific, soon after the Persian War, the wartime alliance 
between Athens and Sparta dissolved, and armed conflicts between the two 
and their allies became frequent and massive, starting around 460 B.C. The 
First Peloponnesian War, which broke out that year, dragged on without any 
decisive result to either camp for almost fifteen years. The intensity of the war 
mounted radically when the treasury of the Delian League was transferred from 
the island of Delos to Athens in 454/3 B.C. Pericles, who took over the Athenian 
leadership after the death of his friend Ephialtes and the ostracism of their 
political rival Cimon in 461 B.C., proposed a truce and the Thirty Years' Peace 
was agreed upon by the contending parties, thus ending the first round of war in 
445 B.C. 
Between 445 and 431 B.C., the Athenians were left in relative peace at 
home, enjoying unprecedented prosperity and a sense of cultural superiority 
having made the city of Athens the cultural center of the world with 
mathematicians, astronomers, philosophers, poets, architects, sculptors, and 
painters of their own and from abroad. 
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In spite of the Thirty Years' Peace, the Athenian interference with the city- 
state of Corinth and its colony Corcyra resulted in the outbreak of the Second 
Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. The Spartans with their allies began their 
almost annual invasion of Attica by land, devastating the crops and forcing the 
people to flee from their homes for safety. In retaliation, Athens ravaged the 
Peloponnesian coast with her fleet, also annually, and cut off Spartan 
commerce. 
This second round of fratricidal war, too, dragged on inconclusively for 
almost ten years until 421 B.C., when the Peace of Nicias for fifty years was 
agreed on. But fighting recommenced within three years, and continued on and 
off for another fourteen years, during which the Athenians lost the mighty fleet, 
which had been the source and guardian of their imperial splendor, and the 
empire itself in 404 B.C. 
During this seemingly endless war, the Athenians experienced joy when 
their men won and grief when they lost in countless battles on land and sea. 
They saw great military leaders rise and perish with their men. They despaired 
when the ill-conceived and ill-fated expeditions, one to Egypt between 459 and 
454 B.C. and another to Sicily between 415 and 413 B.C., ended in total 
disaster. Although the city of Athens was spared from the direct blow of the war, 
in early summer of 430 B.C., soon after the Peloponnesians began their all-out 
attack on Attica, a deadly plague broke out in the city, killing terrified people by 
the thousands, including one-third of Athens' first-line troops and Pericles, the 
Athenians' most illustrious leader, whom they could not afford to lose at such a 
critical time.42 
Even after the death of Pericles, democracy was kept in the hands of the 
leaders, though their vision of democracy and dedication to it were of uncertain 
quality. In conducting the war, the Athenians were cruel and savage, lacking 
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even elementary human compassion towards their armed and unarmed 
opponents, as Thucydides so graphically reported.** In spite of their efforts, the 
empire began to dissolve rapidly, as more and more League members 
defected. They were winning some, but losing gradually more battles until the 
humiliating end had to be arranged in 404 B.C. 
By the terms of the peace of 404 B.C., the Delian League was dissolved, 
and the Athenians were ordered to pull down the walls and forts which had 
protected the city all these years and to acknowledge the leadership of Sparta 
on land and sea in the Greek world. With the end of the war, the Athenians lost 
their democracy, too, for a brief time as the Rule of the Thirty put them under a 
reign of terror; however, they regained democracy the following year. 
Although the major contest between Athens and Sparta was now over, 
the weakened city-states, including Athens, continued to war among 
themselves until all of them fell easy prey to the Macedonian invaders in 338 
B.C. 
Socrates was born in 470/69 B.C., about nine years after the end of the 
Persian War. During the first forty years of his life, he witnessed the 
transformation of Athens from a city-state to an empire and saw the rise of 
literary and artistic achievements, as well as material prosperity, especially 
during the reign of Pericles. Many of classical Greece's eminent intellectuals, 
with whom Pericles surrounded himself, were Socrates' contemporaries, and 
he knew many of them in person. Without any doubt, the intellectual 
atmosphere in the time of Cimon and Pericles had provided abundant stimuli for 
the development of Socrates as a thinker of unique dimension and depth. 
At thirty, Socrates was already an independent thinker, having acquired 
full knowledge of the science of the age and also full mastery of its humanistic 
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culture. Among his circle of friends or associates were many important political 
and intellectual luminaries of his generation and the future.44 
When he was about forty, the Peloponnesian War broke out, and he was 
away from the city of Athens, serving the state as a hopliti, a fully armed 
infantryman, once in 432 B.C., and again in 424 B.C. He performed his share of 
civic responsibilities conscientiously whenever he was given the chance to 
make the Athenian democracy work, but he did not take an active part in 
politics. However, in 406 B.C., he tried to overturn the unjust conviction of the 
commanders impeached after the sea battle at Arginusae, and in 404 B.C. he 
disobeyed an order from the Thirty to arrest a certain Leon of Salamis, who had 
been unjustly selected for proscription. Throughout his life, Socrates remained 
a good, law-abiding citizen. This does not mean, however, that he was content 
with the way his beloved state was evolving. 
Athens’ endless experimentation with various forms of government 
following the time of Solon, the endless feuding among political parties within 
the state and equally endless warring with other states both Greek and foreign, 
must have disturbed Socrates profoundly. In his view, the quality of Athenian 
life was far below what it could be, and for the love of his state and the 
Athenians he wanted to render his best service to raise it to its attainable 
excellence by committing his life to teaching and seeking the highest moral 
values which, he firmly believed, would surely bring positive results. For 
Socrates, the dedication of his life to teaching did not owe to his love of it as a 
profession, but rather it was a divine call45 
His pedagogical mission by the method of questions and answering 
which compelled men to think was deeply affecting, and the state of Athens 
clearly felt its existing socio-political order threatened. Socrates was convicted 
and sentenced to death primarily for "corrupting the youth of Athens." He died 
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for his mission, teaching to the last moment of his life in 339 B.C. Plato 
recorded the words of Socrates in the Apology to show us how seriously 
Socrates took his vocation. 
Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather 
than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up 
philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of 
you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: "Most excellent 
man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the 
most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the 
acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither 
care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your 
soul?" And if any of you argue the point, and says he does care, I shall 
not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and 
examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess 
virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that 
are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I 
shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but 
most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me... If 
by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; 
but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is 
untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells 
you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change 
my conduct even if I am to die many times over. (29 D - 30 B: Fowler) 
In the age of so many self-serving teachers of wisdom, the sophists, Socrates 
wanted to be the true and the best teacher, and he paid with his life for that 
commitment. 
Plato, the most important heir to the spirit and philosophy of Socrates, 
was born in 427 B.C. of great aristocratic families, prominent in Athenian politics 
for many decades. According to his Seventh Epistle, he was interested in 
political affairs from his earliest youth and seriously wished a political career. In 
404 B.C., when he was twenty-three or four years of age, his first political 
opportunity came with the reign of the Thirty, in which two of his relatives, 
Charmides and Critias, were involved. He was actually invited by them, but 
declined, shocked at their terrifying excesses and ruthless despotism. With the 
return of democracy in the following year, Plato's political ambition revived, but 
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he abandoned it totally when his revered teacher Socrates was tried and put to 
death by the reigning democrats. These events might have caused him to turn 
to question, as Socrates had done all along, what "justice" really was. After the 
execution of Socrates, Plato committed himself to two important tasks as his 
lifetime mission. One was to preserve the teachings of Socrates in writing, and 
the other was to develop his own philosophy, in accordance with the spirit and 
teachings of his mentor, also in writing for posterity. 
Socrates and Plato were among the most brilliant and broadly cultivated 
minds the classical Greek world has ever had, and they were responsible for 
initiating a new approach to human problems by designating the moral 
education of man as the key to their solution. Having lost faith in varied forms of 
government, which were supported and run by ambitious and determined but 
morally blind men, both Socrates and Plato concluded that as long as the 
people in ruling positions remained ignorant of the fundamental knowledge of 
"justice," the universal and immutable moral principle, there could be no just 
and happy state. The question raised by Socrates and Plato was simple and 
fundamental: How could a just way of life be achieved by those who had no 
clear conception of what justice is? 
From Homeric times, the Athenian youth had received their values and 
education through association with the elders in their family. In the course of 
this association, a certain set of moral qualities for good citizenship were 
transmitted orally and by imitative practices. This method of education was first 
challenged by Socrates, who questioned repeatedly whether or not fathers and 
elders could, indeed, transmit moral qualities to the young.46 Plato, then, 
intensified the challenge by establishing an academy of his own to do the work 
of moral training more systematically with a curriculum assisted by a well- 
defined pedagogical method. 
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Plato carried out his share of the mission started by Socrates to the end 
of his life, teaching at his Academy and constructing in writing his system of 
moral education, which, he believed, would almost automatically result in an 
ideal and just republic. 
In summary 
It is interesting to note that the two distinctly different groups of people, 
one in China and the other in Greece, separated by thousands of miles from 
each other and isolated by forbidding natural barriers, began to move from their 
original habitats to better places for permanent settlement at just about the 
same time some three thousand years ago, and eventually produced two of the 
most enduring civilizations in the history of mankind. 
In 1027 B.C., the Chou Chinese conquered the Shang King in the 
Central Plain, moving eastward from their northwest homeland and founded 
their own kingdom. The new kingdom was then divided up by the kings and 
given to their relatives and powerful supporters of their dynasty to lord over and 
rule their city-state like domains for the Chou. For the approximately 250 years, 
known as the Western Chou Period (1027-771 B.C.), the kingdom is recorded to 
have enjoyed unity, peace, and prosperity among its people under the 
enlightened ruler of moral excellence. 
In 771 B.C., the reigning king and his government were found internally 
corrupt and incapable of commanding loyal services from the feudal lords to 
protect the kingdom from foreign invaders. A military alliance of powerful lords 
forced the king to relocate his capitol, and he and his successors were allowed 
to keep the royal title and perform their ceremonial duties that only the members 
of the Chou house could perform, but without political power. The unifying and 
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controlling authority of the royal government being gone, Chou China became a 
battleground among the feudal lords. For the next 500 years known as the 
Eastern Chou Period (771-221 B.C.), each fought for his own survival, glory, 
and power, under the pretenses of restoring unity, peace, and prosperity to the 
kingdom. 
In the Greek world, the builders of the future Athenian empire, the Ionian 
Greeks, began to move from the north into Attica around 1023 B.C., absorbing 
the native Greeks of Attica in numerous villages and towns scattered in three or 
four plains separated by hills into the state of Athens under the kings whose 
government was in the city of Athens. The city-state Athens with Attica as its 
territory, was huge and fated to have problems in claiming its sovereignty over 
the whole of Attica. 
Unlike the China of the Western Chou Period, the Archaic Period in 
Greek history (1000-687 B.C.) is filled with reports of endless politico-economic 
conflicts and wars between the native Greeks in different regions of Attica and 
the ruling Athenians. Although a few legendary kings are said to have 
succeeded in uniting all Greeks, the unifications lasted only for very short spans 
of time. 
Beginning in the year 632 B.C., some powerful aristocrats representing 
various regional interest groups began to challenge and even rebel against the 
established order of the state. To preserve the city-state of Athens, a train of 
innovative and determined leaders rose to experiment with one new form of 
government after another, including democracy. But none of them satisfied all 
parties. While the domestic factionalism was becoming increasingly vicious 
and bloody, with plots and counterplots, the mighty Persians invaded the 
mainland of Greece in two great waves between 492 and 479 B.C. All Greek 
states joined in a united effort to repel the invaders and their effort was 
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successful. But the victory over the Persians made two of the mightiest 
defenders of Greece, the Athenians and the Spartans, arrogant, 
uncompromising, and aggressive empire builders after the war and their old 
rivalry erupted again in 431 B.C. The costly and tragic Peloponnesian wars 
continued for almost thirty years and by 404 B.C., the great Athenian empire 
was no more. 
The ancient Greece of the fifth century B.C. was just like the China of the 
fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The people and their leaders alike would have 
found themselves in a hopelessly messed up situation, not knowing exactly 
what was happening, what they were doing or ought to be doing. It was during 
these two centuries that a great many reform-minded philosophers of enormous 
importance made their appearance both in China and Athens. The most 
prominent of them all, whose ideas are still refreshing and inspiring to this day, 
lived and taught during these centuries: Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius 
(372-289 B.C.) in China, and Socrates (470-399 B.C.) and Plato (427-347 B.C.) 
in Athens. Amazingly, both groups of thinkers concluded that the moral 
education of future rulers was the only way to make the world an orderly, 
humane, and happy place for human beings. And they all became teachers, 
not only in their own times, but ever since to this day. 
28 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF MAN 
In the Four Books 
The opening sentence of the Doctrine of the Mean declares that "What 
Heaven has conferred is called nature or sheng (')•£)." (I. i: Legge) When 
Kao Tzu said to Mencius that "Appetite for food and sex is nature," Mencius 
agreed with him. He said: "For the mouth to desire sweet tastes, the eye to 
desire beautiful colours, the ear to desire pleasant sounds, the nose to desire 
fragrant odours, and the four limbs to desire ease and rest - these are natural." 
(M: VII. B. 24: Legge) Confucius, too, noted man’s powerful sexual instinct as 
natural.1 Both Confucius and Mencius acknowledged not only the desires of 
man’s sensual appetites as natural, but also the expectation of a reward of "joy" 
or "ease," when man fulfills his desires. 
They assert, however, that man is not born for the joy and ease that 
comes from the fulfillment of the appetitive desires in his nature alone, but to 
enjoy the supreme "joy” or "ease" that rewards man in fully exercising his mind, 
which is innately jen (<x) according to Confucius and jen-yi 
according to Mencius.2 Mencius said: 
A man cares about all parts of his body without discrimination, and so he 
nurtures all parts equally. There is not a square inch of skin that he does 
not care about, and so he tends all of his skin equally... But he who gives 
preferential treatment to the lesser parts of the body becomes a lesser 
man. He who gives preferential treatment to the great parts becomes a 
greater man... Man despises one who lives only to eat and drink, 
because he develops the lesser function of his body and neglects the 
greater. (M: VI. A. 14: Dobson) 
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The classical Confucians held the view that both man and animals are 
endowed with functionally identical senses and organs for the survival and 
preservation of their species, and the "difference between a man and an animal 
is slight." (M: IV. B. 19: Legge) What distinguishes man from animals is his 
mind {hsin/\s) that thinks {ssu $L) and is inherently good. Mencius said: 
The organs of hearing and seeing cannot think and can be misled by 
external things... To the mind belongs the function of thinking. By 
thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do 
this. And the organs and the mind are what Heaven has given to us. (M: 
VI. A. 15: Legge alt.) 
The mind, which is innately good and which every human being comes with at 
birth, is further explained by Mencius as follows. 
It is of the essence of man's nature that he do good. That is what I mean 
by good. If a man does what is evil he is guilty of the sin of denying his 
natural endowment. Every man has a sense of pity, a sense of shame, a 
sense of respect, a sense of right and wrong. From his sense of pity 
comes i£H (Humanity^); from his sense of shame comes yi (Justice 
'j^)\ from his sense of respect, li (the observance of rites^); from 
ms sense of right and wrong, chih (Wisdom ). Jsn, yi, li, and chih do 
not soak in from without; we have them within ourselves. It is simply that 
we are not always consciously thinking about them. So I say, "Seek 
them and you have them. Disregard them and you lose them." Men 
differ, some by twice, some by five times, and some by an incalculable 
amount, in their ability to exploit this endowment. (M: VI. A. 6: Dobson) 
To prove the innate goodness of the human mind, Mencius said: 
It is a feeling common to all mankind that they cannot bear to see others 
suffer... I say that all men have such feelings because, on seeing a child 
about to fall into a well, everyone has a feeling of horror and distress... 
Not to feel distress would be contrary to all human feelings. Just as not to 
feel shame and disgrace and not to defer to others and not to have a 
sense of right and wrong are contrary to all human feeling. This feeling 
of distress is the first sign of Humanity, ien. This feeling of shame and 
disgrace is the first sign of Justice, yi. This feeling of deference to others 
is the first sign of Propriety, \\. This sense of right and wrong is the first 
sign of Wisdom, £hih. Men have these four innate feelings just as they 
have four limbs... Since all have these four capacities within themselves, 
they should know how to develop and to fulfill them. They are like a fire 
about to burst into flame, or spring about to gush forth from the ground. 
(M: II. A: Dobson) 
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Lau’s translation of the same passages makes Mencius' points even clearer. 
No man is devoid of a heart Oisin *&) sensitive to the sufferinq of 
others... My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart sensitive 
to the suffering of others is this. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden to 
see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainiv 
be moved to compassion... From this it can be seen that whoever is 
devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the 
heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy 
and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right 
and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of 
benevolence, jsn; the heart of shame, of dutifulness, yi; the heart of 
courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites, Ji; the heart of right and 
wrong, of wisdom, chih. Man has these four germs just as he has four 
limbs. For a man possessing these four germs to deny his own 
potentialities is for him to cripple himself... If a man is able to develop all 
these four germs that he possesses, it will be like a fire starting up or a 
spring coming through.3 
The term hsin (/u'), which I translate as "mind," is rendered by others 
as "feelings" (Legge and Dobson) and as "heart" (Lau). The term was used in 
early China to denote many things, including "intentions," "feelings," "the 
location of the desires, cognitive activity, evaluative activity," and also referred to 
"tendencies" or "potential behavior."4 
When Mencius spoke about the four "minds" or "feelings" inherent in all 
men in the passages quoted above, he was speaking of two essentially different 
sets of things. Jen-mind, which "cannot bear to see others suffer" or is 
"compassionate," and //-mind, which is courteous, modest, and proper in 
conduct, describe the mind's innate moral qualities. The remaining two, namely 
y/-mind, which is capable of feeling "shame and dislike" based on man's innate 
sense of yi (Justice) and can take action as man's innate moral nature dictates, 
and c/7/77-mind, which evaluates and discriminates between right and wrong, 
together make up the evaluating function of the mind. 
The four "minds" are not, therefore, separable from each other, for they 
are only four parts or aspects of each man's single mind. Man's unique mind - 
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which is yen, meaning "humanhearted," "benevolent," "compassionate," 
"commiserate"; and //, meaning "proper," "moderate," "courteous in conduct" in 
quality - can fully express itself if the mind’s yi and chih elements, which 
discriminate and evaluate, are there to guide it. The possession of this four- 
elemented mind is what makes man different from other creatures, according to 
Mencius. 
Besides man's appetitive instincts of the senses and his inherently alert 
and virtuous mind, Mencius introduces yet a third element as also innately 
present in man's nature. He calls is "hao jan chih chT 
This phrase is translated variously as "vast passion-nature or spirit" (Legge), 
"the flood-like chT (Lau), and "greater physical vigor" (Dobson). The word ch'i 
(®/) alone means "air," "temper," "breath," "steam," "force," "lifegiving 
principle," or "energy."5 I would render it as an "expansive energy." 
According to Mencius, it is this "expansive energy" in man's nature that 
carries out what the mind has decided. It is a kind of energy which, if untamed, 
can be destructive to man's moral well-being, but if nourished and guided by 
the jen-yi mind as naturally as the trees of the Niu mountains,6 it will assuredly 
make man achieve his moral excellence. Mencius said: 
The mind gives order to the chi and the ch!i is that which fills our 
physical frame. The mind is in charge, the ctQ its subordinate. For this 
reason I say, 'He who has firm grip in his mind should do no harm to his 
ch'i.' I am adept in the cultivation of the hao ian chih ch'i. (M: II. A. 2. ix) 
When asked what he meant by the hao jan chih ch'i, Mencius said: 
It is difficult to explain. This is a ctQ which is, in the highest degree, vast 
and unyielding. Nourish it with integrity and place no obstacle in its path 
and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth. It is a ctQ which 
unites rightness and the Way. Deprive it of these falls below the standard 
set in one's mind, it will collapse... You must work at it and never let it out 
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of your mind. At the same time, while you must never let it out of vour 
mind, you must not forcibly help it grow either. (M: II. A. 2. xii-xvi: Lau) 
Although Confucius implicitly and Mencius explicitly agree that all men 
are equally endowed with the jen-yi mind or moral tendencies in their nature, 
they both note that not all men are equally successful in nourishing them to their 
fullest manifestation in actual life. Confucius said, "By nature men are nearly 
alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart." (A: XVII. 2: Legge) Mencius said, 
"Jen, yi, //, and chih are not infused into us from without. We are certainly 
furnished with them... Men differ, some by twice, some by five times, and some 
by an incalculable amount, in their ability to exploit this endowment." (M: VI. A. 
6: Legge & Dobson) 
Moreover, Confucius had something more to say about the varied 
capacity in individuals in cultivating the moral seed to its fullest fruition as 
follows. He said, 
Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest 
class of men. Those who learn, and so, readily, get possession of 
knowledge, are the next. Those who are dull and stupid, and yet 
compass the learning, are another class next to these. As to those who 
are dull and stupid and yet do not learn - they are the lowest of the 
people. (A: xvi. 9: Legge) 
Mencius pointed out that some are great and some are mediocre in 
achieving moral excellence by their own choice. 
Kung-tu said, "All are equally men, but some are great men, and some 
are little men; how is this?" Mencius replied, "Those who follow that part 
of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part 
which is little are little men." (M: VI. A. 15: Legge) 
The meaning of this statement is clear. The man who takes care of his innately 
moral mind to its fullest natural growth is the great man. 
It is interesting to note that Hsun Tzu (born ca. 312 B.C.), the most 
prominent Confucian thinker of the third century B.C., differed with Mencius by 
asserting that the nature of man is evil. He devoted an entire chapter entitled 
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"Man's Evil Nature" to prove his point. At any rate, he, too, like Confucius and 
Mencius, put his faith in education which alone can transform man’s evil nature 
to a moral nature. The following excerpts from the chapter represent his view. 
Man's nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity The 
nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness for profit. If he 
indulges this fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife and all 
sense of courtesy and humility will disappear. 
He is born with the feelings of envy and hate, and if he indulges 
these, they will lead him into violence and crime, and all sense of loyalty 
and good faith with disappear. 
Man is born with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a fondness for 
beautiful sights and sounds. If he indulges these, they will lead him into 
license and wantonness, and all ritual principles and correct forms will be 
lost. 
Hence, any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions 
will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strife, will violate the 
forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal. 
Therefore, man must first be transformed by the instruction of a 
teacher and guided by ritual principles, and only then will he be able to 
observe the dictates of courtesy and humility, obey the forms and rules of 
society, and achieve order. It is obvious from this, then, that man's nature 
is evil, and that his goodness is the result of conscious activity.7 
Mencius states that man is capable of learning because his nature is 
good, but I say that this is wrong. It indicates that he has not really 
understood man's nature nor distinguished properly between the basic 
nature and conscious activity. 
The nature is that which is given by Heaven; you cannot learn it, you 
cannot acquire it by effort. Ritual principles, on the other hand, are 
created by sages; you can learn to apply them, you can work to bring 
them to completion. That part of man which cannot be learned or 
acquired by effort is called the nature; that part of him which can be 
acquired by learning and brought to completion by effort is called 
conscious activity. This is the difference between nature and conscious 
activity.8 
The man in the street can become a Yu. What does this mean? 
What made the sage emperor Yu a Yu, I would reply, was the fact that he 
practiced benevolence and righteousness and abided by the proper 
rules and standards. If this is so, then benevolence, righteousness, and 
proper standards must be based upon principles which can be known 
and practiced. Any man in the street has the essential faculties needed 
to understand benevolence, righteousness, and proper standards, and 
the potential ability to put them into practice. Therefore, it is clear that he 
can become a Yu. 
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If the man in the street applies himself to training and study, 
concentrates his mind and will, and considers and examines thinas 
carefully, continuing his efforts over a long period of time and 
accumulating good acts without stop, then he can achieve a godlike 
understanding and form a triad with Heaven and earth. The sage is a 
man who has arrived where he has through the accumulation of qood 
acts.9 
Whether or not man's nature is innately good or evil as disputed among the 
classical Confucians, they all agreed that his nature could be guided to attain its 
moral excellence. 
They also agreed on the importance of the socio-political, economic, and 
cultural environment and conditions for the proper education of man. Mencius 
was particularly aware of the vulnerability of man's nature to negative 
circumstantial conditions, especially economic hardship. He said: 
In good years the children of the people are most of them good, while in 
bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to 
any difference of their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are 
thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances through 
which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in evil. (M: VI. 
A. 7: Legge) 
To the hungry all food is sweet; to the thirsty all water is sweet. Such 
cannot judge when food and drink is as it should be. Their hunger and 
thirst blunt their palate. And it is not surely only the mouth and belly that 
are affected by hunger and thirst; they affect the minds of men. (M: VII. A. 
27: Dobson) 
Hsun Tzu concluded the chapter on "Man's Evil Nature" with the following 
words. 
...a man, no matter how fine his nature or how keen his mind, must seek a 
worthy teacher to study under and good companions to associate with. If 
he studies under a worthy teacher, he will be able to hear about the ways 
of Yao, Shun, Yu, and T’ang, and if he associates with good companions, 
he will be able to observe conduct that is loyal and respectful. Then, 
although he is not aware of it, he will day by day progress in the practice 
of benevolence and righteousness, for the environment he is subjected 
to will cause him to progress. But if a man associates with men who are 
not good, then he will hear only deceit and lies and will see only conduct 
that is marked by wantonness, evil, and greed. Then, although he is not 
aware of it, he himself will soon be in danger of severe punishment for 
the environment he is subjected to will cause him to be in danger. An old 
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text says, "If you do not know a man, look at his friends; if you do not 
know a ruler, look at his attendants." Environment is the important thina' 
Environment is the important thing!™ K y 
As to the question of why some men are incapable of becoming moral, 
the classical Confucians imply that some men are outside of the tenet that all 
men can be brought to follow the right and moral way through training and the 
examples set by the sages.11 Although some passages in the Four Bonks 
cause us to question the Confucians as to why men come with different degrees 
of will and why Heaven produces inferior and superior men, despite their 
consistent assertion of the natural goodness of all men and "all are equally 
men," there is no clear answer given by either Confucius or Mencius, except the 
explanations that only a lack of will and adverse circumstances can be the 
causes for the wrong way taken by many.12 
In the Dialogues 
In Plato's view, man shares with other animals both the appetitive and 
spirited parts of his nature, but he is different from other animals in one respect: 
he possesses the philosophic or calculating part which enables him to reason. 
In the creation myth in the Timaeus. Plato alludes that the human race 
was created by the Demiurge, who was "Good" and desired "that all things 
should come as near as possible to being like himself." (29 E: Cornford) The 
Demiurge further thought that: 
Among things that are by nature visible, no work that is without 
intelligence will ever be better than one that has intelligence, when each 
is taken as a whole, and moreover that intelligence cannot be present in 
anything apart from soul. In virtue of this reasoning, when he framed the 
universe, he fashioned reason within soul and soul within body, to the 
end that the work he accomplished might be by nature as excellent and 
perfect as possible. This, then, is how we must say, according to the 
likely account, that this world came to be, by the god’s providence, in very 
truth a living creature with soul and reason. (30B: Cornford) 
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In the same dialogue, Plato also points out that at the creation all souls were 
equal in quality, having been created with the same ingredients, but that since 
then there has been a steady evolution in the qualities of the souls into three 
classes - gold, silver," and "brass," thus implying that, though all men were 
created by the same god identically with the same ingredients and methods, the 
original men's descendants are no longer equal in the quality of their souls. In 
fact, he even suggested that the immoral men were created by the lesser 
gods.13 
Plato explains the "appetitive" element of the soul as that part "with which 
it feels hunger and thirst and is distracted by sexual passion and all the other 
desires, we will call irrational, associated with pleasure in the replenishment of 
certain wants." (R: IV. 439: Cornford) Explaining this element further, Plato 
said: 
[This element was] so multifarious that we could find no single 
appropriate name; we called it after its chief and most powerful 
characteristic, "appetite," because of the intensity of all the appetites 
connected with eating and drinking and sex and so on. We also called it 
money-loving, because money is the principal means of satisfying 
desires of this kind. Gain is the source of its pleasures and the object of 
its affection; so "money-loving" or "gain-loving" might be the best single 
expression to sum up the nature of this part of the soul for the purpose of 
our discussion. (R: 580 E - 581 A: Cornford) 
This element in the soul is so powerful that, if uncontrolled, it easily 
deprives a man of his humanness. "The appetites, which form the greater part 
of each man’s soul and are by nature insatiably covetous," therefore, must be 
watched by the other two parts of the soul, 
...lest this part, by battening on the pleasures that are called bodily, 
should grow so great and powerful that it will no longer keep to its own 
work, but will try to enslave the others and usurp a dominion to which it 
has no right, thus turning the whole of life upside down. (R: 422 A - B: 
Cornford) 
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In Plato s view, there are desires or appetites which are necessary and 
good, and desires or appetites which are unnecessary and bad. He defines the 
necessary and the unnecessary appetites in the following passages. 
There are appetites which cannot be got rid of, and there are also those 
which it does us good to fulfill. Our nature cannot help seeking to satisfy 
both these kinds, so they rnay fairly be described as necessary. On the 
other hand, "unnecessary" would be the right name for all appetites 
which can be got rid of by early training and which do us no good and in 
some cases do harm. (R: 588 D: Cornford) 
The appetites for food and sex, though important for man's survival and 
the preservation of his species, if fed immoderately as the insatiable appetites 
demand, would become "unnecessary" appetites. In his words: 
The desire to eat enough plain food - just bread and meat - to keep in 
health and good condition may be called necessary. In the case of bread 
the necessity is twofold, since it not only does us good but is 
indispensable to life; whereas meat is only necessary in so far as it helps 
to keep us in good condition. Beyond these simple needs the desire for 
a whole variety of luxuries is unnecessary... Further, these unnecessary 
appetites might be called expensive, whereas the necessary ones are 
rather profitable, as helping a man to do his work. The same distinctions 
could be drawn in the case of sexual appetite and all the rest. (R: 599 A 
- B: Cornford) 
One of the reasons for Plato’s condemnation of democracy is that it has 
limitless tolerance for man's unnecessary appetites in the pursuit of insatiable 
and self-destructive ends. He described the typical young man without much 
moral training, growing up in a democratic state in the following passages of the 
Republic. 
When he is told that some pleasures should be sought and valued as 
arising from desires of a higher order, others chastised and enslaved 
because the desires are base, he will shut the gates of the citadel against 
the messengers of truth, shaking his head and declaring that one 
appetite is as good as another and all must have their equal rights. So 
he spends his days indulging the pleasure of the moment, now 
intoxicated with wine and music, and then taking to a spare diet and 
drinking nothing but water; one day in hard training, the next doing 
nothing at all, the third apparently immersed in study. Every now and 
then he takes a part in politics, leaping to his feet to say or do whatever 
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c°mes into his head. Or he will set out to rival someone he admires a 
sokJier it may be, or, if the fancy takes him, a man of business His life is 
subject to no order or restraint, and he has no wish to change an 
existence which he calls pleasant, free, and happy. 
That well describes the life of one whose motto is liberty and eoualitv 
(R: 561 A - C: Cornford) H y> 
Plato also described how uncontrolled appetites could make men in 
governing positions tyrannical and possessive by taking away from their fellow 
men anything by deceit or force to satisfy their appetites. And the most tyrannic 
will even punish his parents and the state, if they do not offer the things to satisfy 
his appetites. The man who is dominated by the unnecessary appetites is 
necessarily always poverty-ridden and is maddened by desires and loves.14 In 
sum, a man whose unnecessary appetites in his soul are not controlled through 
moral training can be likened to a tyrant, 
...even if he doesn't seem so to someone, in truth a real slave... and with 
his desires getting no kind of satisfaction, he shows that he is most in 
need of the most things and poor in truth, if one knows how to look at a 
soul as a whole. Throughout his entire life he is full of fear, overflowing 
with convulsions and pains. (R: 579 E: Bloom) 
The second part of man's nature or soul is "spirited." This part can make 
man, like a well-bred watchdog, having "quick senses to detect an enemy, 
swiftness in pursuing him, and strength, if they have to fight when they have 
caught him." (R: 375 A: Cornford) Courage has its source in this part of the 
soul, and the "spirited" soul is fearless and invincible. This element is not 
exclusively in man's nature alone, but in other animals' nature also. Plato talks 
about well-bred dogs and horses, too, as possessing this quality in their nature. 
This is the part in every man's soul which is most clearly observable from the 
time of his birth. "For, even in little children, one could see that they are full of 
spirit straight from birth." (R: 411 A: Bloom) 
This element makes man competitive, ambitious, passionate, and loving 
of "victory and honour.Through or from this part of man s nature, anger, 
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too, makes its appearance, waging war against the appetitive part in his nature 
and sometimes against himself for not following the commands of the rational or 
philosophic part of the soul.16 In Plato’s words: 
The savage stems from the spirited part of their nature, which if rightly 
trained, would be courageous; but, if raised to a higher pitch than it ouqht 
to have, would be likely to become cruel and harsh. (R: 410 D: Bloom) 
This is the part of the soul which needs to be controlled so that its quick 
temperament, irritability, crudeness, and cowardice will not dominate one’s life. 
This part of the soul, if uncultivated by certain softening and harmonizing 
influences, makes man a misologist and "he no longer makes any use of 
persuasion by means of speech but goes about everything with force and 
savageness, like a wild beast; and he lives ignorantly and awkwardly without 
rhythm or grace." (R: 411 E: Bloom) 
If a man is driven by this part of the soul alone, the true pleasures of life 
will be lost. Plato wrote: 
Take, again, the satisfaction of the spirited element in our nature. 
Must not that be no less illusory, when a man seeks, at all costs, to gratify 
his ambition by envy, his love of victory by violence, and his ill-temper by 
outbursts of passion, without sense of reason? 
What then? May we boldly assert that all the desires both of the 
gain-loving and of the ambitious part of our nature will win the truest 
pleasures of which they are capable, if they accept the guidance of 
knowledge and reason and pursue only those pleasures which wisdom 
approves? Such pleasures will be true, because truth is their guide, and 
will also be proper to their nature, if it is fact that a thing always finds in 
what is best for it something akin to its real self. (R: 586 C - D: Cornford) 
Plato warned that the "spirited" part of man's nature could be lost 
altogether if he let the part which is "gain-loving" or money-loving invade and 
dominate his soul. He wrote: "Humbled by poverty, he thrusts love of honour 
and spiritedness headlong out of the throne of his soul, he turns greedily to 
money-making," and makes the philosophic and spirited parts the slaves of the 
appetitive part of his soul. This is not difficult to see, according to Plato, for most 
40 
of us are lovers of gain and money.17 But the spirited part, which is "by nature 
an auxiliary to the philosophic part, if it is not corrupted by bad reading," can 
make the whole soul come to the knowledge of the Good and do what the Good 
dictates.18 
The last but the most important part of the soul is "whereby it reflects or 
calculates, therefore, rational." (R: 439 D: Bloom) It possesses within it the 
knowledge of that which is beneficial for each of the three parts and for the 
whole soul. Moreover, it is this part of the soul which desires to know wisdom, 
"not of one part and not another, but of all of it.” (R: 475 B: Bloom) It is this 
element in the soul which cannot only grasp "what is always the same in all 
respects" but also loves to learn of the eternal and unchanging things. The 
philosophic part of the soul is what makes man different from and superior to 
other animals, for it alone can command and guide the other parts of the soul to 
work in harmony and cooperation for the happiness of his existence as an 
individual and as a member of his society. Plato wrote: 
"Then," said I [Socrates], "may we not confidently declare that in both 
the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that 
wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in 
conjunction with them, take only those pleasures which reason approves, 
will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is 
possible for them. 
Then, when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom- 
loving part and is not filled with inner dissension, the result for each part 
is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task and is just, and 
likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best 
pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible, the truest." (R: 586 D - 
587 A: Shorey) 
This is the best and most important part among the three parts that make up the 
human soul and can be ruined if it is not properly taken care of and instructed. 
Although every man has the philosophic part in his soul, Plato thought that not 
all men are able to develop it to its full capacity for the following reasons. 
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Our account of the true lover of knowledge is one born to strive towards 
reality, who cannot linger among the multiplicity of things which men 
believe to be real, but holds on his way with a passion that will not faint or 
fail until he has laid hold upon the essential nature of each thing with that 
part of his soul which can apprehend reality because of its affinity 
therewith; and when he has by that means approached real being and 
entered into union with it, the offspring of this marriage is intelligence and 
truth, so that at least, having found knowledge and true life and 
nourishment, he is at rest from his travail... Nor is there any need to 
prove once more that a whole array of other qualities must go with the 
philosophic nature: you will remember how it entailed courage, 
magnanimity, quickness to learn, and a good memory. (R: 490 B - C- 
Cornford) 
This part is ordained to strive entirely toward knowing the highest 
knowledge which will lead man to his moral excellence; therefore, the other two 
parts of his nature must be made to cooperate with it by sheer determination 
and dedication. Plato was certain that man is capable of making all parts of his 
soul cooperate to make his whole being just and excellent. In the Timaeus. we 
read the following. 
This is not true, for it is to the heavens, whence the soul first came to birth, 
that the divine part attaches the head or root of us and keeps the whole 
body upright. Now if a man is engrossed in appetites and ambitions and 
spends all his pains upon these, all his thoughts must needs be mortal... 
But if his heart has been set on the love of learning and true wisdom and 
he has exercised that part of himself above all, he is surely bound to 
have thoughts immortal and divine... By learning to know the harmonies 
and revolutions of the world, he should bring the intelligent part, 
according to its pristine nature, into the likeness of that which intelligence 
discerns, and thereby win the fulfillment of the best life set by the gods 
before mankind both for this present time and for the time to come. (90 A 
- D: Cornford)19 
Although Plato maintains that all wrongdoing is involuntary, because all 
men will do the good and also no man who knows the right will do wrong, he 
does not ignore the importance of environment for man's education, indicating 
how an unhealthy and decadent socio-cultural environment and economic 
conditions can blind man's philosophic soul and even damage it permanently. 
To Plato, the human nature or soul is something living that requires the right 
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conditions and environment to grow to its expected excellence. The 
meanin9 "rearing,” "nursing," "nourishing," "bringing up," or 
"tending," which Plato uses to express his idea of education, implies it.20 
Having pronounced then the existing socio-political and cultural conditions and 
environment as unsuitable for the nurturing of man's soul, Plato gave himself 
the task of constructing his visionary utopian state, the Republic, which would 
control and create, if necessary by force, the conditions and atmosphere 
suitable for the natural and healthy growth of man's soul, especially its 
philosophic or rational part. In the Goraias. Plato wrote: 
People do say they have made the city great; but that it is with the 
swelling of an imposthume due to those men of the former time, this they 
do not perceive. For with no regard for temperance and justice they have 
stuffed the city with harbours and arsenals and walls and tribute and 
suchlike trash; and so whenever that access of debility comes they will 
lay the blame on the advisers who are with them at the time, and belaud 
Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who caused all the trouble; and 
belike they will lay hold of you, if you are not on your guard, and my good 
friend Alcibiades, when they are losing what they had originally as well 
as what they have acquired, though you are not the authors, except 
perhaps part-authors, of the mischief. And indeed there is a senseless 
thing which I see happening now, and hear of, in connexion with the men 
of former times. For I observe that whenever the state proceeds against 
one of her statesmen as a wrongdoer, they are indignant and protest 
loudly against such monstrous treatment: after all their long and valuable 
services to the state they are unjustly ruined at her hands, so they protest. 
But the whole thing is a lie; since there is not a single case in which a 
ruler of a city could ever be unjustly ruined by the very city that he rules. 
For it is very much the same with pretenders to statesmanship as with 
professors of sophistry. The sophists, in fact, with all their other 
accomplishments, act absurdly in one point: claiming to be teachers of 
virtue, they often accuse their pupils of doing them an injury by cheating 
them of their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good they 
have done them. Now what can be more unreasonable than this plea? 
That men, after they have been made good and just, after all their 
injustice has been rooted out by their teacher and replaced by justice, 
should be unjust through something that they have not! Does not this 
seem to you absurd, my dear friend! (518 E - 519 D: Lamb) 
Plato explains this point more in the Republic. 
Everyone, I think, would agree that a nature with all the qualities we 
required to make the perfect philosopher is a rare growth, seldom seen 
among men Consider, how many grave dangers threaten to destrov 
these few. Strangest of all, every one of those qualities we approved - 
courage, temperance, and all the rest - tends to ruin its possessor and to 
wrest his mind away from philosophy... And, besides this, all the good 
things of like, as they are called, corrupt and distract the soul: beauty 
wealth, strength, powerful connexions, and so forth - ...The matter will be 
clear enough, and what I have just said will not seem so strange, when 
you have grasped the underlying principle. 
We know it to be true of any seed or growing thing, whether plant or 
animal, that if it fails to find its proper nourishment or climate or soil then 
the more vigorous it is, the more it will lack the qualities it should 
possess. Evil is a worse enemy to the good than to the indifferent; so it is 
natural that bad conditions of nurture should be peculiarly uncongenial to 
the finest nature and that it should come off worse under them than 
natures of an insignificant order... 
Is not the same principle true of the mind, Adeimantus: if their early 
training is bad, the most gifted turn out the worst. Great crimes and 
unalloyed wickedness are the outcome of a nature full of generous 
promise, ruined by bad upbringing; no great harm, or great good either, 
will ever come of a slight or feeble disposition... 
Or do you hold the popular belief that, here and there, certain young 
men are demoralized by the private instructions of some individual 
sophist? Does that sort of influence amount to much? Is not the public 
itself the greatest of all sophists, training up young and old, men and 
women alike, into the most accomplished specimens of the character it 
desires to produce? 
Whenever the populace crowds together at any public gathering, in 
the Assembly, the law-courts, the theatre, or the camp, and sits there 
clamouring its approval or disapproval, both alike excessive, of whatever 
is being said or done; booing and clapping till the rocks ring and the 
whole place redoubles the noise of their applause and outcries. In such 
a scene what do you suppose will be a young man's state of mind? What 
sort of private instruction will have given him the strength to hold out 
against the force of such a torrent, or will save him from being swept 
away down the stream, until he accepts all their notions of right and 
wrong, does as they do, and comes to be just such a man as they are? 
(R: 491 B - 492 C: Cornford) 
Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the 
proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, 
but, if it be sown and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the 
outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue. 
(R: 492 A: Shorey) 
There are passages in the dialogues which suggest Plato's assessment 
of men as incapable of ruling themselves21 and his suspicion of an irrational 
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and potentially evil secondary soul 22 but his fundamental faith in man’s power 
to develop his inherently good and philosophic nature in his soul to its highest 
excellence predominates throughout his works. Through a proper training, the 
triumph of man’s philosophic soul over all other human desires and appetites is 
firmly expected by Plato, thus convincing his readers of the definite possibility of 
having the philosopher-kings, who will perform their duties reflecting the 
knowledge of the Good they have acquired. 
In summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the following two questions: 
first, "How did our thinkers of China and Athens understand human nature?" 
and second, "What did they say about man's capacity to learn to be good?" 
To answer the first, both groups agree that man’s nature is comprised of 
three parts: the reasoning, the appetitive, and the spirited, and the reasoning 
part is what distinguishes man from all animals. To the second question, too, 
they agree that man can learn to be good because he is endowed not only with 
the reasoning part that also comprehends, remembers, compares, judges, and 
above all desires for the Good, but also with the seed of goodness or innate 
goodness. For man is of the Good and by the Good. In their view, however, the 
acquisition of full knowledge of the Good is difficult, requiring many years of 
study. Therefore, it is not for everyone. It is for an exceptional few whose power 
of reasoning is far above ordinary men's with the love and determination to 
pursue the Good, and it is they who should be rulers. 
They also agree that the appetitive and the spirited parts are natural and 
indispensable to make man whole, but that they must be guided by the 
reasoning part to be good and human. If these parts are unattended by the 
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reasoning part, man is not much different from other animals. The spirited part, 
if it is in tune with the reasoning part that seeks the Good, provides man with 
energy and courage to do what is good and controls the appetitive part, which is 
the strongest and the most demanding of the three parts of man. Therefore 
although the primary task of education is to help develop man's reasoning mind 
to obtain full knowledge of the Good, it must also help him develop 
simultaneously the other two parts, so that all three parts can function in perfect 
harmony and coordination to make him wholly of the Good or morally excellent. 
Lastly, both groups point out the fragility of man’s nature, which is pliant 
and susceptible especially in man’s infancy and youth to all sorts of influences 
the world presents. Therefore, they emphasize the importance of right 
endowment, right teachers and friends, right courses of study, and right 
methods in the education of man. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AIM OF EDUCATION 
In the Four Books 
The broad aim of the Confucian education system is twofold. One aim is 
to help the student cultivate his innate virtue or jen-yi mind to its fullest and the 
other is to qualify him to serve the people by applying his jen-yi mind so 
cultivated in real life as an official of state. Mencius said: 
J&n is man’s mind and yi is man's path. How lamentable is it to neglect 
the path and not pursue it, to lose the mind and not know to see it again! 
The whole purpose of education is nothing else but to seek for the lost 
mind. (M: VI. A. 11: Legge) 
He further said: 
Now men possess a moral nature, but if they are well fed, warmly clad, 
and comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they 
become almost like the beast. 
These statements indicate that helping man recover his "lost mind," and 
cultivate his mind's innate jen-yi, is one part of the twofold aim of education, and 
the following statements explain the other part.1 Confucius said: "Though a 
man might have learned extensively, if he cannot serve the people, what good 
is his learning?" (A: XIII. 5.: Legge) Tsze Hsia, one of his disciples, agreed 
with him and said: "Having completed his studies, the learner should apply 
himself to be an officer." (A: XIX. 13: Legge) Mencius, after investigating all 
the types of schools known to him in his days, stated that the aim of all such 
schools was to make the student understand human relations so that those who 
had been educated in them could rule the people better.2 
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Having diagnosed the loss of the jen-yi mind in men of the ruling class as 
the cause of all the woes in the world, the classical Confucian teachers set out 
to educate the future officials to recover the lost mind fully in order to perform 
their public duties in jen-yi. 
Although all men possess the jen-yi mind, not all of them are endowed 
equally with certain intellectual and mental qualities necessary to make it 
develop to its fullest and applicable capacity. Moreover, in their view, most men 
are not intellectually ambitious enough to want to know the root and meaning of 
everything in the world. Mencius said: "To act without understanding, and to do 
so habitually without examination, pursuing the proper path all the life without 
knowing its nature - thus is the way of multitudes." (M: VII. A. 5: Legge) 
Therefore, neither Confucius nor Mencius felt it necessary to educate everyone 
to have an ideal state. They were realists enough to know that a state must 
necessarily be composed of groups of men with different occupational 
preferences to make it function. However, they never considered the people, 
who were not getting the kind of education they were giving, unimportant. 
Mencius said: 
There are affairs of great men, and there are affairs of small men. 
Moreover, it is necessary for each man to use the products of all the 
hundred crafts. If everyone must make everything he uses, the Empire 
will be led along the path of incessant toil. Hence it is said, "There are 
those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. 
The former rule; the latter are ruled. Those who rule are supported by 
those who are ruled." This is a principle accepted by the whole Empire. 
(M: III. A. 6: Lau) 
Accordingly, the Confucian education was for the future members of the ruling 
class, and the Confucian teachers were convinced that if they could help those 
men who were after the knowledge and cultivation of jen-yi in their persons and 
who would use their enlightened minds when called to perform their public 
duties, the realization of a virtuous state was a definite possibility. 
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The students so educated would be the possessors of the knowledge of 
jen-yi and were called chun-tzu (%, J-). The term has been translated as 
"the men of outstanding virtue," "gentlemen," "superior men," Princely men," and 
so on; and the Confucian teachers identified some essential things that they 
must let these men learn know while educating them.3 First, they let them know 
that the goal of making the world jen-yi or virtuous was dependent totally on 
them and must be pursued in a correct order. In the Great Learning we read- 
Things have their root and their branches. Affairs have their end and 
their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to 
what is taught in the Great Learning. 
The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the 
kingdom, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their 
States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their 
families, they first cultivated their person... 
From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must 
consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides. (GL: 
3, 4, & 6: Legge)4 
They taught them also the importance of making their commitment to the 
cultivation of jen-yi in their persons true and sincere and their desire to know 
Heaven and earth and everything in between extensive and thorough. We 
further read in the Great Learning: 
...Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. 
Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their 
thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to 
the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the 
investigation of things. (GL: 4: Legge) 
Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their 
knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts 
being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being 
rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, 
their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States 
were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole 
kingdom was made tranquil and happy. (GL: 4 & 5: Legge) 
In the following quotes from the Four Books we read how Confucius and 
Mencius described the character of chun-tzu and at the same time how they 
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taught by example some essential intellectual skills of observation, 
discrimination, analysis, and comparison in learning from Nature, people, and 
books, to grasp the jen-yi principle in the universe. In the Book of Mencius we 
read: 
...The disciple Hsu said, 'Chung-ni [Confucius] often praised water, 
saying, O water! O water!" What did he find in water to praise?' 
Mencius replied, There is a spring of water; how it gushes out! It 
rests not day nor night. It fills up every hole, and then advances, flowing 
on to the four seas. Such is water having a spring! It was this which he 
found in it to praise. But suppose that the water has no spring. In the 
seventh and eighth months when the rain falls abundantly, the channels 
in the fields are filled, but their being dried up again may be expected in 
a short time. So a superior man is ashamed of a reputation beyond his 
merits!' (M: IV. B. 18: Legge) 
Confucius said: 
I am able to discourse on the rites of the Hsia, but the state of Ch’i does 
not furnish sufficient supporting evidence; I am able to discourse on the 
rites of the Yin, but the state of Sung does not furnish sufficient 
supporting evidence. This is because there are not enough records and 
men of erudition. Otherwise I would be able to support what I say with 
evidence. (A: III. 9: Lau) 
See what a man does. Mark his motives. Examine in what things he 
rests. How can a man conceal his character! (A: 11.10: Legge) 
There may be those who act without knowing why. I do not do so. 
Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it; Seeing much 
and keeping it in memory: - this is the second style of knowledge. (A: 
VII. 27: Legge) 
When I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my teachers. I 
will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and 
avoid them. (A: VII. 21: Legge) 
Learning from direct contact with men and things, too, requires the 
discriminating use of one's mind in order to gain, for example, the knowledge of 
human relationships correctly and unbiased. The following lines from the 
Mencius show the way Mencius exercised his inquisitive and discerning mind to 
get the truth out of a situation. 
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Kao Tzu said, The music of Yu surpassed that of Kinq Wen ’ 
'What makes you say that?' said Mencius. 
'It is the bell-rope. It is almost worn through.’ 
'That is not sufficient as evidence. Do you imagine that the rut 
through the city gates was made by a single pair of horses'?’ (M- VII R 
22: Lau) ' v 
Another thing they urged their students was to be intellectually honest 
and courageous. Confucius said, ’’Yu, shall I tell you what it is to know? To say 
you know when you know, and to say you do not know when you do not, that is 
knowledge." (A: 11.7: Lau) Again, he said, "When you have faults, do not fear 
to rectify or abandon them.” (A: I. 8. IX. 24: Legge) He said also that "to see 
what is right and not to do it is want of courage." (A: II. 24. ii: Legge) Confucius 
was certain that intellectual honesty would reward the learner with peace of 
mind and the respect of others. We read in the Analects the following 
conversation. 
Ssu-ma Niu asked about the gentleman. The Master said, 'The 
gentleman is free from worries and fears.' 
'In that case, can a man be said to be a gentleman simply because 
he is free from worries and fears?' 
The Master said, 'If, on examining himself, a man finds nothing to 
reproach himself for, what worries and fears can he have?’ (A: XII. 5: 
Lau) 
The Confucian teachers also let the student know that his education was 
not for his own moral improvement alone, but for the well-being of the state as 
well. Therefore, learning and practicing what one came to know to be jen-yi 
were the two things inseparable throughout the life of chun-tzu. Mencius 
identified the sage king Shun as one of the model rulers who had people's 
affection for his understanding of human relations. He said: "Shun understood 
the way of things and had keen insight into human relationships. He followed 
the path of morality, jen-yi. He did not just put morality into practice." (M: IV. B. 
19: Lau) Mencius explains further what exactly the king Shun did with his 
subjects. 
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■ Hc\UA,?hi t£?ught the people how t0 cu|t'vate land and the five kinds of 
grain. When these ripened, the people multiplied. This is the wav of the 
common people: once they have a full belly and warm clothes on their 
back they degenerate to the level of animals if they are allowed to lead 
idle lives, without education and discipline. 
They gave the sage King further cause for concern, and so he 
appointed Hsieh as the Minister of Education whose duty was to teach 
the people human relationships: love between father and son duty 
between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, 
precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends (M- III 
A. 4. viii: Lau) 
Confucius, too, asked of his students to attain correct understanding and 
handling of human relationships based on the principles of jen-yi. He said: 
When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and 
exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. 
What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others. 
In the way of the superior man there are four things, to not one of 
which have I as yet attained. To serve my father, as I would require my 
son to serve me: to this I have not attained; to serve my prince, as I would 
require my minister to serve me: to this I have not attained; to serve my 
elder brother, as I would require my younger brother to serve me: to this I 
have not attained; to set example in behaving to a friend, as I would 
require him to behave to me: to this I have not attained... (DM: XIII. 3 - 4: 
Legge) 
The important moral qualities the Confucian teachers wanted their future 
chun-tzu to cultivate in their persons are described abundantly in the Four 
Books. The following select quotes will show us what sort of men were to be 
chun-tzu and why an ideal and virtuous state was totally dependent on chun- 
tzu. 
Chi Kang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, 
To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people with correctness, 
who will dare not to be correct?’ 
Chi Kang, distressed about a number of thieves in the state inquired 
of Confucius how to do away with them, Confucius said, 'If you, sir, were 
not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not 
steal.' 
Chi Kang asked Confucius about government, saying, 'What do you 
say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?' Confucius 
replied, 'Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing 
at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will 
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be good. The relation between superiors and interiors, is like that 
between the wind and the grass. The grass bends, when the wind blows 
across it.' (A: XVII, XVIII, & XIX: Legge) 
Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said The 
requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency 
of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler ’ 
Tsze-kung said, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be 
dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first'?' The 
military equipment,' said the Master. 
Tsze-kung again asked, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of the 
remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be 
foregone?' The Master answered, 'Part with the food. From of old, death 
has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers 
there is no standing for the State.’ (A: XII. 7: Legge) 
Some more characteristic qualities of chun-tzu worthy of people's faith in them 
are described in the following ways. 
The Master said of Tsze-chan that he had four of the characteristics of a 
superior man: - in his conduct of himself, he was humble; in serving his 
superiors, he was respectful; in nourishing the people, he was kind; in 
ordering the people, he was just. (A: V. 15: Legge) 
The Master said, 'Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be 
established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to enlarge 
himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.' (A: VI. 28. ii: Legge) 
The Master said, 'He who speaks without modesty will find it difficult to 
make his words good.' (A: XIV. 21: Legge) 
The Master said, 'The superior man is modest in his speech but exceeds 
in his actions.' (A: XIV. 29: Legge) 
Describing a distinguished gentleman - officer - The Master said, 'Now 
the man of distinction is solid and straightforward, and loves 
righteousness. He examines people's words, and looks at their 
countenances. He is anxious to humble himself to others. Such a man 
will be distinguished in the country; he will be distinguished in his clan. 
(A: XII. 20. v: Legge) 
Remembering the exemplary chun-tzu of the past Mencius said: 
The Great Shun had a still greater delight in what was good. He 
regarded virtue as the common property of himself and others, giving up 
his own way to follow that of others, and delighting to learn from others to 
practise what was good. 
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,rt :T ,he ,iIn? when he p|0u9hed and sowed, exercised the potter's 
rnntfr,l^a? 3 flsher<man't0 lhe ,ifne wh0n he became emperor, he was 
continually learning from others. 
To take example from others to practise virtue, is to help them in the 
same practise. Therefore, there is no attribute of the superior man 
greater than his helping men to practise virtue. (M: II. A. 12. iii-v: Legge) 
Quoting Confucius, the Doctrine of the Mean has the following passages. 
The Master said, There was Shun: - He indeed was greatly wise! Shun 
quGStlon othe[f ■ and t0 study their words, though they might be 
shallow He concealed what was bad in them, and displayed what was 
good. He took hold of their two extremes, determined the Mean and 
employed it 'n his government of the people. It was by this that he was 
Shun! (DM: VI: Legge) 
A chun-tzu in dealing with the problems in the world, "does not set his 
mind either for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow." (A: IV 
10: Legge) Mencius said: "A great man need not keep his word nor does he 
necessarily see his action through to the end. He aims only at what is right." 
(M: IV. B. 11: Lau) Confucius said: 
There are nine things the gentleman turns his thought to: to seeing 
clearly when he uses his eyes, to hearing acutely when he uses his ears, 
to looking cordial when it comes to his countenance, to appearing 
respectful when it comes to his demeanour, to being conscientious when 
he speaks, to being reverent when he performs his duties, to seeking 
advice when he is in doubt, to the consequences when he is enraged, 
and to what is right at the sight of gain. (A: XVI. 10: Lau) 
Moreover, chun-tzu is not a man of pleasure and the easy life and does not 
seek unearned fame and wealth. He is a man who seeks to cultivate his 
inherent jen-yi, the cause of all other virtues, for a lasting pleasure for himself 
and others. 
With the production of chun-tzu the aim of the Confucian education would 
be finally fulfilled and a virtuous state would become a definite possibility. 
Confucius said, "Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous and lo! virtue is 
at hand."5 He further said: 
When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and 
exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. 
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Xin^'Legge1)0' Whe" d°ne'° y0urself’ do not do 10 °<hers. (DM: 
"We seek the things that are in ourselves," said Mencius.6 
In the Dialogues 
In the Plato describes his broad two-fold aim of education through 
the protagonist of the dialogue, the Athenian, as follows: 
Mi. But we must not allow our description of education to remain 
indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man's 
upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as 
uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated 
in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation 
But, we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that 
such things as these make up education^ the education we speak of is 
training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly 
desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding both how to rule 
and be ruled righteously.; This is the special form of nurture to which, as I 
suppose, our present argument would confine the term "education"; 
whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical 
strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and 
justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name 
"education." Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide 
by the statement we agreed upon just now,'that those who are rightly 
educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case 
disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are 
given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put 
straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address 
himself with all his might. (643 D - 644 B: Bury) 
In short, the aim of education is to instruct all children, both boys and girls, from 
their childhood up in goodness, so that they will become perfect citizens 
capable of leading their lives in justice whether as ruler or the ruled. 
Accordingly, the system of education Plato sketches in the Republic and the 
Laws is geared to attain its twofold aim: one is to help all future citizens to 
become just as far as they can, and the other is to help build a just state where 
the rulers and the ruled would do their separate and defined works justly for the 
common happiness and welfare of the state. Realizing that not all citizens are 
born to rule, Plato divides his system into two divisions: one is for all citizens, 
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and the other, for the special education of those select citizens who would be 
guardians or auxiliaries and rulers of the state. 
Education of men and women begins from their time in their mothers’ 
wombs7 through their infancy, childhood, youth, and adulthood, subjecting them 
to carefully selected physical and fine arts courses according to their degrees of 
maturity for the sole purpose of making them good citizens. All children of the 
citizens, both boys and girls, are made to receive the common education 
between the ages of three and twenty in music and gymnastics, which includes 
story telling, singing, dancing, reciting epic and dramatic poetry, lyre playing, 
and rudiments of arithmetic and geometry, besides learning to read and write 
for three years between the ages of ten and thirteen. It is important to note that 
the emphasis placed on these two traditional subjects is no longer "music for 
the soul and gymnastics for the body," but they are both for the soul.8 
At the age of twenty, students are evaluated through tests for the purpose 
of selecting those with the qualifications necessary for higher education, and 
those who fail to pass the tests are guided to pursue other vocations most suited 
to their natural talents. Now, the vastly diminished number of those who pass 
the tests would receive higher education for the guardianship for ten years in 
advanced branches of arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy and 
harmonics, which are not to be pursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but 
for the sole purpose of developing the reasoning faculty of the soul, which alone 
would enable them to discern wisdom from ignorance, courage from cowardice, 
temperance from licentiousness, justice from injustice, and good from evil. 
At the conclusion of higher education a further selection of men and 
women is conducted to give to those selected the "first of the finest gifts," the 
highest education that will make them rulers, "the best men" and women of all 
citizens. And those who are not selected, for they are proven to be more 
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spirited than thoroughly rational, would be assigned to be the guardians of 
auxiliary status.9 
The first duty of men and women, especially those who would be rulers, 
is to be good and they must first of all examine their own souls to see how much 
they know about good and evil. Then, they must proceed to pursue the 
knowledge of the Good using vigorously the art of dialectic until they grasp it. 
According to Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, man possesses a special 
capacity for the search after the knowledge of the Good and there is in his soul 
a certain power that will see the Good if only it is turned in the right direction. In 
the Republic, Socrates tells us how man is capable of rising from the darkness 
of the world of phenomena and the uncertainties of opinion into the radiant land 
of knowledge. He says: 
Education is now what it is said to be by some, who profess to put 
knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put 
sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, the soul of every man does 
possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with; and 
that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order that the 
eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendor which we 
have called the Good. Hence there may well be an art whose aim would 
be to effect this very thing, the conversion of the soul, in the readiest way; 
not to put the power of sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but 
to ensure that, instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the 
way it ought to be. (518 B - D: Cornford) 
In the Meno we read: 
The soul is immortal and has been born many times and beheld all 
things both in this world and in the nether realms, so she has acquired 
knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she be able 
to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. For as 
all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason 
why we should not, by remembering but one single thing - an act which 
men call learning - discover everything else, if we have courage and faint 
not in the search; since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly 
recollection. (81 C - D: Lamb) 
Also in the Timaeus we read: 
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As concerning the most sovereign form of soul in us we must conceive 
that heaven has given it to each man as a guiding genius - that part 
which we say dwells in the summit of our body and lifts us from earth 
toward our celestial affinity, like a plant whose roots are not in earth but 
in the heavens. And this is most true, for it is to the heavens, whence the 
soul first came to birth, that the divine part attaches the head’or root of us 
and keeps the whole body upright. Now if a man is engrossed in 
appetites and ambitions and spends all his pains upon these all his 
thoughts must needs be mortal and, so far as that is possible ’ he cannot 
fall short of becoming mortal altogether, since he has nourished the 
growth of his mortality. But if his heart has been set on the love of 
learning and true wisdom and he has exercised that part of himself 
above all, he is surely bound to have thoughts immortal and divine, if he 
shall lay hold upon truth, nor can he fail to possess immortality in the 
fullest measure that human nature admits; and because he is always 
devoutly cherishing the divine part and maintaining the guardian genius 
that dwells with him in good estate, he must needs be happy above all. 
(90 A - C: Cornford) 
As the above quotes clearly indicate, each human soul, coming from the 
immortal Good, already has the knowledge of the Good. And what education 
can do is help facilitate the soul to recollect it through the art of dialectical 
search for its own sake and for the good of the state. But, the search for the 
Good is not for everyone. Although every human soul is endowed with 
intelligence, only a very few men and women are capable of developing it fully 
to apprehend the Good, which dwells in the metaphysical domain, and become 
philosopher-rulers. 
Then, there are passages, such as the one quoted below, which warns 
those who would have the knowledge, not to relinquish their duties as rulers in 
the face of the seemingly impossible task of making their state just, and not to 
be driven by their own self interest. In the Republic we read: 
One who has joined this small company and tasted the happiness that is 
their portion; who has watched the frenzy of the multitude and seen that 
there is no soundness in the conduct of public life, nowhere an ally at 
whose side a champion of justice could hope to escape destruction; but 
that, like a man fallen among wild beasts, if he should refuse to take part 
in their misdeeds and could not hold out alone against the fury of all, he 
would be destined, before he could be of any service to his country or his 
friends, to perish, having done no good to himself or to anyone else - one 
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who has weighed all this keeps quiet and goes his own way like the 
traveler who takes shelter under a wall from a driving storm of dust and 
hail; and seeing lawlessness spreading on all sides, is content if he can 
keep his hands clean from iniquity while his life lasts, and when the end 
comes take his departure, with good hopes, in serenity and peace (496 
C - E: Cornford) ' 
Traditionally, the primary task of the guardians was to protect their state 
from enemies.10 But the guardians of Plato's ideal state must be able to make 
their state wise, courageous, temperate, just and good, as they themselves are, 
besides protecting it from enemies. They must make sure that the division of 
labor according to each citizen’s natural inclinations is adhered to strictly to give 
all citizens economic security, social justice, and unity;11 supervise the selection 
and education of citizens for various works that need to be performed;12 and 
above all, examine themselves constantly to make sure that their own task of 
guardianship is properly carried out. Having received the special education to 
rule their state with the knowledge of the Good, they are not to allow themselves 
to indulge in the bliss the attainment of that knowledge would certainly award, 
but must engage themselves willingly in the task of establishing a just and good 
state for the happiness of all citizens. After the parable of the cave, Socrates 
exhorts: 
...[t]hat the law is not concerned to make any one class specially happy, 
but to ensure the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. By 
persuasion or constraint it will unite the citizens in harmony, making them 
share whatever benefits each class can contribute to common good; and 
its purpose in forming men of that spirit was not that each man should be 
left to go his own way, but that they should be instrumental in binding the 
community into one. (519 E- 520 A: Cornford) 
A few lines later he gives additional reasons why the possessors of the 
knowledge of the Good must also be rulers. He says: 
We have brought you into existence for your country's sake as well as for 
your own, to be like leaders and king-bees in a hive; you have been 
better and more thoroughly educated than those others and hence you 
are more capable of playing your part both as men of thought and as 
men of action. You must go down, then, each in his turn, to live with the 
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rest and let your eyes grow accustomed to the darkness. You will then 
see a thousand times better than those who live there always' you will 
recognize every image for what it is and know what it represents 
because you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in their reality 
and so you and we shall find life in our commonwealth no mere dream 
as it is in most existing states, where men live fighting one another about 
shadows and quarrelling for power, as if that were a great prize- whereas 
in truth government can be at its best and free from dissension only 
where the destined rulers are least desirous of holding office. (520 B - D- 
Having attained the knowledge of the Good in that "purer world" and also 
having experienced the happiness and satisfaction that come with it, Socrates 
thinks that the philosophers "will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable 
necessity," but they must not refuse to share in the labours of state each in his 
turn and rule, because they "are really rich, not in gold, but in the wealth that 
makes happiness - a good and wise life."13 
In short, the ultimate task of the philosopher-rulers is to make all citizens 
have the blessings of the Good. Therefore, the personal bliss they would have 
from the attainment of the knowledge of the Good must not be overindulged in 
order to fulfill the twofold aim of their special education, because the possibility 
of an ideal state is fully dependent on their application of the knowledge which 
they have finally attained. 
In summary 
The twofold aim of education of the Confucian and the Athenian thinkers 
is identical, that is, to help the future rulers of their respective states have the 
knowledge of the Good or the principle of moral excellence so that their states, 
too, will be good and morally excellent. 
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Each of the subjects of study and pedagogical methods they chose had 
its own specific aim, but they were all to fulfill the ultimate twofold aim of their 
education. 
Theirs was a special education for a special class of men and women, 
because the full knowledge of the Good could not be grasped by everyone, but 
was reserved for those few with higher intellectual capacity than most people, 
and also because not all people are born to be rulers. As human individuals 
are differently and unequally endowed in their mental capacities, talents, and 
desires, only those with the desire and capacity necessary to be the seekers of 




METHODS OF EDUCATION 
In the Four Books 
Before discussing the methods of education Confucius and Mencius 
used, the specific qualifications and abilities they expected both teachers and 
students to possess deserve our attention. Confucius said, "If a man keeps 
cherishing his old knowledge, so as continually to be acquiring new, he may be 
a teacher of others." (A: 11.11: Legge) Speaking about himself as a teacher he 
said, "I have listened in silence and noted what was said. I have never grown 
tired of learning nor wearied of teaching others what I have learned. These at 
least are merits which I can continually claim.” (A: VII. 2: Waley) Expressing 
his feeling toward the youth he said, "Respect the young. How do you know that 
they will not one day be all that you are now?" (A: IX. 22: Waley) 
As a teacher, Confucius was open and honest with his students. He said, 
"Do you think, my disciples, that I have any concealments? I conceal nothing 
from you. There is nothing that is not shown to you, my disciples - that is my 
way." (A: VII. 23: Legge) Disclaiming himself to be "one of those who have 
innate knowledge," Confucius placed himself as one who had to work hard to 
acquire it with his discriminating mind. He said, "There may be those who act 
without knowing why. I do not do so. Hearing much and selecting what is good 
and following it; seeing much and keeping it in memory - that is my way." (A: 
VII. 27: Legge)1 
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Mencius said, "If you do not practice the Way yourself, you cannot expect 
it to be practiced even by your own wife and children." (VII. B. 9: Lau) He also 
said, "A good and wise man helps others to understand clearly by his own clear 
understanding.” (VII. B. 20: Lau) Confucius said, "Do I regard myself as a 
possessor of knowledge? Far from it. But if even a simple peasant comes in all 
sincerity and asks me a question, I am ready to thrash the matter out, with all its 
pros and cons, to the very end." (A: IX. 7: Waley) 
Confucius as a teacher did not treat his students uniformly. His 
instruction was according to the students' temperaments, intellectual readiness, 
and cognitive aptitude levels or cognitive susceptibility. "To men above the 
average one may discourse on higher things; but to those who are below the 
average one may not discourse on higher things," said Confucius.2 For 
example, when Confucius gave two different answers to the same inquiry, one 
of his students Kung-hsi Hua was confused. Kung-hsi said, "When Yu asked, 
'When one hears a maxim, should one at once put it into practice?' you said, 
'You have a father and elder brother alive.' But when Ch'iu asked, 'When one 
hears a maxim, should one at once put it into practice?’ you said, 'When you 
hear it, put it into practice.' I am perplexed, and would venture to ask how this 
was." The Master said, "Ch'iu is backward; so I urged him on. Yu is fanatical 
about Goodness; so I held him back." (A: XI. 21: Waley) One of the students of 
Confucius who was also a teacher expressed this way of handling students as 
follows: 
If it be transmitted to him before he is ripe 
By the time he is ripe, he will be weary of it. 
Disciples may indeed be compared to plants and trees. They have to be 
separately treated according to their kinds. (A: XIX. 12: Waley) 
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To sum up, the ideal Confucian teacher must love to learn himself, must 
love to teach, must practice what he learned to be right in his life, must be 
honest and respectful in his dealings with the student, and must be sensitive 
and flexible in meeting the psychological and intellectual needs of his student. 
The role the teacher plays in the development of the student's discriminating 
mind and his inherent moral tendency is important in two vital respects; first, as 
the model for his student to emulate; second, as the partner of discussion, which 
is the chief channel through which the cognition and application of moral 
knowledge are achieved. Ideally, the teacher must also possess a perfect 
knowledge of what to know and how to behave, but neither Confucius nor 
Mencius admitted to having it. They themselves were humble and dedicated 
seekers of the perfect virtue, the jen-yi.3 
To implement their educational plan, how Confucius and Mencius 
gathered their students and where the students came to them for instruction are 
not clear.4 The opening two sentences of the Analects describe the master's 
pleasure in learning together with friends who came from distant places.5 From 
the same book, we also learn that Confucius accepted men as his students 
regardless of their socio-economic background as long as they were sincere 
and desirous of learning from him.6 For Mencius, too, education was for all who 
sincerely wanted the pursue the knowledge of ultimate importance and to 
improve the quality of the lives of all men. Mencius, after turning down a man 
named Keng of Teng to be his student said, 
I do not answer him who questions me presuming on his nobility, nor him 
who presumes on his talents, nor him who presumes on his age, nor him 
who presumes on services performed to the state, nor him who presumes 
on old acquaintance. Two of those things were chargeable on Keng. 
(VII: A. 43: Legge) 
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Confucius and Mencius expected a prospective student, in order to be a 
successful learner, to have the following qualities in him. He must be 
intellectually ambitious. Confucius said: 
Do you be a scholar after the style of the superior man, and not after that 
of the ordinary man. (A: VI. 11) 
I do not open up the truth to one who is not eager to get knowledge, nor 
help out any one who is not anxious to explain himself. When I have 
presented one corner of a subject to any one, and he cannot from it learn 
the other three, I do not repeat my lesson. (A: VII. 8: Legge) 
He must be broad-minded in learning, "willing to learn both from the worthy and 
unworthy men." (A: IV. 23: Legge)7 He is expected to be inquisitive. 
Confucius said, "When a man is not in the habit of saying - ’What shall I think of 
this? What shall I think of this?'I can indeed do nothing with him!" (A: IV. 23: 
Legge) Praising an honored scholar of former days, Confucius said, "He was of 
an active nature and yet fond of learning, and he was not ashamed to ask and 
learn from his inferiors." (A: V. 14: Legge) 
The learner must keep himself alert in study to measure his own 
progress. Confucius said, 
He, who from day to day recognizes what he has not yet, and from month 
to month does not forget what he has attained to, may be said indeed to 
love to learn. There are learning extensively, and having a firm and 
sincere aim; inquiring with earnestness, and reflecting with self¬ 
application: jen is in such a course. (A: XIX. 5 - 6: Legge) 
He must also be persistent in his study until he understands, his inquiry until he 
knows, his reflection until he apprehends, his discrimination until it becomes 
clear, his practices until it succeeds. "If a man succeed by one effort, he will use 
a hundred efforts. If a man succeed by ten efforts, he will use a thousand." (DM: 
XX. 20: Legge)8 The following two passages also list a few more qualities 
expected of the student. Confucius said: 
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If the scholar be not grave, he will not call forth any veneration and his 
learning will not be solid. Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first 
principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself. When you have faults 
do not fear to abandon them. (A: 1.8: Legge) 
He who aims to be a man of complete virtue in his food does not seek to 
gratify his appetite, nor in his dwelling-place does he seek the 
appliances of ease; he frequents the company of men of principle that he 
may be rectified; such a person may be said indeed to love to learn (A- 
I. 14: Legge) ' v ' 
In short, Confucius said, The scholar who cherished the love of comfort is not fit 
to be deemed a scholar." (A: XIV. 3: Legge) And Mencius said, "In the 
nourishing of the mind, there is nothing better than to make the desires few." 
(VII: B. 35: Legge) 
It is obvious that only a gifted few had the qualities expected of them in 
their search for the ultimate knowledge of jen-yi upon which to base their public 
service. "The purpose of learning is to know the essence of things,"9 and the 
educational standards set up by the early Confucians were not easy to follow for 
everyone. Someone said to Mencius: 
As far as your teaching is concerned, it is lofty and admirable; indeed, it is 
like an ascent to Heaven - something one cannot quite attain to. Why not 
make it a little more attainable by daily unremitting effort? 
Mencius replied: 
The Master Craftsman does not accommodate the inept workman by 
tampering with the measuring line. Yi the Archer did not accommodate 
an inept pupil by changing the target or the rules. The true gentleman 
leads. He does not turn aside. He leaps forward as it were, placing 
himself squarely in the center of the Way. Those who can, follow him. 
(VII. 4. 41: Dobson) 
Confucius advised his students by saying, "The Way of the Superior man 
may be compared to what takes place in traveling, when to go to a distance we 
must first traverse the space that is near, and in ascending a height, we must 
begin from the lower ground." (DM: XV. 1: Legge) 
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Concerning the methods of education Mencius said, "There are more 
ways than one of instructing others. My disdain to instruct a man is itself one 
way of instructing him." (VI. B. 616: Legge) To be more specific, he said: 
?m*an tefches m five ways- The first is by a transforming influence 
hke that of timely rain. The second is by helping the student to realize his 
virtue to the full. The third is by helping him to develop his talent The 
fourth is by answering his questions. And the fifth is by setting an 
example others not in contact with him can emulate. These five are the 
ways in which a gentleman teachers. (VII. A. 40: Lau) 
Both the Analects and the Book of Mencius show that Confucius and Mencius 
used any number of the "five ways" to create an informal yet very personal 
learning atmosphere. The "five ways" were not fixed or programmed methods 
applicable to all students in a uniform manner. In their view, the whole purpose 
of all educational methods was to help the student cultivate his innate goodness 
himself to its fullest possible capacity, and the role of the teacher was to point 
the student towards a direction he could use as his guide. Mencius said, "The 
way of truth is like a great road. It is not difficult to know it. The evil is only that 
men will not seek it. Do you go home and search for it, and you will have 
abundance of teachers." (VI. B. 2. iii: Legge) He also said, "A master carpenter 
or carriage maker may give a circle and square, but cannot make his apprentice 
skillful in the use of them.” (VII. B. 5) The real attainment must be made by the 
learner for himself. 
Even so, for the student to succeed in self-cultivation, the guidance of the 
teacher was invaluable. A Confucian teacher, who was ideally a "gentleman" 
(chun-tzu or "superior man" himself and had trodden the path of 
learning to attain jen-yi before his student, could certainly help the young with 
his own experience; indeed, it was his obligation.10 
Though the "five ways" of instruction are not extensively explained, it is 
clear that they were designed to meet the needs of the students whose 
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individual educational levels and capacities were understandably varied. The 
first of the "five ways" is the method of unforced instruction with comments, 
suggestions, and encouragement to bring about the student's progress to moral 
knowledge and behavioral maturity as naturally as possible. This method by 
implication requires patience and human care on the part of the teacher, for 
hastening the process in learning may spoil the expected result. Confucius 
said, "Flowing water is a thing which does not proceed till it has filled the 
hollows in its course. The student who has set his mind on the Way, does not 
advance to them but by completing one lesson after another." (VII. A. 24: 
Legge-Dobson) 
The second method is that of helping the student to sharpen his inner 
eye or discriminating mind to see the innate virtue he already has and 
consciously cultivate it to base his social conduct and relationship with others. 
The third method needs no extensive exposition. It is simply that of 
helping the student to develop his talent to its fullest capacity. Mencius did not 
indicate any particular talent over others as needing the teacher's special 
attention and guidance. 
The fourth method is that of a dialectic method most evident in the 
Analects and the Book of Mencius. The Chinese title Lun Yu for 
the Analects means the record of discourses or dialogues. Both Confucius and 
Mencius held sessions with one or a few of their students at a time to converse 
or carry on a dialogue with questions and answers. This method was highly 
effective not only in stimulating the mind of the student to think, but also in 
making him aware of his ignorance or understanding of the issue under 
investigation. Although there is no detailed description on the procedure of this 
method in the Four Books, its objective was, too, to help the student to acquire 
the knowledge of moral principles for himself through serious and free 
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exchange of his opinions and ideas with his teacher. Each session was 
purposefully directed and conducted in an open, positive, and relaxed 
atmosphere, and the method as a whole was successful. 
Many passages in the Book of Mencius prove that Mencius was an avid 
disputant using the method of analogy, but not always convincing in the 
judgment of his critics.11 
Kung-tu Tzu said, "Outside of our circle, men say that you, Sir, simply like 
to argue. May I ask what you yourself say to this?” Mencius replied, "It 
surely cannot be thought that I like to argue! I do so because I have no 
other recourse... I too, wish to set aright the minds of men, to put an end 
to pernicious teaching, to stand opposed to wicked deeds, and to banish 
evil talk, and thus to continue with the work of these three Sages. It 
surely cannot be said that I ’like to argue.' I do so because I have no 
other recourse." (III. B. 9. i & xiii: Dobson) 
The last of the "five ways" is the method of emulation designed for the 
student who is unable to study with the teacher in person. The teacher, though 
separated from the student by time and space, can still teach him, granted that 
the teacher has maintained his intellectual and moral integrity as a model 
worthy to be emulated by the student. This method was the one Mencius said 
he had used to learn from Confucius.12 Aware of man's natural inclination to 
imitate either a good or bad model, both Confucius and Mencius advised their 
students to choose their friends and neighbors wisely, lest they might be led 
away from the Way.13 
The models Confucius and Mencius selected for their students to 
emulate were not only exemplary men of their own days, but also those of the 
highest moral reputation of the past, such as the legendary sage kings, Yao and 
Shun, of the earlier dynasties and the Duke of Chou.14 In their observation, 
man sometimes learns unconsciously, imitating models around him, and 
sometimes consciously, imitating the models of his choice made by his 
discriminating mind. They believed that man in his right mind almost always 
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would choose to emulate the models of the highest moral excellence 
Confucius said: 
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them bv 
punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of 
shame. If they be led by virtue, and the uniformity sought to be qiven 
them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame and 
moreover will become good. (A: 11.3: Legge) 
Mencius, too, agreed in his own words: 
When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. 
They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one 
subdues men by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased and 
sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy disciples in their 
submission to Confucius. What is said in the Book of Poetry, 
"From the west, from the east, 
From the south, from the north, 
There was not one who thought of refusing submission," 
is an illustration of this. (II. A. 4. ii: Legge) 
Confucius said, "When we see men of worth, we should think of equalling them; 
when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and examine 
ourselves." (IV. 17: Legge) 
The last quoted statement of Confucius introduces yet another method of 
learning the early Confucians recommended to their students. This method is 
that of "to turn inwards," read in Chinese as nei sheng (^^ ), 
renderable in English as self-examination or introspection, enabling the student 
to measure critically his own progress in self-cultivation, so that his social action 
and behavior will not contradict his knowledge of jen-yi. 
According to Confucius and Mencius, self-examination is the best 
method by which the student can come to know himself, his ability, and his level 
of progress in moral training. It is the best way to prevent him from self- 
deception, inhuman attitude and behavior towards other human beings, and 
making the same mistakes repeatedly. Statements such as those quoted below 
stress the importance of self-examination in no uncertain terms. 
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The philosopher Tsang said, "I daily examine myself on three points- 
whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful- 
whether, in intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere- 
whether, I may have not mastered and practiced the instruction of mv 
teacher." (A: I. 4: Legge) 
What the superior man seeks is in himself, what the mean man seeks is 
in others. (A: XV. 20: Legge) 
Here is a man who treats me in a perverse and unreasonable manner. 
The superior man in such a case will turn round upon himself - ”1 must 
have been wanting in benevolence: I must have been wanting in 
propriety: how should this have happened to me" (MEN IV. B. 28. iv 
Legge) 
The Master said, "In archery we have something like the way of the 
superior man. When the archer misses the centre of the target, he turns 
round and seeks for the cause of his failure in himself." (DM: XV. 5: 
Legge) 
When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be 
anxious about, what is there to fear? (A: XII. 4. iii: Legge) 
In the Dialogues 
Socrates the Teacher - His Role and Method: Socrates, who was 
immortalized by Plato as the greatest teacher of all times, had different views of 
himself. He did not pretend to know everything, insisting that his only 
advantage over others was the knowledge of his own ignorance. (Meno: 71 B) 
He was declared the wisest of men by the Delphic oracle that "no man living 
was wiser than Socrates," (Apol: 21 A ft.) but insisted that he was, in fact, 
without the knowledge of even "what justice or virtue was." (Meno: 71 B; Rg£.: 
354 C) Confessing his ignorance, he proposed to learn from anyone or any 
school the knowledge he was seeking in order to carry on his search for truth 
with others. (Theaet: 143 D) He said he was a seeker himself and would seek 
for it to the end of his life as his service to god and his people. In the Apology, 
we read: 
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Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the qod rather 
than you and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never qive ud 
philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of 
you whom I may meet... And if any of you argues the point, and says he 
does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away but I shall 
question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does 
not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorninq the 
things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less 
worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and 
citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related 
to me. For I know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that 
no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the ood 
(29 D - 30 A) y 
Socrates had no fixed place to give his instruction and no formalized 
curriculum to offer. His students, whom he called his "associates,"15 were 
mostly adults with traditional education and culture, some old and some young, 
and they were free to come and go. Among them were prominent thinkers of his 
day, including some Sophists of great eminence from far and near, noted 
political figures of Athens, and even those who later accused him as the 
corrupter of the youth of Athens and a religious heretic, thus sending him to his 
death in 399 B.C. he accommodated everyone who came to hear him, argue 
with him, learn from him, and seek the truth of all things with him. (Apol: 23 C) 
His method of teaching and learning with this circle of "associates" was 
conversational, as Plato’s dialogues so clearly demonstrate. Socrates 
encouraged everyone present to take part in the informal, but intellectually 
stimulating atmosphere his pedagogical method inevitably created. The 
method was called "dialectic," and how it actually worked will be discussed 
toward the end of this chapter. Simply put, dialectic aimed to make the 
participants in the session exercise their minds to their maximum capacity in a 
philosophical discourse to acquire the knowledge of the highest virtue. 
In the Theaetetus. Socrates compares his role as a teacher with that of a 
midwife saying: 
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Have y°u not heard that I am the son of a noble and burly Phaenarete? 
And have you not also heard that I practice the same art?Y (149 A) 
I am not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention the 
offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me althouqh 
at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance 9 
advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful 
progress, not only in their opinion, but in that of others as well And it is 
clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anythinq from 
me, but because they have found in themselves many fair thinos and 
have brought them forth. (150 C-D) 
Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in 
childbirth... (151 B) 
I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are 
pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering 
that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do 
your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. (151 B-C) 
You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and 
claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am 
merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering 
incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, 
until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. (157 C-D) 
You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to 
think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments... I myself know nothing, 
except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who 
is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought 
from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself. (151 A-B) 
Such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, 
now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good 
for both of us. (169 B-C) 
These passages show how Socrates challenged his friends or students to 
philosophical discussions and what role he played to make them become active 
thinkers themselves. This was the method with which he wished to assist the 
learner, through rigorous questioning and answering, to turn the eye of his 
reasoning soul to the source of the cosmic order, the Good. 
In his more formalized educational system, Socrates proposed in the 
Republic and the Laws that the type of philosophical sessions he conducted 
with mostly adult students belonged to the stage of higher education. And at 
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this stage of advanced education, Socrates demands certain specific mental 
qualities and intellectual aptitudes in his students, for "Philosophy, the love of 
wisdom, is impossible for the multitude." (Be* 494 A) The students at this level 
of education must possess the following innate qualities: "the spirit of 
truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and love 
of truth" (585 C); "Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be 
most of all a striver after the truth in every form" (Ibid.: 485 D); "Such a man 
will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth." (Ibid.: 485 E) He who 
seeks for the ultimate truth which is eternal and universal "will not suppose 
death to be terrible." (jl?id-: 486 A-B) "The forgetful soul, we must not list in the 
roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory." (ibid.: 486 
D) He must have "youthful spirit with a disposition to live an orderly, quiet, and 
stable life." (Ibid.: 503 C) "There is a close affinity between proportion and 
truth," says Socrates, "hence, besides our other requirements, we shall look for 
a mind endowed with measure and grace, which will be instinctively drawn to 
see every reality in its true light." (Ibid.: 486 D-E) In brief, the student must be 
"by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly 
and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety." (Ibid.: 487 A) 
The entire curriculum of the Socratic education, which will be discussed 
in the following chapter, was simply to produce qualified candidates capable of 
philosophical conversation in their final stage of moral education. The 
dialectical method was, therefore, naturally for the intellectually mature students 
who had been trained in abstract thinking. 
In the Republic and the Laws. Socrates proposes that all children of the 
citizens must be educated. He proposes state-controlled and state-supported 
schools and compulsory education for all children, both boys and girls, of the 
citizens. It was important to impose universal education on the children in order 
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to select the best and the brightest for the higher level of education for the posts 
of leadership and responsibility. 
Although Plato mentions the importance of prenatal education in the 
Laws,16 the formal education of children begins at the age of three. According 
to the BfiPUfrliC, children between the ages of three and nine or ten are taken 
away from home and spend their time in music for the mind and gymnastics for 
the body. The program in music for the children of this age group included 
story-telling, singing, dancing, reciting epic and dramatic poetry, lyre-playing, 
and the rudiments of arithmetic and geometry. 
Between the ages of ten and twenty, the teens are given a more intense 
instruction in all above-mentioned subjects and in the skills of reading and 
writing. Plato wrote in the Laws: "About three years will be a reasonable time 
for a child of ten to spend on literature, and a further three years, beginning at 
the age of thirteen, should be spent on learning the lyre.” (810) Then three 
years of intense physical and military training will follow to conclude the 
preliminary education. "These times," Plato insisted, "must be neither shortened 
nor lengthened; neither the child nor its father must be allowed to extend or 
curtail these periods of study out of enthusiasm for, or distaste of, the curriculum; 
that will be against the law." (Ibid.l 
In dealing with children in their early stages of education, Socrates 
emphasizes the importance of play as an educational method and warns of the 
futility of coercion, In the Republic, we read: 
All this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies 
that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to 
them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction... 
Because, a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for... 
nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind... Do not, 
then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play. 
That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each. 
(536 E - 537 A) 
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At the age of twenty, all the students go through tests and examinations 
for the purpose of selection of those who qualify for higher education and those 
whose qualifications are fit for other vocational pursuits. Those selected twenty 
year-olds begin their higher education by spending the next ten years studying 
advanced branches of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmony, "which 
are not to be pursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but rather with a view 
to their combination by means of dialectic into an ideal of all knowledge."17 
At the age of thirty, a further selection is made, and those selected will 
spend the next five years studying philosophy or dialectic and the ultimate 
moral principles. 
From thirty-five to fifty years of age, they are sent into active public life, 
manning those posts most suited to their training and qualifications. 
At fifty, they return to philosophical study and enjoy life to the end of their 
days, but when their turn comes they will, in rotation, turn to the weary business 
of politics and, for the sake of society, do their duty as Rulers, not for the honour 
they get by it but as a matter of necessity." (Rep.: 540 A-B) 
Socrates considered dialectic as the best possible method of acquiring 
the ultimate knowledge of the Good which future philosopher-kings must 
acquire. In his view, there would be no knowledge of the Good without 
dialectic, and without the knowledge of the Good, there would be no good rulers 
and good government. Dialectic was inseparable from Socrates; indeed, it was 
Socrates. 
As the speech quoted on page 127 exemplifies, dialectic was employed 
to obtain the most complete answer possible to a moral question under 
investigation through persistent questioning and answering until it is found. 
Whether or not the perfect answer to every moral question is possible through 
dialectic is another question. At any rate, the entire work of Plato which 
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involves Socrates is constructed with endless cross-examinations showing 
Socrates' indefatigable attempts to find the universally verifiable concept or 
definition underlying a separate moral precept, such as "justice" or "courage." 
The simple form of the question "What is courage?" requests definitions to start 
the quest for the complete meaning of "courage." 
The way dialectic worked with Socrates is best described by Werner 
Jaeger as follows. 
The purpose of the Socratic dialogue is, by discussion with other men on 
a subject which is of incomparable interest to all concerned - namely, the 
highest values in human life - to reach an agreement which must be 
recognized as valid by everyone. In order to reach this result, Socrates 
always starts with what is admitted, either by his interlocutor, or by people 
in general. This admission is used as the "hypothesis," the foundation. 
Then the discussion works out what follows from the hypothesis, and 
tests those findings by other facts which we know to be established. 
Therefore an essential factor in a dialectic advance is the discovery of the 
contradictions which confront us when we base arguments on certain 
definite statements. These contradictions compel us to re-examine the 
correctness of the judgments we had laid down as true, and sometimes 
to revise them or abandon them. The aim of all this process is to bring 
separate phenomena in the realm of moral standards under one 
supreme general standard. But in his investigations Socrates does not 
start by looking for this "good in itself." He starts with some "virtue" 
denoted by the name of a particular moral quality - for instance, the 
quality we call bravery or justice. Thus, in Laches, there are a number of 
attempts to find out what "courage" is; but the statements made about it 
must be dropped, one after another, because each of them describes the 
nature of courage too narrowly or too broadly...18 
Dialectic as a curricula in the final stage of education for the future philosopher- 
rulers will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
In summary 
This chapter aims at answering the following questions: first, according 
to our thinkers of China and Athens, "What specific qualities must one have to 
be the teacher of moral education?"; second, "What specific qualities must one 
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have to receive moral education?-; and lastly, "What are the methods of moral 
education?" 
To answer the first question, both groups agree that ideally speaking, 
only the chun-tzu and the Guardians, who have the knowledge of the Good and 
practice the Good, should do the teaching. But, in the absence of those, anyone 
with certain specific qualities may be the teacher. The essential qualities both 
groups list are virtually identical. By implication the teacher is expected to have 
the same qualities which Confucius and Socrates had. Therefore, like 
Confucius and Socrates, he must love to learn tirelessly in order to get to the 
heart of the knowledge most worthy and of the highest value and, at the same 
time, love to teach tirelessly those who are eager to learn. He must be totally 
honest and sincere about his knowledge, admitting his ignorance if he does not 
know. He must love his students, knowing them individually so that he can give 
most appropriate instruction when needed, treating them as his equals, for he 
too is a life-long student and seeker of wisdom, and must listen to them carefully 
and critically to carry on their philosophic conversation about the knowledge 
they must find. He must also put into practice what he knows and teachers to be 
true consistently and as best as possible. 
Now about the student, Confucius and Socrates appear to have 
welcomed anyone who wanted to learn with and from them, especially 
Confucius, irrespective of one's social and economic status. It must be 
remembered that the students Confucius and Socrates had were not recruited 
and were all adults, including established thinkers in their own right. For these 
students, both Confucius and Socrates chose the dialectical method as the best 
and used it exclusively. Plato's school in the Republic, however, would accept 
all children of the citizens when they reached the age of three, but would screen 
and select them as they grew older, and only those judged qualified would be 
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promoted to the next higher level of education. When the students reach the 
age of thirty, they are again screened for the final time and an elite few are 
permitted to receive the highest and the last level of education, the education in 
dialectic. 
The intellectual capacities and other human qualities expected in their 
elite group of students are understandably the same as those expected in their 
teachers. A few more qualities mentioned by both groups are: the love of 
knowledge or wisdom more than anything else in the world including life; an 
alert, inquisitive, and perceptive mind with a good memory; persistent and 
disciplined study habits; a simple and ordered lifestyle; and the desire to 
improve others as one improves oneself. 
Before discussing the various methods both groups used, the underlying 
supposition they held in justifying their methods needs to be reiterated. In their 
view, the knowledge of the Good cannot be taught, because it is in man already. 
To put it another way, man can only acquire knowledge by recollecting, 
discovering, or searching out what is in him already. Therefore, education is 
only valuable if it can assist him in becoming an autonomous seeker of 
knowledge and all its substance by developing his reasoning faculty to its fullest 
extent. To use a Socratic metaphor, education is like a midwife, who assists in 
the birth of a new class of men and women. Based on this supposition, each 
group chose various courses of study and methods judged effective to develop 
and train the appetitive, the spirited, and above all, the reasoning parts of man 
harmoniously and fully to help students become men of excellence. 
The methods used by the Confucian and the Athenian thinkers are many. 
Some methods are for the teacher, some are for the student, and still others are 
for both the teacher and the student. For example, the method of not 
transplanting the knowledge of someone else into the student is for the teacher; 
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the method of learning through self-examination is for the student alone, and 
the method of emulation is both for the teacher and the student, because the 
teacher must present a model for the student to imitate and the student must 
imitate the model passively. All these methods are considered by both groups 
valuable, if used flexibly and wisely according to the needs of various age 
groups or individual students. 
In Plato s school, some courses of study, such as arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy, and harmonics are required not for their practical application, but 
solely for their methodological values to aid the development of the student's 
reasoning power so that they will become able to deal with abstract concepts 
such as the Ideas or Forms of the Good or the Beautiful before entering the 
highest stage of education in dialectic. 
Although both groups had many and various methods to use, if they were 
able to find new and better methods, they welcomed them, too, as long as the 
methods did not obstruct or retard an orderly and natural progress towards 
wholesome maturity of the future chun-tzu or Guardians in moral excellence. 
In concluding the summary of this chapter, two quotations from the Book 
of Mencius and one from the Republic will be useful to prove the above point, 
which is of great importance and underlies all their methods. Mencius said: 
You must not be like the man from Sung. There was a man from Sung 
who pulled at his rice plants because he was worried about their failure 
to grow... There are few in this world who can resist the urge to help their 
rice plants grow. There are some who leave the plants unattended, 
thinking that nothing they can do will be of any use. They are the people 
who do not even bother to weed. There are others who help the plants 
grow. They are the people who pull at them. Not only do they fail to help 
them but they do the plants positive harm. (M: II. A. 2. xvi: Lau) 
There are more ways than one of instructing others. My disdain to 
instruct a man is itself one way of instructing him. (M: VI. B. 16: Lau) 
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In the Republic. Socrates said: 
QtMHioc'thof stLJdy °f reckon'ng and geometry and all the preliminary 
studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be 
presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory 
fnr\rLlviIOK'■^•PeiCuUSe a free soul ought not to Pursue any study slavishly 
for while bodily labours performed under constraint do not harm the V’ 
body nothmg that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind Do 




In the Four Books 
A passage in the Analects says, "The Master taught four things, 
wen (jt). hsing ), chung (&), and hsin (H).n (VII. 24) What 
exactly these four things Confucius taught were was not clear. Legge translated 
them as "letters, ethics, devotion of soul, and truthfulness"; Soothill as "culture, 
conscientiousness, and good faith"; Waley as "culture, conduct of affairs, loyalty 
to superior, and keeping of promise"; and Lau as "culture, moral conduct, doing 
one's best and being trustworthy in what one says."1 Wen as a curricula is 
easier to identify, though not simple, than the other three things. Whether hsing, 
chung, and hsin, which have something to do with three different expressions of 
moral conduct, were three separate subjects of study or not, is also unclear. 
What these "three things" are will be discussed in more detail later. First, we 
shall discuss what wen was and what studies were involved in it according to 
the Four Books. 
In the days of Confucius and Mencius, wen, literature or culture, involved 
not only literary studies, but some other studies also, such as music, 
ceremonies or rites, archery, horsemanship, writing, and numbers.2 According 
to Waley, "Wen denotes arts of peace (music, dancing, literature) as opposed to 
those of war. The arts of peace, however, everything that we should call culture, 
have a te that is useful for offensive purposes.”3 Confucius said in the Angels 
XVI. 1. xi: 
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attract 'therrfhu onh ?'lds stl" do not submit’,hen ruler must 
“thT by ®nbancm9 the prestige (is.) of his culture (went- and when 
bf®a duly attracted, he contents them. And whSere is 
contentment there will be no upheavals. (Waley) 
And also in IX. 5: 
When the Master was trapped in K'uang, he said, When King Wen 
perished did that mean that culture (wen) ceased to exist? If Heaven 
had really intended that such culture (wan) as his should disappear a 
latter-day mortal would never have been able to link himself to it as i 
have done And if Heaven does not intend to destroy such culture (wen) 
what have I to fear from the people of K’uang? (Waley) ’ 
In these two passages, the character wen is clearly used to mean culture or 
civilization. However, the word wen is most often used in a narrower sense in 
the Analects to mean literature or literary studies, especially when Confucius 
was said to have taught "four things."4 
Wen as a curricula involved the study of poetry shih), history 
shu), the art of ceremony or rite (*£//), and music yueh) 
Poetry 
Neither Confucius nor Mencius wrote any poetry as far as we know, but 
both of them quoted freely, almost too freely, from the Book of Poetry in their 
teaching. For centuries, in fact, Chinese scholars credited Confucius as either 
the editor or compiler of the Book of Poetry, but most recent scholarship 
discounts such claims.5 There is a passage in the Analects which indicates 
Confucius' rearranging some pieces of the Book of Poetry, but nothing more.6 
At any rate, Confucius used it in his teaching for the following values as stated 
in the Analects. He said, "In the Book of Poetry are three hundred pieces, but 
the design of them all may be embraced in one sentence - 'Having no depraved 
thoughts."' (II. 2: Legge) In XVII. 9 he said: 








The Odes serve to stimulate the mind. 
They may be used for purposes of self-contemplation 
They teach the art of sociability. 
They show how to regulate feelings of resentment. 
From them you learn the more immediate duty of serving one's father 
and the remoter one of serving one's prince. 
From them we become largely acquainted with the names of birds 
beasts, and plants. (Legge) ’ 
The Master said to Po-yu, "do you give yourself to the Chau-nan and the 
Shao-nan? The man who has not studied the Chau-nan and the Shao- 
nan, is like one who stands with his face right against a wall Is he not 
so? (XVII. 10: Legge)7 
One of the disciples asked the son of Confucius: 
As his son you must after all sure have heard something different from 
what the rest of us hear. Po-yu replied saying, No. Once when he was 
standing alone and I was hurrying past him across the courtyard, he said, 
Have you studied the Songs? I replied saying, No. [He said] If you do 
not study the Songs, you will find yourself at a loss in conversation So I 
retired and studied the Songs. (XVI. 13: Waley) 
Confucius urged his students to study Poetry for the positive benefits it rewards. 
In his view, the study of Poetry serves to stimulate the mind with imagination 
and makes it sensitive to human feelings. It also improves interpersonal 
relations and helps one to express one's feeling of resentment when confronted 
with injustice. It cultivates the correct attitude toward one's own father in serving 
him at home and toward one's superiors in his service to the state away from 
home. It also increases the knowledge of Nature's other living things, such as 
birds, animals, plants, and trees with their correct names. Even a quick 
sampling of some of the pieces in the Book of Poetry is enough to make one 
see that the poems in it poignantly describe the depth of man's varied 
experiences of joys and sorrows, triumphs and defeats, dreams and realities, 
and other emotional ups and downs. They also inform us of general human 
conditions that existed under various rulers of the past and how they affected 
the lives and feelings of the people. 
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In the training of the chun-tzu, who must know his people to be their 
benevolent ruler, Confucius must have felt the study of Poetry was essential to 
his curriculum not only for enhancing knowledge of man's complex nature, but 
as a practical tool for improving the communicative abilities of future officials of 
government. Although a thorough acquaintance with the Book of Pnptry to the 
point of memorizing the whole book, could be considered a commendable 
achievement, Confucius warned his students that such an achievement was 
useless unless they could use what they had acquired in actual life. He said, 
Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, yet if when 
intrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, 
when sent to any quarter on a mission, he cannot give his replies 
unassisted, notwithstanding the extent of his learning, of what practical 
use is it? (LY. XIII. 5: Legge) 
History 
The study of history as a curriculum was as important as that of poetry to 
both Confucius and Mencius. For it is through history that one learns about the 
men who were directly tied to the success or failure of the past dynasties. It is 
through history that one can acquire the knowledge of moral and immoral rulers 
and the effects of their rules upon the people. 
In the eyes of both Confucius and Mencius, the legendary dynasties of 
Hsia and Shang and the Western (or Earlier) Chou (about 1050 - 770 B.C.) had 
been blessed with virtuous and moral rulers, and under their governments, the 
people prospered and were happy in peace.8 Confucius saw the culture of the 
Western Chou, when founded and ruled by Kings Wen and Wu and the Duke of 
Chou, as the model of the highest moral culture, which all future rulers should 
admire and emulate. The virtuous rulers of the early Chou, according to 
Confucius, were wise and moral because they did not neglect learning from the 
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history of the preceding dynasties and their Sage Kings, Yao, Shun, and Yu.9 
The names of these three Sage Kings and their moral examples are mentioned 
by both Confucius and Mencius throughout the Eour Books numerous times, but 
for Confucius, the single outstanding model of the superior moral man of all time 
was the Duke of Chou. For Mencius, it was Confucius, the "unseptered or 
uncrowned Sage King."™ 
Confucius, who described himself as an indefatigable and devoted 
student of history and a transmitter of the wisdom of the past,11 considered the 
culture of the Western Chou the worthiest of all past wisdoms to transmit as a 
teacher. To him, the history of the Western Chou was not at all so remote as 
Wolfgang Bauer points out: 
It is important to realize that from the perspective of the sixth century B.C., 
this meant that it was not situated in remotest antiquity but still stood in 
the brightest light of history, having ended little more than two hundred 
years earlier.12 
Mencius had an increased number of historical exemplars besides the 
Sage Kings of antiquity and installed Confucius, the "unseptered Sage King," 
as the ultimate model of man for his students to emulate. Mencius chose 
Confucius as his most respected teacher although he missed being his disciple 
in person by a little over a hundred years.13 As only a keen student could, he 
mastered the teachings of Confucius through others and the study of historical 
sources to become the most eminent Confucian after Confucius.14 The Book of 
Mencius is virtually filled with discourses in which the moral and immoral 
governments of the remote and recent past are contrasted and discussed, and 
Mencius shows his students the beneficial efficacy of a government ruled by 
moral men. 
To both Confucius and Mencius, the knowledge of history was, just as 
"the square and compass" were to the craftsman, the standard by which to 
86 
measure and chart the path for future rulers to take. Although both Confucius 
and Mencius were profoundly disappointed by the morally sunken state of their 
rulers, as insightful readers of history they were not pessimists. In Confucius' 
view, history repeated itself and, at the same time, moved on straight from 
primordial perfection through temporary degeneration to final perfection. The 
word tao (5^ : way) as used in the Analects meant the Way of the 
Ancients, which was the perfect way. Confucius firmly believed that the 
restoration of the perfect state in the future, if not in his lifetime, was a definite 
possibility only if the future rulers would seek and follow the Way. 
To Mencius as well, history was "the progress in cycles"1* and the record 
of the rise and fall of political morality of the past rulers that repeated every five 
hundred years. He too was firm in believing that if men of his own days would 
strive hard to seek and follow the Way of the Ancients, the restoration of the 
ideal state was a definite possibility in his lifetime. In the Book of Mencius, he 
said: 
A little more than five hundred years passed from the times of Yao and 
Shun until the times of Tang the Successful. Men like Yu the Great and 
Kao Yao knew Yao and Shun at first hand, but Tang knew them only by 
hearsay. A little more than five hundred years elapsed from the times of 
T'ang until King Wen. Men like Yi Yin and Lai Chu knew T'ang at first 
hand, but King Wen knew him only by hearsay. A little more than five 
hundred years elapsed from King Wen to Confucius. Men like T’ai Kung 
Wang and San Yi-sheng knew King Wen at first hand, but Confucius 
knew him only by hearsay. A little over a hundred years have elapsed 
from the time of Confucius until the present. Today we are not so far 
removed from the times of the Sage, and, more seriously, are close by 
the place where he lived. But there is no Sage! Is there not to be one? 
(VII. B. 38: Dobson) 
In reading history, just as in reading all other ancient literature, Confucius 
and Mencius instructed their students to be persistent and critical. Confucius 
said: 
87 
The superior man may not engage in studying, but once he does he 
does not relax until he can understand all that he studies. He may not 
SlSS*h-n mqK,ry’ but 0nce he does- he does not relax unt'l he knows 
everything about which he inquires. He may not reflect, but once he 
does he does not relax until he apprehends everything on which he 
ref ects. He may not discriminate, but once he does, he does not relax 
until he is clear in his discrimination. He may not practice, but once he 
does, he does not relax until he is earnest in his practice. 
If another man succeeds by one effort, he will use a hundred efforts. 
If another man succeeds by ten efforts, he will use a thousand. 
Let a man proceed in this way, and, though dull, he will surely 
become intelligent; though weak, he will surely become strong. (DM- 
XX. 20 - 21 )1b 
Confucius' intellectual honesty and his critical approach to the things of the past 
are evident in the following passage from the Analects. He said: 
I am able to discourse on the rites of the Hsia, but the state of Ch'i does 
not furnish sufficient supporting evidence; I am able to discourse on the 
rites of the Yon, but the state of Sung does not furnish sufficient 
supporting evidence. This is because there are not enough records and 
men of erudition. Otherwise I would be able to support what I say with 
evidence. (III. 9: Lau) 
Mencius said, "If one believed everything in the Book of History, it would 
have been better for the Book not to have existed at all. In the Wen Chieng 
chapter I accept only two and three strips.17 (VII. B. 3: Lau) In correcting an 
erroneous interpretation of a poem in the Book of Poetry. Mencius said: 
...Hence in explaining an ode, one should not allow the words to obscure 
the sentence, nor the sentence to obscure the intended meaning. The 
right way is to meet the intention of the poet with sympathetic 
understanding. (V. A. 4. ii: Lau) 
In concluding this section of study, the following passages from the Book 
of Mencius will fortify the importance placed by the early Confucians on the 
study of history in their education of chun-tzu. Mencius said: 
The sage is teacher to a hundred generations. Such were Po Yi and Liu 
Hsia Hui. Hence hearing of the way of Po Yi, a covetous man will be 
purged of his covetousness and a weak man will become resolute; 
hearing of the way of Liu Hsia Hui, a mean man will become generous 
and a narrow-minded man tolerant. Can these two, if they were not 
sages, have inspired by their example all those who come a hundred 
generations after them? How much more inspiring they must have been 
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t/?/.t.hoSe^h? were fortunate enough to have known (vii. B. 15: Lau) them personally! 
When a scholar feels that his friendship with all the virtuous scholars of a 
kingdom is not sufficient to satisfy him, he goes back in time and 
communes with the ancients. When one reads the poems and writinqs of 
Hfn^1Clent^, Carlrt be .nght not t0 know somethin9 about them as men? 
Hence one tries to understand the age in which they lived. This can be 
described as "looking for friends in history." (V. B 8- Legge-Lau) 
With eyes as sharp as those of Li Lou or with hands as skilled as those of 
Kung-shu one could still not draw a perfect circle without the aid of 
compasses, or a perfect square without the aid of a set square There 
are princes with Humane hearts, or with a reputation for Humanity, but 
whose people gain no benefit therefrom, and whose example will not 
bear emulation by generations to come. This is because they do not put 
into practice the Way of the Former Kings... The Sages passed on to us 
the compass, the square, the level, and the line... so that we can make 
things square or round, level or straight. The usefulness of these thinqs 
is incommensurable. (IV. A. 1: Dobson) 
The perfect square and the perfect circle come only from the set square 
and compasses. The perfect exemplars of man's relation to man come 
from the Sages. Both he who, as a prince, wishes to follow fully the way 
of princes, and he who, as a subject, wishes to follow fully the way of 
subjects, should take Yao and Shun as his model... (IV. A. 2: Dobson) 
It is important to note that in teaching history, Confucius and Mencius were not 
expecting professional historians out of their students, but those who would 
apply the highest moral standards they have acquired from study in their real 
life as government officials. Confucius said, "To study and when the occasion 
arises to put what one has learned into practice - is this not deeply satisfying?" 
(A: I. I.i) 
Li: The Art of Ceremony or Rite 
Confucius said, "When a man is not virtuous or jen (<-), of what 
account are his knowledge of proper manners of li (f§)? When a man is not 
virtuous, of what account is his music?" (A. III. 3) In other words, if a man is 
devoid of inner virtue or genuine humane nature, though he may be able to 
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perform all religious ceremonies and social etiquette meticulously and perform 
music with all the notes expertly played, what he does will be empty and 
artificial. For the li and yeuh ( % music) to be genuine, it must come from a 
man's genuine nature, jen. 
The term li, originally meaning "sacrifice or to sacrifice" and later 
acquiring the meanings of "order" and "arrangement," cannot be rendered in 
one English word. It has been translated as "propriety," "ritual," "ceremony," 
moral and religious institutions," "the laws and usages of social life," "code of 
proper conduct," "rules of social conduct," "observance of rites," "holy ritual," 
"sacred ceremony." 
In pre-Confucian China, the term li, understood as "rules of proper 
conduct," had both religious and social implications. It governed the ceremonial 
procedures and behavior in performing memorial services for the departed or at 
royal court, meetings between diplomatic representatives, or proper manners at 
archery competitions among aristocratic warriors and at banquets usually 
following such meets. By the time of Confucius, it came to cover not only 
religious and social rituals and manners, but also all the essential decorum in 
establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships. And it was Confucius 
and his followers who gave the li an ethical significance by making it essential 
to bringing order into the individual's life and to society.18 
According to Confucius, each man is born with jen (4— human¬ 
heartedness), yi (sense of justice), and chih "basic stuff"),19 
and these innate moral qualities must be nurtured and put into practice 
according to the rules of li. Confucius said: 
The chun-tzu has the sense of justice (yi) as his basic stuff and by 
observing the rules of Ji puts it into practice, by being modest gives it 
expression, and by being trustworthy in word brings it to completion. 
Such is a chun-tzu. (A: XV. 17) 
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In the following passages, Confucius explains the importance of learning, 
which, of course, includes the study of li. 
Love of human-heartedness without the love of learning leads to a 
foolish simplicity. Love of wisdom without the love of learning leads to 
dfssipahon of mmd. Love of sincerity without the love of learning leads to 
a harmful behavior. Love of straightforwardness without the love of 
earning leads to rudeness. Love of courage without the love of learninq 
eads to insubordination. Love of firmness without the love of learninq 
leads to reckless conduct. (A: XVII. 8) 9 
He also said, "Respectfulness without li becomes tiresome. Carefulness without 
li becomes timidity. Courage without li becomes insubordination. 
Straightforwardness without //becomes rudeness." (A: VIII. 2) 
Intellectual refinement through the study of li, among other studies such 
as of poetry, history, and music, is essential for the future chun-tzu, but 
excessive and uncontrolled refinement must be watchfully avoided, lest it may 
obstruct his "basic stuff" or natural moral substance chih from free and 
spontaneous expression. Confucius said: 
When there is a preponderance of native substance over acquired 
refinement, the result will be churlishness. When there is a 
preponderance of acquired refinement over native substance, the result 
will be pedantry. Only a well-balanced admixture of these two will result 
in gentlemanliness. (A: VI. 18: Lau) 
When a man acquires the knowledge of li, he will be able to balance his 
acquired refinement {wen jC) with his inherent moral substance {chih% ). 
Yen Yuan asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "To subdue one's 
self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue..." Yen Yuan said, "I beg to 
ask the steps of that process." The Master replied, "Look not at what is 
contrary to li (propriety); listen not to what is contrary to li, speak not what 
is contrary to li; make no movement which is contrary to li." (A: XII. 1: 
Legge) 
Confucius said, "Without knowing the rules of propriety, it is impossible for the 
character to be established." (A: XX. 3: Lau) 
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To Confucius, the proper performance of religious rites was important, 
and he himself expressed a love for it and observed the rules correctly as 
prescribed.20 What he cared about most in //, however, were not the details of 
ritual rules, which were numerous and fascinating, but the reverent mood and 
the genuinely humane and ordered relationships between a man and his living 
and departed fellow men which it would generate. Li to him was more than an 
act of formality, but an active force that made man's relationship with everything 
above and under Heaven proper and correct. In the Book of Mencius there is a 
dialogue which makes clear exactly this point: 
A man of Jen asked Wu-lu which of the two, eating itself or the rules 
we obey when eating, was the more important. He answered "The rules 
we obey when eating." The man asked, "Which of the two, sex itself or 
the rules which govern the enjoyment of sex, is the more important?" He 
answered again, "The rules which govern its enjoyment." The man 
continued, "Would you still insist on this, if I could only save my life by 
eating in disregard of the rules, but would die by insisting on them? 
Would you insist on the rule that a man must go personally to receive his 
bride if, being unable to do so, he could not then get married?" To this 
Wu-lu could not answer. 
On the next day he went to Tsou and reported this to Mencius. 
Mencius said, "What is so difficult about answering a question like that?... 
If your questioner wants to deduce from the cases he adduces that eating 
and sex are always more important than the rules we obey in enjoying 
them, then why does he stop there? Why not go and ask him, "If you * 
could get food to eat only by twisting your older brother's arm and forcibly 
taking it from him, would you do so? Or if you could only get a bride by 
climbing a wall of the house next door and abducting your neighbour’s 
virgin daughter, would you do so?" (VI. B. 1: Dobson) 
Li, translated as "rules of conduct" or "the code of right manners," sounds 
rigid and inflexible, but it is not. According to Confucius, all specific moral 
conduct or virtues such as loyalty, honesty, kindness, courage, etc., are 
encompassed in jen or the Perfect Virtue in its broad sense, which is above all 
"love of all men." (A: XII. 22)21 Li, which is born of or in the spirit of jen, cannot 
be inflexible. Mencius makes this point quite clear in the following dialogue. 
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Ch un-yu k un said. Is it prescribed by the Ji that, in giving and 
receiving, man and woman should not touch each other?" 9 
"It is," said Mencius. 
help her?" °nG'S sister‘in‘law is drowning, does one stretch out a hand to 
Not to help a sister-in-law who is drowning is to be a brute It k 
prescribed by the li that in giving and receiving, man and woman should 
no touch each other, but in stretching out a helping hand To a drowninl 
sister-in-law one uses one's discretion." (M: IV. A. 17: Lau) 9 
Confucius said: 
There are some with whom one can associate in study, but who are not 
yet able to make common advance toward the Way; there are others with 
whom one can make common advance toward the Way, but who are not 
yet able to take with you a like firm stand; and there are others with whom 
one can take such a firm stand, but with whom one cannot make 
emergency decisions. (A: IX: 29)22 
To Confucius, a man who can be firm with the prescribed li under all 
circumstances is not yet a man of jen, because such a man cannot handle 
unexpected human problems that do take us by surprise. In dealing with 
human problems, therefore, one must act according to the li that expresses 
man's genuine nature or feelings toward other human beings, which is jen. 
This means one must be able to make "emergency decisions" or be adept "in 
the exercise of moral discretion."23 Then, even the following definition of chih 
( 4 uprightness) by Confucius is not beyond our comprehension. 
The Duke of She observed to Confucius: "In my part of the country there 
is a man so upright (chih) that when his father appropriated a sheep he 
bore witness to it." Confucius said: "The upright people in my part of the 
country are different from that for father will screen his son, and a son his 
father. In that there lies uprightness." (A: XIII. 18) 
In the Analects we read, "There are four things the Master refused to have 
anything to do with: he refused to entertain conjectures or insist on certainty; he 
refused to be inflexible or to be egotistical." (IX. 4: Lau) 
In educating men who would be rulers of more perfect humane states, 
Confucius and Mencius stressed the correct understanding of the spirit or heart 
of li to be infinitely more important than the correct learning of specific rules of 
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conduct. The Master said, "Ritual, ritual! Does it mean no more than presents of 
jade and silk?" (A: XVII. 11: Waley) In the words of Mencius, the heart of li is 
"the feeling of modesty and complaisance" (Legge) or "deference to others" 
(Dobson).24 Li is not a set of dead and mechanical rules. 
Confucius and Mencius adopted the study of li as a curricula on account 
of the effective transforming influence the power li can exert on men and 
society. In their view, the ruler's moral power was mightier than all the other 
powers gained through military means, threats, or punishments. The Master 
said: 
Govern the people by laws, keep order by punishment, and they will flee 
from you, and lose all their self-respect. Govern them by Jen and keep 
order by \\, and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their 
own accord. (A: II. 3) 
Yen Hui asked about Goodness (jenT The Master said, "He who can 
himself submit to ritual (li) is Good. If [a ruler] could for one day himself 
submit to ritual, everyone under Heaven would respond to his 
Goodness." (A: XII. 1: Waley) 
The Master said, "When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his 
government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal 
conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed." 
(A: XIII. 6: Legge) 
The Master said, "When rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the 
people respond readily to the calls on them for service." (A: XIV. 44: 
Legge) 
Music 
James Legge, in his introduction to Li Chi: Book of Rites, wrote: 
As one of the Six Arts cultivated by the Chou aristocracy, music had an 
important position in the classical curriculum, but in the post-Chou 
periods it degenerated even among the Confucian scholars. The Chou 
classic of music, one of the six Chou canons, is lost to posterity, and it is 
only in the works of Hsun Tzu that we can understand the part played by 
music as a ritual experience and a communal entertainment in ancient 
times. He also gave a good description of the various instruments used 
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in ancient China, as written in Chapter 20 of the Hsun Tzu Chantprc yiy 
and XLV of LLQhi, dealing with music and drinking festivity were taken 
from this chapter in the Hsun Tzu 25 y were taken 
Therefore, for the study of this section, this writer felt strongly the need to quote 
some revealing passages from the twentieth chapter of the Hsun Tzu which 
explain the reasons for considering music as an indispensable subject of study 
for the future chun tzu by Confucius and his followers. Hsun Tzu (c340 c245 
B.C.), a contemporary of Mencius and the most prominent Confucian thinker 
next to Mencius, wrote: 
Music is joy, an emotion which man cannot help but feel at times Since 
man cannot help feeling joy, his joy must find an outlet in voice and an 
expression in movement. The outcries and movements, and the inner 
emotional changes which occasion them, must be given full expression 
in accordance with the way of man. Man must have his joy, and joy must 
have its expression, but if that expression is not guided by the principles 
of the Way, then it will inevitably become disordered. The former kings 
hated such disorder, and therefore they created the musical forms of the 
odes and hymns in order to guide it. In this way they made certain that 
the voice would fully express the feelings of joy without becoming wild 
and abandoned, that the form would be well ordered but not unduly 
restrictive, that the directness, complexity, intensity, and tempo of the 
musical performance would be of the proper degree to arouse the best in 
man's nature, and that evil and improper sentiments would find no 
opening to enter by. It was on this basis that the former kings created 
their music. 
When music is performed in the ancestral temple of the ruler... When it is 
performed within the household... And when it is performed in the 
community... [it] brings about complete unity and induces harmony... It is 
sufficient to lead men in the single Way or to bring order to ten thousand 
changes. 
Music enters deeply into men and transforms them rapidly. Therefore, 
the former kings were careful to give it the proper form. When music is 
moderate and tranquil, the people become harmonious and shun 
excess. When music is stern and majestic, the people become well 
behaved and shun disorder... Then the fame of the state will become 
known abroad, its glory will shine forth greatly, and all people within the 
four seas will long to become its subjects. 
But if music is seductive and depraved, then the people will become 
abandoned and mean-mannered. Those who are abandoned will fall 
into disorder; those who are mean-mannered will fall into quarreling; and 
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where there is disorder and quarreling, the troops will be weak the cities 
will revolt, and the state will be menaced by foreign enemies In such a 
he common people will find no safety in their dwellings and no 
delight in their communities, and they will feel only dissatisfaction toward 
heir superiors. Hence, to turn away from the proper rites and music and 
to allow evil music to spread is the source of danger and disgrace For 
this reason the former kings honored the proper rites and music and 
despised evil music... It is the duty of the chief director of music to 
enforce the ordinances and commands, to examine songs and writinas 
and to abolish licentious music, attending to all matters at the appropriate 
time, so that strange and barbaric music is not allowed to confuse the 
elegant classical modes. 
...Music is something which the sage kings found joy in, for it has the 
power to make good the hearts of the people, to influence men deeply 
and to reform their ways and customs with facility. Therefore, the former 
kings guided the people with rites and music, and the people became 
harmonious. If the people have emotions of love and hatred, but no ways 
in which to express their joys or anger, then they will become 
disordered... 
The gentleman utilizes bells and drums to guide his will, and lutes and 
zithers to gladden his heart... Therefore, the purity of his music is 
modeled after Heaven, its breadth is modeled after the earth, and its 
posturings and turnings imitate the four seasons. Hence, through the 
performance of music the will is made pure, and through the practice of 
rites the conduct is brought to perfection, the eyes and ears become 
keen, the temper becomes harmonious and calm, and customs and 
manners are easily reformed. All the world becomes peaceful and joins 
together in the joy of beauty and goodness... The gentleman takes joy in 
carrying out the Way; the petty man takes joy in gratifying his desires. He 
who curbs his desires in accordance with the Way will be joyful and free 
from disorder, but he who forgets the Way in the pursuit of desire will fall 
into delusion and joylessness. Therefore, music is the means of guiding 
virtue. When music is performed, the people will set their faces toward 
the true direction. Hence, music is the most effective means to govern 
men...26 
In the Four Books and the Hsun Tzu. // and music are said to have been 
formulated by the ancient sage kings in order to have their kingdoms perfectly 
ordered, happy, and harmonious. Professor H. G. Creel, however, points out 
that the elaborate systems of metaphysical ideas, such as "linking music with 
numerology, magic, and government," "does not appear in the books of the 
period before 600 B.C." He says further that, 
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It was said that the morals and even the future of a state could be known 
by examining its music, so that the king might use this means of learni^n 
whether his vassals ruled their territories well or ill. But all this appears to 
be the philosophical elaboration of a later day.27 PP 0 
If this is the case, then, it was Confucius and his followers who made music a 
pedagogically valuable agent in their moral training of the future chun tzu. 
Confucius loved music and knew how to play certain instruments. Music 
was important in his life in letting out his swollen feelings of happiness and 
sadness, satisfaction and despair in a cultivated way. A passage in the 
Analects reports how the notes Confucius was playing one day on the stone 
chimes, expressing his disappointment at his failure to get public employment 
and be understood, sounded pathetic and frustrated to the ears of a discerning 
listener, 28 It reads: 
While the Master was playing the stone chimes in Wei, a man who 
passed in front of the door, carrying a basket, said, "The way he plays the 
stone chimes is fraught with frustrated purpose.” Presently he added, 
"How squalid this stubborn sound is. If no one understands him, then he 
should give up, that is all. 
When the water is deep, go across by wading; 
When it is shallow, lift your hem and cross." 
The Master said, "That is indeed an easy way out."29 (XIV. 42: Lau- 
Waley) 
In another passage, the Analects reports how Confucius loved good songs and 
to sing them along with others. "When in the Master's presence anyone sang a 
song that he liked, he did not join in at once, but asked for it to be repeated and 
then joined in." (VII. 31: Waley) 
Widely versed in various musical forms of his time and keenly aware of 
what music could do to man's soul and his development of character in 
particular, Confucius contrasted the good and the bad music, honestly showing 
his personal preference to the former. For example, about the musical pieces 
known as Shao and Wu, he made the following statements.30 
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The Master said of the Shao that it was perfectly beautiful and also 
peS good. (A: T£: ‘SiSP* “ “ P8rteC"y b6aUti,Ul but 
Yen Yuan asked how the government of a country should be 
administered. The Master said, "...Let the music be the Shao with its 
pantomimes. Banish the songs of Chang, and keep far from specioLs 
talkers. The songs of Chang are licentious; specious talkers are 
dangerous." (A: XV. 10. v. vi: Legge) 6 
Of the piece of music called the Kwan Tseu, which accompanied the singing of 
the first song or poem in the Book of Poetry Confucius said: 
The Kwan Tseu is expressive of enjoyment without being licentious and 
of grief without being hurtfully excessive. (A: III. 20: Legge) 
When the Music-Master Chin begins to play and when the Kwan Tseu 
comes to its end, how the sound fills the ear! (A: VIII. 15: Lau) 
While convening with the Music-Masters of Lu, Confucius said: 
Their music [the music of the ancients] in so far as one can find out about 
it began with a strict unison. Soon the musicians were given more liberty 
[to improvise]; but the tone remained harmonious, brilliant, consistent 
right on till the close. (A: III. 23: Waley) 
Confucius, expressing his preference for the classical to the modern music, 
said: 
The men of former times, in the matter of ceremonies and music, were 
rustics, meaning whose music was purer without excessive 
ornamentation, while the men of these latter times, in ceremonies and 
music, are accomplished gentlemen. If I have occasion to use those 
things, I follow the men of former times. (A: XI. 1: Legge) 
Mencius, too, according to a tradition, loved music as much as Confucius 
did and valued it for its pedagogical effects on man as Confucius had, and 
expressed his preference for the classical music to the modern in a 
conversation with the king of Ch'i. 
When Mencius was received by the King, he said, "Is it true that Your 
Majesty told Chuang Tzu that you were fond of music?" 
The King blushed and said, "It is not the music of the Former Kings 
that I am capable of appreciating. I am merely fond of today's popular 
music." 
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antiquitymakes SffiS&T ** °' °f 'he ™SiC °< 
Can I hear more about this9" 
the cornpanj?ofrnSny?8ni0yment in the C°mpany °'3 ,ew or e"i™ 
"In the company of many.” 
"Let me tell you about enjoyment. Now suppose you were havinn * 
hel|kCaanHPrirf0rmanCw tJere' and When the pe°p|e h®ard ,he sound of your 
arhfnn h dH ms !he n0tes of your pipes and ,lu,es they all with V 
aching heads and knitted brows said to one another, 'In being fond of 
™isic' why does our King bring such straits that fathers and sons do not 
see each other, and brothers, wives and children are parted and 
scattered. ... On the other hand, suppose you were having a musical 
performance here, and when the people heard the sound of your bells 
and drums and the notes of your pipes and flutes they all looked pleased 
and said to one another, 'Our King must be in good health, otherwise 
how could he have music performed?' Now if you shared your 
enjoyment with the people, you would be a true King." (M: I. B. 1: Lau) 
In this dialogue, Mencius was clearly implying that the ruler's love of popular, 
mundane music was one of the causes of the people's suffering and 
unhappiness, thus Mencius' belief that "Through its music one can know the 
moral quality of its ruler.” (M: II. A. 2. xxvii) Confucius also said, "If a man be 
without the virtues proper to humanity or jen, what has he to do with music?" 
(A: III. 3: Legge) 
Confucius and his followers studied music not only for the means it 
provided to express in a cultivated way their inner feelings, but also for the 
harmonious, ordered, and virtuous character worthy of chun tzu it could nurture 
in them. 
The Study of Moral Principles 
In discussing the remaining three "things" mentioned in VII. 24 in the 
Analects, it is only logical to discuss them along with other specific virtues 
mentioned in the Four Books, because in teaching specific virtues Confucius 
and Mencius did not take up one virtue after another in a systematic way, but 
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several virtues at once, thus indicating that all specific moral acts are generated 
by the single moral reservoir or source called yen «=.) in its broad sense. 
At any rate, hsing (ft), the first of the three remaining things Confucius 
is said to have taught, cannot be considered as a specific virtue like the other 
two things, namely chung (&), and hsin </f |). The character,If (hsing), 
originally represented the picture of a crossroad, and as a verb it means to walk, 
to do, to act, to travel; and as a noun, it means, actions, conduct, behavior, etc.31 
Therefore, Legge's rendition of the word as "ethics" and Lau's as "moral 
conduct" are acceptable. Then, hsing must be considered as a course which 
investigates the philosophical principles of all virtues and the methods of 
application of those virtues in actual life. 
The other two things - chung, which means faithfulness, devotion, 
honesty, loyalty, etc., and hsin, which means good faith, truthfulness, 
trustworthiness, etc. - are only two of the many other social virtues and need to 
be discussed along with others for their fuller meaning as this section of the 
study progresses. 
According to Confucius, the task of attaining moral excellence of jen is a 
difficult one because jen cannot be given by others, but can only be attained by 
the individual who seeks it through self-cultivation. It is a heavy burden to 
acquire and carry jen,32 but not an impossible task. He said, "Is jen indeed far 
off? I crave for jen and lo! Jen is right here." (A: VII. 29) Even so, its difficulty is 
increased, for jen requires the knowledge of all other virtues and the wisdom to 
know the ways to practice virtues comfortably in actual human situations. 
Indiscriminate and inflexible application of any one of these virtues may well 
produce negative results. Therefore, one must know the fundamental spirit or 
principles of Perfect Virtue or jen, so that his moral actions may be in harmony 
with jen. 
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The Chinese character for yen is formed by adding to the character for 
man (A.) the character for two (i.), making it clear that the concept of yen 
is a relationship between man and man or two men. Therefore, the man of yen 
«=) is one who can relate himself as a human being to another human being 
or other human beings with all their innate and distinct human qualities 
according to //. What is yen according to the early Confucians in the Eggr 
Books? In the Analects, we read: 
When Chung Kung asked the meaning of jen, the Master said, "When 
abroad behave as though you were receiving an important guest. When 
employing the services of the common people behave as though you 
were officiating at an important ceremony. Do not impose on others what 
you yourself do not desire. In this way you will be free from ill will 
whether in a state or in a family." (XII. 2: Lau-Shin) 
Tzu Kung asked, "Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduct 
throughout one's life?" The Master said, "It is perhaps the word 'shu' 
fiS)- Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire " (XV 
24: Lau) ' 
The Master said, "Ts'an! There is one single thread binding my way 
together." 
Tseng Tzu assented. 
After the Master had gone out, the disciples asked, "What did he 
mean?" 
Tseng Tzu said, "The way of the Master consists in doing one's best 
(chung) and in using oneself as a measure to gauge others (shu). That is 
all." (IV. 15: Lau) 
The Master said, "As for jen - you yourself desire rank and standing; then 
help others to get rank and standing. You want to turn your own merits to 
account; then help others to turn theirs to account - in fact, the ability to 
take one's own feelings as a guide - that is the sort of thing that lies in the 
direction of i£n-" (VI. 28: Waley) 
In the Book of Mencius, we read: 
Mencius said, "There is no greater joy for me than to find, on self- 
examination, that I am true to myself. Try your best to treat others as you 
would wish to be treated yourself (or try your best to be shu). and you will 
find that this is the shortest way to benevolence (or to jan)." (VII. A. 4: 
Lau-Shin) 
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Sa‘d’ "!! 'S °f the essence of man’s nature that he do good That 
Honwinn h™3" ?00cl ,f 3 man does what is evil he is guiltvof the sin of 
of I!" 31 endowment. Every man has a sense of pity a sense 
of shame, a sense of respect, a sense of right and wrong. From his 
sense of pity comes jen (Humanity); from his sense of shame comes vi 
(Justice); from his sense of respect, H (the observance of rites)- from Ns 
fnefnrnm 58* ^ T"9’ ^ <Wisdom>- JfllL 1L and dull do not soak 
in from without, we have them within ourselves... So I say 'Seek them 
and you have them. Disregard them and you lose them (VI A fi- 
Dobson) * v • 
Mencius said, "It is a feeling common to all mankind that they cannot bear 
to see others suffer... I say that all men have such feelings because on 
seeing a child about to fall into a well, everyone has a feeling of horror or 
distress... Not to feel distress (at the suffering of others) would be 
contrary to all human feelings... This feeling of distress is the first siqn of 
m” (II. A. 6: Dobson) y 
Shu, translated as "consideration" (Waley) and as "reciprocity" (Dobson) 
meaning "Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you,” clearly 
means that the practice of jen consists of putting oneself into the position of 
others. If personally ambitious to succeed in life, to be aware of the same in 
others is shu. The virtue of chung is explained as faithfulness or devotion to 
others, in that desiring to be successful oneself, one also helps others to be 
successful. Therefore to practice shu and chung is to practice jen. 
As we can see in the excerpts from the Book of Mencius cited above, 
Mencius identified jen with man's innate "sense of pity" (Dobson) and "the 
feelings that cannot bear to see others suffer." (Dobson) Mencius coined two 
phrases to explain this distinct moral quality in man: tse yin chih hsin 
( T§'i /^') and Jan ren chih hsin ( )• 
Legge rendered both phrases as "the feeling of commiseration" and Lau 
rendered the first phrase as "the heart of compassion" and the second as "a 
heart sensitive to the suffering of others." At any rate, to Mencius, this feeling of 
compassion, pity, commiseration, distress at or sensitivity to the suffering of 
others pertains to jen and is jen. "This feeling, which is jen, is the mind of man,” 
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said Mencius, and "The whole purport of learning is nothing more than this: to 
regain the mind that has strayed." (VI. A. 11: Dobson) 
In cultivating yen or Perfect Virtue, the early Confucians taught the virtue 
of sincerity, truthfulness, or trustworthiness as extremely important, using the 
two characters \h{hsin) and i^{cheng). It is interesting to note that both 
characters are formed by combining the character for "word or words" {\ ) 
with the character for "man or men" (A-) for hsin (4t), and for cheng 
(t$) the character for "word or words" with another character for "to 
complete or perfect, thus denoting that hsin and cheng have something to do 
with what one speaks to man or men and completing or perfecting what one has 
spoken. 
About hsin, which is the last of the "four things" Confucius taught 
according to VII. 24 in the Analects, the Master said, "If a man lacks sincerity or 
hsin, I do not know how he can get on, any more than a wagon could without a 
yoke for attaching the horse." (A: II. 23: Creel)33 One of his followers, the 
philosopher Tsang, said, "I daily examine myself on three points: whether, in 
transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful (chung); whether in 
intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere {hsin)\ whether I may have 
not mastered and practised the instructions of my teacher." (A: I. 4: Legge) 
When asked by Tzu-chang what yen was, Confucius included sincerity [hsin) 
among the five qualities essential to Perfect Virtue, saying, "Gravity, 
magnanimity, sincerity {hsin), earnestness, and kindness." (A: XII. 6: Legge)34 
However, in the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean, the 
principle of sincerity, using the character cheng (f$), is expounded as being 
of paramount importance in cultivating Perfect Virtue. "What the Great Learning 
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teaches, is - to illustrate illustrious virtue; to love the people?* and to rest in the 
highest Good." (G.L.: text 1: Legge-Shin) Then the same text says: 
Th*ngs have root and tha'r branches. Affairs have their end and 
their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to d 
what is taught in the Great Learning. 
4. The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throuqhout the 
kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their 
states, they first regulated their families. Wising to regulate their families 
they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate9their persons they 
first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first souqht 
to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thouqhts 
they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension lav in 
the investigation of things. y 
5. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete Their 
knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts 
being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being 
rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, 
their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states 
were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole 
kingdom was made tranquil and happy. 
6. From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must 
consider cultivation of the person the root of everything besides. (Legge) 
In short, the above passages clearly mean that a man's wish to be truly sincere 
by extending his knowledge through investigation of things is the beginning of 
his moral self-cultivation. In the Doctrine of the Mean, the virtue of cheng is 
further discussed in the following passages. 
Sincerity is the end and the beginning of all things; without sincerity, 
there is nothing. Therefore, the superior man regards the attainment of 
sincerity the highest excellence. (XXV. 2) 
He who attains to sincerity, is he who chooses what is good, and 
firmly holds it fast. 
To this attainment there are requisite the extensive study of what is 
good, accurate inquiry about it, careful reflection on it, the clear 
discrimination of it, and the earnest practice of it. (XX. 19: Legge) 
The possessor of sincerity develops not himself only; with it, he also 
develops others. To develop himself completely is to be truly virtuous (or 
jSQ). (XXV. 3) 
It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can 
exist under Heaven, who can give full development to his nature. Able to 
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give its full development to his own nature he 
nature of other men. (XXII: Legge) can do to same to the 
He who has sincerity without effort hits what is right and discerns with™,. 
Wayn0(XXth108:9LeSgghee) 'S 3 ^ Wh° naturally and readily <°"°ws the 
In the Analects. Confucius once said, 
The leaving of virtue without proper cultivation; the not thorouqhlv 
discussing what is learned; not being able to move towards 
righteousness of which a knowledge is gained; and not being able to 
change what is not good: these are the things which occasion me 
solicitude. (A: VII. 3: Legge) 
The Dggtrine qf fllfl Mean says the man of sincerity "can assist the transforming 
and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth." (XXII: Legge) Then it says, "It is 
only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under 
heaven, who can transform others." (XXIII) Sincerity is an active and powerful 
moral force which 'without display, it becomes manifested; without any 
movement, it produces changes; and without any effect, it accomplishes its 
ends." (XXVI. 6: Legge) 
To attain sincerity, which can radiate such transforming influence, one 
must make "a hundred" or even "a thousand efforts"36 until he knows what is 
good. In the text, it is said: 
The superior man, while there is anything he has not studied, or while in 
what he has studied there is anything he cannot understand, will not 
intermit his labour. While there is anything he has not inquired about, or 
anything in what he has inquired about which he does not know, he will 
not intermit his labour. While there is anything which he has not reflected 
on, or anything in what he has reflected on which he does not 
apprehend, he will not intermit his labour. While there is anything which 
he has not discriminated, or his discrimination is not clear, he will not 
intermit his labour. If there be anything which he has not practised, or his 
practise fails in earnestness, he will not intermit his labour. (D.M.: XX. 
20: Legge) 
Let a man proceed in this way, and, though dull, he will surely become 
intelligent; though weak, he will surely become strong. (D.M.: XX. 21: 
Legge) 
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Therefore, to be cheng or sincere is, like to be jen or perfectly virtuous, difficult 
and burdensome, because it requires the persistent searching for the 
knowledge of Good. It is clear that in the early Confucian usage, the terms 
cheng and jen were the same aspiration of the chun-tzu-to-be, and it was to 
attain perfect moral excellence. 
Moreover, as jen comprehends a multitude of other social virtues, so 
does cheng. When Fan Chih asked about yen, Confucius said, "It is in retreat, to 
be grave or kung (^); in the management of business, to be reverently 
attentive or ching ($0; in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere or 
chung {&)” (A: XIII. 19: Legge) When Tsze-chang asked about jen, he 
said, "To be able to practice five things everywhere and under heaven 
constitutes yen," and they are, "gravity or kung generosity or kwan 
(%)> sincerity or hsin (>fe), earnestness or min (4afc), and kindness or hui 
(A: XVII. 6: Legge) Confucius also said, "The superior man in 
everything considers justice or yi (jfc) to be essential. He performs it 
according to //. He brings it forth in humility or sun He completes it with 
sincerity or hsin (A: XV. 17: Legge) 
In the Four Books, there are numerous other specific social virtues 
discussed besides the ones cited above, and all of them are treated as practical 
moral acts to be put into practice in the pervasive principle of Perfect Virtue of 
jen or cheng or jen-yi in the Mencius, as one confronts specific human problems 
either as a private individual or as a public official.37 
Confucius said, "There are three things constantly on the lips of the 
gentleman none of which I have succeeded in following: 'A man of 
benevolence never worries about the future; a man of wisdom is never in two 
minds about right and wrong; a man of courage is never afraid.’" (A: XIV. 30: 
Lau) "Wisdom, benevolence, and courage, these three are the virtues 
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universally binding," says the Doctrine of thn Mean (XX. 8) What is wisdom of 
chih {*§)? 
In cultivating moral excellence, all early Confucians stressed the 
importance of using man's unique faculty of reason because, in their view, man 
alone can observe, compare, examine, contemplate, choose, and act according 
to the dictates of his reason. The purpose of reasoning, therefore, is to know, 
and the purpose of knowing is to attain wisdom. Man needs to develop the 
inherent "beginnings of tuan 0$) or yen, yi, //, and chih” in himself, because 
he is born to be human and in his heart he longs to be truly human and prefers 
the rational and just to the irrational and unjust, when he uses his reason, which 
distinguishes him from all other creatures. Mencius said: 
He who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who 
lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a 
feeling of modesty and of yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a 
sense of right and wrong is not a man. 
The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of jgn. The feeling of 
shame and dislike is the beginning of yi. The feeling of modesty and 
yielding is the beginning of li. The sense of right and wrong is the 
beginning of chih or wisdom. 
Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them 
know to give them their full development and completion, and the result 
will be like fire that begins to burn, or of a spring which has begun to vent. 
Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect 
all within the four seas. (M: II. A. 6: Bodde)38 
Indiscriminate accumulation of knowledge would not give a man his 
wisdom. He must learn to distinguish between right and wrong, human and 
inhuman, proper and improper. In the words of Mencius: "The wise embrace all 
knowledge, but they are most earnest about what is of the greatest importance." 
(M: VII. B. 46: Legge) 
Fan Chih asked what constituted wisdom. Confucius said, "To give one's 
self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual 
beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom." (A: VI. 20: 
Legge) 
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The man of wisdom to Confucius is he who knows his obligation to his 
fellowmen to be more important than his obligation to supernatural beings. 
The next virtue to be studied is that of courage or yung (j|). Yung is 
free from fear as Confucius said, "The man of courage is never afraid," (A: IX. 
28) but not reckless as the following passages reveal. 
Tzu-lu said, "If you were leading the Three Armies, whom would you 
take with you? 1 
The Master said, "I would not take with me anyone who would try to 
fight a tiger with his bare hands or to walk across the river and die in the 
process without regrets. If I took anyone it would have to be a man who 
when faced with a task, was fearful of failure and who, while fond of 
making plans, was capable of successful execution." (A: VII. 10: Lau) 
Tzu-lu said, "does the gentleman consider couraqe a suDreme 
quality?" 
The Master said, "For the gentleman it is morality (yi) that is supreme. 
Possessed of courage but devoid of morality, a gentleman will make 
trouble while a small man will be a brigand. (A: XVII. 23: Lau) 
Tzu-kung said, "Does even the gentleman have dislikes?" 
The Master said, "Yes... The gentleman has his dislikes... He 
dislikes those who, while possessing courage, lack the spirit of ]L. 
The Master asked, "Do you, Ssu, have your dislikes as well?" 
"I dislike those in whom insolence passes for courage..." (A: XVII. 
24: Lau) 
To Confucius, "to see which is right (yi) and not to do it is want of courage" (A: II. 
24: Legge); therefore, "the man of jen must necessarily have courage." (A: XIV. 
5) "For Gentlemen of purpose and men of jen while it is inconceivable that they 
should seek to stay alive at the expense of jen, it may happen that they have to 
accept death in order to have jen accomplished." (A: XV. 8: Lau) 
Mencius had his own phrase, pu tung hsin which 
means "the mind that does not waver" or "the mind that remains unmoved," to 
explain courage. Asked about the way to develop the mind that cannot be 
moved or stirred, he said: 
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„ Jh.? W'^S commander over the cm,40 while the chi is that which lilk 
the b°dy. The halts where the will arrives. HencTii is said “Take 
hold of your will and do not abuse your ch'i" 
As you have already said that the chi rests where the will arrives 
what is the point of going on to say, "Take hold of your will and do not 
abuse your chi?"... May I ask what your strong points are? 
I have an insight into words. I am good at cultivating my "flood-like 
May I ask what this "flood-like sM" is? 
It is difficult to explain. This is a qM which is, in the highest degree 
T* >ny,n n,n£- Uou"shJx with inte9rity and place no obstacle in its 
path and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth. It is a chi which 
unites rightness and the Way. Deprive it of these and it will collapse. It is 
born of accumulated rightness and cannot be appropriated by anyone 
through a sporadic show of rightness. Whenever one acts in a way that 
falls below the standard set in one's heart, it will collapse... 
You must work at it and never let it out of your mind. At the same 
time, while you must never let it out of your mind, you must not forcibly 
help it grow either... (M: II. A. 2. ix-xvi: Lau) 
In short, according to Mencius, true courage or pu tung hsin is possible when a 
man’s whole being is flooded with the ch'i called hao ran chih ch'i 
tjfL). which is born of principles of Perfect Virtue and 
nourished constantly by them. In the words of Tseng Tzu, courage is "When, on 
self-examination, I find that I am upright, I will go forward against thousands and 
tens of thousands." (M: II. A. 2. vii: Lau) The man of courage in the Confucian 
ideal has moral courage, and physical courage, however thoughtfully executed, 
is an inferior sort. 
Another moral precept extensively discussed in the Analects and the 
Book of Mencius is that of hsiau $f) of "filial piety." About the virtue of filial 
piety, the Analects has the following passages: 
Meng I Tzu asked about the treatment of parents. The Master said, 
"Never disobey!" 
Fan Chih (who was driving his carriage for him) said, "In what sense 
did you mean it?" 
The Master said, "While they are alive, serve them according to li. 
When they die, bury them according to li and sacrifice to them according 
to li." (II. 5: Waley) 
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Meng We p0 asked about the treatment of parents. The Master said 
Behave in such a way that your father and mother have no anxiety about 
you, except concerning your health." (II. 6: Waley) y 
The Master said, "In serving his father and mother a man may qentlv 
remonstrate with them. But if he sees that he has failed to chanqe their 
opinion he should resume an attitude of deference and not thwart them- 
may feel discouraged, but not resentful. (IV. 18: Waley) 
The Master said, "If for the whole three years of mourning a son manaqes 
to carry on the household exactly in his father's day, then he is a good9 
son indeed." (IV. 20: Waley) y 
The Master said, "A man should not be ignorant of the age of his father 
and mother. It is a matter, on the one hand, for rejoicing and, on the other 
hand, for anxiety." (IV. 21: Lau) 
Mencius said, "There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no 
posterity is the greatest of them." (M: IV. A. 26: Legge) Certainly, all the acts or 
duties mentioned above are commendable aspects of filial piety; to the early 
Confucians, it meant more than just performing prescribed duties. Confucius 
said: 
Nowadays for a man to be filial means no more than that he is able to 
provide his parents with food. Even dogs and horses are, in some way, 
provided with food. If a man shows no reverence, where is the 
difference? (A: II. 7: Lau) 
Tzu-hsia asked about being filial. The Master said, "What is difficult to 
manage is the expression of one's face. As for the young taking on the 
burden when there is work to be done or letting the old enjoy the wine 
and the food when these are available, that hardly deserves to be called 
filial." (A: II. 8: Lau)41 
They considered filial piety as a basic virtue of great importance in the following 
passages. Mencius said: 
Humanity (ienl attains its finest flower in the service of parents. (M: IV. A. 
27: Dobson) 
There are many duties one should discharge, but the fulfillment of one's 
duty towards one’s parents is the most basic. (M: IV. A. 19: Lau) 
If only everyone loved his parents and treated his elders with deference, 
the Empire would be at peace. (M: IV. A. 12: Lau) 
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In the Analects, we read: 
It is rare for a man who is filial to his parents and obedient to his elders tn 
nnle '"CVna,IOn t0 tr3ns9ress against his superiors; it is unheard of for 
one who has no such inclination to be inclined to start a rebellion The 
fn?^°n.h8rn °Vhe 9enlleman is 10 the roots and fundamentals of thinqs 
MieHn h lhe f ar® 'established, the Way will grow therefrom. Being9 ' 
'a l .h s p,aren’s anvd obedient to his elders: are they not the root of 
v'- Lau-bnin) 
The tie between a man and his parents being the closest of all human 
relationships, it is not difficult to understand why Confucius and Mencius 
considered filial piety to be one of the basic moral obligations of man to other 
human beings. The practice of any virtue at all was naturally expected to begin 
with and among the members of his own family, but filial piety is only a branch 
of yen. And jen is the root. When a man's genuine nature jen with its inherent 
feelings of commiseration (shu) and loyalty (chung) expresses itself in treatment 
of his own parents, it automatically becomes filial piety. When Mencius said, 
"There has never been a man possessing jen who neglected his parents," (M: I. 
A. 1. v: Legge), probably he was implying this. 
At this point, it must be noted that, in Confucian moral education, the 
study of religion has no place in the curriculum. Although the existence of 
spirits, gods, and ghosts is recognized, the early Confucians do not credit them 
as having any power in shaping man's moral character. 
However, the concept of tien, generally rendered in English as Heaven, 
imparts a considerable influence on a man's moral cultivation, but only as a 
distant but perfect model for him to contemplate upon and emulate. The word 
tien (£z) primarily means sky, heaven, or firmament. Its meaning extended, 
tien represents Nature or the Universe. It also expresses the idea of something 
natural, as opposed to anything artificial. Giancarlo Finazzo further spells out its 
additional meanings in the following words. "The remoteness of the sky, its 
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immensity and its beauty are such that man is induced to employ the term 
denoting it, to signify anything supreme, mysterious and pure."42 Finazzo's 
arrangement of the moral qualities of Heaven as described in the Four Bonks is 
transcribed below. Noting that the term tien also indicates "the energy 
pervading all natural things," he wrote: 
This conceptual value which the word stands for finds its clearest 
enunciation in Monq tse V. A. 6. ii: "All this is lien, what could not be 
made by man; that which is done without man's doing it is tien " 
This energy that pervades things and acts as their organizing principle 
operates silently: "the doings of the supreme li^n have neither sound nor 
smell (DM: XXXIII. 6); "does tien speak? The four seasons follow their 
course and all things are produced, vet does tien speak?" (A- XVII 19 
iii); "li£Q does not speak." (M: V. A. 5. iv) 
This silent activity is thus peculiar to all natural things; we read f.i. that 
"the four limbs do not speak and yet understand," (M: VII. A. 21. iv) 
inferring that they know naturally how to operate and to arrange 
themselves, (yiz. also M: VII. A. 38) 
Its ways are therefore defined as "unfathomable" (DM: XXVI. 7); 
"extensive and substantial"; "lofty and shining"; "far-reaching and 
permeating"; "profound and endless." (DM: XXVI. 8. 10) 
Its activity appears to be one of "supporting, covering and containing all 
things" (DM: XXX. 1. 2.), i.e. "all embracing" (DM: XXXI. 3), and following 
a "cyclical progression" comparable to the progression of the four 
seasons and the successive shining of the sun and the moon. (DM: 
XXX. 1.2) 
This power, furthermore, "nourishes all things" and makes them pursue 
their way "without resistance." 
The magnitude of their doings is what makes "heaven and earth" so 
great. (DM: XXX. 3) They produce things in a veracious way which 
excludes "duplicity," rectifications of repetitions (DM: XXVI. 7), letting 
things have "one root" (M: III. A. 5. iii) and manifesting a power which is 
the one "true virtue." (DM: XXXII. 3) 
To the Chinese, there was a common principle of moral order throughout 
the Universe of which human society was only a part. They saw in the Universe 
or Heaven a moral paragon no chun tzu-to-be should ignore. Having observed 
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and listed the main qualities of Heaven, they concluded that "the way of Heaven 
is Sincerity." The purpose of their education being to help men attain "sincerity" 
or cheng, they taught them to get inspiration and learn from the way of Heaven. 
This is what Confucius meant when he said, "Without recognizing the ordinance 
of Heaven it is impossible to be a superior man." (A: XX. 3: Legge) The 
DagtrinQ gf lhfi Mqgn, agreed with him, saying, "In order to know men, the 
superior man may not dispense with the knowledge of Heaven." (XX. 7: Legge) 
We must not forget, however, though the knowledge of Heaven is very 
important, Heaven cannot make man like itself with all the Heavenly qualities 
cited above. Thus, "Sincerity is the way of Heaven," but "the attainment of 
sincerity is the way of man." (DM: XX. 18: Legge) As humanists, the early 
Confucians denied even Heaven to have any power to make man virtuous. It 
was entirely the responsibility of each man to cultivate his innate moral 
qualities, which Heaven had given him.43 
Finally, there is a word frequently used in the Four Books with moral 
overtone: the word is tao (3J). Tao simply means "way" or "road," for 
example, tao as the way of Heaven and Earth (DM: XXVI. 7. 8) or the way of 
ease (M: VII. A. 12) or "the crooked way or the straight way" as used in A: XVIII. 
2. 
When it is used as in A. XV. 31, which reads: "The Master said, ’A 
gentleman, in his plans, thinks of the way; he does not think how he is going to 
make a living... But a gentleman’s anxieties concern the progress of the Way; 
he has no anxiety concerning poverty,"' (Waley) tao is the way of moral principle 
or "truth," as Legge interpreted it. In the Four Books, tao is used almost always 
denoting it as the way to moral excellence. The following few passages will be 
sufficient to show it. 
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The Master said, "The Way is not far from man. When men seek the 
S ?y,n9Mr fW?y fr°? man*thiS COurse cannot be considered the way. (DM. XIII. 1: Legge) 
"Loyalty tebuna) and reciprocity (situ) are not far away from the Wav 
What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others" (DM- 
XIII. 3: Legge) ' 
Tszu-hsia said, "The gentleman studies, that he may perfect himself in 
the Way." (A: XIX. 7: Waley-Shin) 
The Master said, "It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way It is 
not the Way that is capable of broadening Man." (A: XV. 28: Lau) 
Tao, then, understood as the way to moral perfection, is what the chun- 
tzu-Xo-be must certainly know. The utmost importance of knowing the Way is 
expressed by Confucius in the following statement: "If one hears the Way in the 
morning, he may die in the evening without regret." (A: IV. 8) And, as with the 
road, the Way, too, is frequently in need of repair and extension. That is why 
education, which is the training of man in the capacity of "broadening the Way," 
becomes very important. 
In the Dialogues 
The entire curriculum proposed by Socrates-Plato for their ideal state is 
geared to the production of men and women of the highest virtue. They wanted 
only those courses of study which will induce those students with natural 
aptitudes for guardianship to cultivate their philosophic minds in the soul to 
acquire knowledge of the ultimate virtue. 
The children start receiving education at the age of three, first in music for 
the mind and then in gymnastics for the body. The term ^ou<ru<.^ 
for music, as used in the text, has no English equivalent. Music as a curricula, 
like wen {X) in the Confucian system, included not only playing the lyre and 
the study of music in general, it also included other subjects such as poetry, 
letters, culture, and philosophy.44 The education in music for the young children 
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included not only singing and dancing, but also listening to stories created by 
poets. They are unable yet to read themselves, so the stories are told to them 
and most of these stories they now tell, we must reject," says Socrates. 
To Socrates, it is extremely important to tell the right kind of stories in a 
correct manner, because "the beginning in every task is the chief thing, 
especially for any creature that is young and tender." (Rep.: 377 B) Most Greek 
stories are derived from legends and myths and do not always tell the truth 
about the gods. These stories are made by poets, and in Socrates’ view almost 
all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, are tellers of false stories about the 
gods for they are ignorant of the true nature of the gods. In the Apology. 
Socrates states: 
I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the 
rest... taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been 
most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I 
might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed 
to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was 
hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than 
they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the 
case of the poets also I presently recognized this, that what they 
composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because 
they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also 
say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident 
to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. 
And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, 
thought they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they 
were not. (22 B-C) 
Socrates thinks that there are two kinds of stories, the one true and the 
other false, and that the false stories must be banned. If the stories are about 
god, "the true qualities of god we must always surely attribute to him whether we 
compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse... And is not god of course good in 
reality and always to be spoken of as such?" says Socrates. (Rep.: 379 B) His 
complaint about the existing literature and poetry is that it does not illustrate the 
gods as they really are. Insisting on his own view of god as nothing but good, 
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Socrates asserts that god cannot be the cause of evil things. He says, "This 
then will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods to which 
speakers and poets will be required to conform that God is not the cause of the 
things, but only of the good." (Efift.: 380 C) Therefore, he says, "we shall 
condemn as a foolish error Homer's description of Zeus as the dispenser alike 
of good and of evil to mortals." (Ml.: 379 E) And "we surely will not say that 
God is deficient in either beauty or virtue," says Socrates. (Rep.: 381 C) In 
short, the children must be taught to understand that the gods are unchanging, 
non-deceptive, and truthful. Moreover, the stories which discourage bravery 
and moderation must not be told, and also the stories which suggest that 
injustice is profitable must be forbidden.45 
The children, especially older ones, are allowed to take part in telling the 
stories by reciting certain lines or imitating certain characters in the stories, but 
they are allowed only the parts of the good men. Socrates gives the reason for 
this restriction as follows: 
If they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate 
to them - men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of 
the kind but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor 
be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the 
imitation they imbibe the reality. Or have you not observed that 
imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and 
[second] nature in the body, the speech, and the thought? (R: 395 C-D) 
He forbids his guardians-to-be to play many different roles in a performance for 
the simple reason that "each one can practice well only one pursuit and not 
many, but if he attempts the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of 
distinction in all... And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same 
man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one?" (Rep.: 394 E) 
"Neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comedies." (Ml.: 395 
B) Moreover, the future guardians are neither allowed to imitate the characters 
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of women, slaves, and undisciplined men, nor the sounds and noises of 
animals and other things, such as "the roar of the sea and the thunder and 
everything of that kind." (Mi.: 395 D - 396 B) 
To Socrates, the style and manner of telling stories are equally important 
as the content of stories. After identifying basically three styles of audio-visual 
representation of stories, he favors the simple third-person narrative style over 
the styles that require dramatic imitation only and that combine narration and 
imitation. He says, "For ourselves, we shall for our own good employ story¬ 
tellers and poets who are severe rather than amusing, who portray the style of 
the good man and in their works abide by the principles we laid down for 
them..." (Mi.: 397 C) Aiming at training the future guardians in truthfulness, 
goodness, courage, and modesty in their character, Socrates does not think it 
right to expose them while they are young to fictitious literature and allow them 
to play the roles of undesirable characters or multiple roles even in an accepted 
performance. 
The training in "music" as we understand the term today was very 
important. In the Timaeus. we read: 
Concerning sound also and hearing... they were bestowed by the 
Gods... 
Music, too, in so far as it uses audible sound, was bestowed for the 
sake of harmony. And harmony, which has motions akin to the 
revolutions of the Soul within us, was given by the Muses to him who 
makes intelligent use of the Muses, not as an aid to irrational pleasure, 
as is now supposed, but as an auxiliary to the inner revolution of the 
Soul, when it has lost its harmony, to assist in restoring it to order and 
concern with itself. 
And because of the unmodulated condition, deficient in grace, which 
exists in most of us, Rhythm also was bestowed upon us to be our helper 
by the same deities and for the same ends. (47 C - E) 
In the above passages from his myth of Creation of the Universe, Plato 
has Timaeus say that music with its harmony and rhythm was with man from the 
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beginning of time and it was to help man keep his soul in order and harmony. 
In the Peppplig. Socrates describes how the works of art in general and music 
in particular can affect man's soul in the following poetic passages. 
Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to 
embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not 
^fnr°^ham°.n9 US’ 0r must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, 
and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the 
illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures'or in 
buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey 
of being forbidden to practise their art among us, that our guardians may 
not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of 
poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day bv 
day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huae 
mass of evil in their own souls. y 
But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature 
are capable of following the train of true beauty and grace, that our young 
men dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from 
all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of 
beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from 
wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly 
guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason... 
And is it not for this reason... that education in music is most 
sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find 
their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with 
them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the 
contrary? 
And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things 
badly made or grown would be most quickly received by one who was 
properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would 
praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his 
soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. 
The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young 
and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came the man 
thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he 
would know her. (401 B - 402 A) 
Socrates imposes the same sort of strict rules on the content and style of 
music as he does on literature, because of the importance of music in education 
and his desire to keep it as an effective course of study in the training of moral 
character of the guardians. 
In its broadest sense, music in ancient Greece consisted of melody, 
dance and poetry, and poetry was always chanted to the accompaniment of 
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instruments and also gestures. The Homeric bard sang his ode and strummed 
his lyre as he told stories.** The song," Socrates says, "is composed ot three 
things, the words, the melody, and the rhythm. And the melody and the rhythm 
must follow the words." ©SB.: 398 A - B) The words being the direct 
expression of man’s reason, therefore, reason must lead also in musical 
performance. 
Socrates dismisses as unsuitable "the dirge-like modes of music " 
identified by his musician friend Glaucon as "the mixed Lydian and the tense 
Lydian modes," and "certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax," 
for they are only suited for drunkenness, unmanliness, and idleness.47 
Confessing his ignorance of other musical modes by name, yet he says, "Leave 
us those two modes - the enforced and the voluntary - that will best represent 
the utterance of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brace - leave us 
these." (Re£.: 398 E - 399 C) He bans those musical instruments of many 
strings or a wide harmonic range, such as harps, zithers, and also the flutes 
which have "the widest harmonic range of all," and allows only the lyre and the 
zithara in the city and "in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to 
pipe on." (jjaid.: 399 C - D) 
Socrates now discusses the importance of rhythm in music and what it 
does to man's soul. In the Republic, he, again confessing his inability to explain 
it in technical terms, insists, nevertheless, that rhythms which suit a life of 
courage and discipline must be allowed.48 He thinks that beauty and ugliness 
result from good rhythm and bad and says: 
Good or bad rhythm and also tunefulness or discord in music go with 
the quality of the poetry; for they will be modelled after its form, if, as we 
have said, metre and music must be adapted to the sense of the words... 
And the content of the poetry and the manner in which it is expressed 
depend, in their turn, on moral character... Thus then, excellence of form 
and content in discourse and of musical expression and rhythm, and 
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grace of form and movement, all depend on goodness of nature bv 
V.nnll n=t6an-K0t.the ,00l'Sh simPlici,V sometimes called by courtesy 
artru“abHsUhedna,Ure in ^ 9°°dneSS °f Character has been well 
h A"d the absence of grace, rhythm, harmony is nearly allied to 
baseness of thought and expression and baseness of character- 
7!®“^ Presence goes with that moral excellence and self-masterv 
of which they are the embodiment. (400 C - 401 A: Cornford) ^ 
"Pleasure is indeed a proper criterion in the arts," Plato has the Athenian 
concede in the LaittS, "but not the pleasure experienced by anybody and 
everybody. The productions of the Muse are at their finest when they delight 
men of high calibre whose education and moral standards reach heights 
attained by no one else." (658 E: Saunders) Deeply distressed by the 
contemporary trends in music and literature which were arousing man's 
passion for pleasure more than his desire for moral excellence, Socrates and 
Plato have a director of music appointed to regulate the arts.49 The director 
must appoint censors of at least fifty years of age and make them select from 
any ancient composition what seems to come up to standard with the 
knowledge that "among the works we have inherited from the past there are a 
great many grand old pieces of music,"50 reject unsuitable ones, and revise or 
rearrange substandard pieces, on the advice of poets and musicians.51 They 
are also charged to regulate the songs suitable for men and those suitable for 
women, "so an elevated manner and courageous instinct must be regarded as 
characteristic of the male, while a tendency to modesty and restraint must be 
presented - theory and law alike - as a peculiarly feminine train." (Laws: 802 E: 
Saunders) They are also responsible to determine whether or not music is 
correctly taught to the young.52 Why all these restriction and censorship? It is 
because: 
...we and these guardians we are to bring up will never be fully cultivated 
until we can recognize the essential form of temperance, courage, 
liberality, high-mindedness, and all other kindred qualities, and also their 
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opposites, wherever they occur. We must be able to discern the 
presence of these forms themselves and also of their images in anythino 
nr? ,tcontams them-realizing that to recognize either, the same skill and9 
practice are required, and that the most insignificant instance is not 
beneath our notice. (R: 402 C: Cornford) 
In concluding this section of study on musical training, it must be 
repeated that for Socrates and Plato only poetry or literature and music fitting all 
above indicated specifications will be permitted in the education of the 
guardians, because there is a connection between beauty and order in music 
and the corresponding features of character and of soul. 
Socrates turns now to the other of the "two formal lessons or courses" 
required of all citizens between the ages of three and twenty, gymnastics or the 
physical training. At the outset of his discussion on gymnastics, he says he 
does not believe "that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but 
on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is 
possible." (Rep.: 403 D) By this statement, Socrates implies that even in 
physical training the soul that can reason soundly can produce a sound result 
and give it its true meaning. 
Gymnastic training involves not just physical exercises, but many other 
things including a regulated life style, correct diet, and competitions. There are 
many things one should not do. For example, from intoxication he must abstain 
(Ibid.: 403 E), even though the drinking party is considered a valuable 
educational medium to test a man’s true nature and also to help him acquire 
and exercise the virtue of self-control by being exposed to conditions in which 
he can be easily tempted to be licentious. (Laws: 645 D - 650 B) Too much 
sleeping and sumptuous eating are mentioned to be the causes of dull mind 
and physical illness and, therefore, must be avoided. (Rep.: 404 A - 405 A) 
Gymnastics is adopted as a curricula not merely to develop strength and 
athletic agility, but "chiefly for the soul's sake." (Mi.: 410 B) And the training in 
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music and gymnastics must be balanced or must compliment each other, 
because "the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they 
should be and those of music softer than is good for them... They must be 
harmoniously adjusted to one another... And the soul of the man thus attuned is 
sober and brave." (Ml.: 410 D-E) "Then he who best blends gymnastics with 
music and applies them most suitably to the soul is a man whom we should 
most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician... 
rather than one who brings the strings into unison with one another." (ibid.: 412 
A) 
However, the training in music and gymnastics for males and females 
between the ages of three and twenty is only the first stage of moral education 
for future leaders of the state. Socrates says, "gymnastics is devoted to that 
which grows and decays of the body. Then this cannot be the study that we 
seek." (Ibid.: 521 E) About the training in music, too, Socrates has the 
following statement to make. 
It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by melody a certain 
harmony of spirit that is not science, and by the rhythm measure and 
grace, and qualities akin to those in the words of tales that are fables and 
those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to 
any such good as you are now seeking. (Ibid.: 522) 
Therefore, to the next stage of moral education, Socrates lists the 
following studies as indispensable: Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and 
harmonics. 
Arithmetic 
To activate and sharpen man's inborn faculty of reason, which alone will 
ultimately seek, contemplate, and acquire the knowledge of the good, the study 
of arithmetic is one of the basic courses Socrates insists that all future 
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guardians must take. "This common thing," says Socrates in the Republic "that 
all arts and forms of thought and all sciences employ... is among the first things 
that everybody must learn." (522 C) Because the mathematical studies 
"naturally conduce to the awakening of thought."53 
In the world of endless dualities to our sense perception, such as of 
bigness and smallness, thickness and thinness, softness and hardness, 
lightness and heaviness, and so on, "naturally," says Socrates, "it is in such 
cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason and 
tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two." (523 B) 
He explains further that "reckoning and the science of arithmetic are wholly 
concerned with number... And the qualities of number appear to lead to the 
apprehension of truth." Therefore, "these would be among the studies that we 
are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a 
philosopher, because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold 
on essence or he can never become a true reckoner... And our guardian is 
soldier and philosopher in one." (525 A - B) Elaborating his point once more 
Socrates says: 
Those who are to take part in the highest functions of state must be 
induced to approach it, not in an amateur spirit, but perseveringly, until, 
by the aid of pure thought, they come to see the real nature of number. 
They are to practise calculation, not like merchants or shopkeepers for 
purposes of buying and selling, but with a view to war and to help in the 
conversion of the soul itself from the world of becoming to truth and 
reality... 
Moreover, talking of this study, it occurs to me now what a fine thing it 
is and in how many ways it will further our intentions, if it is pursued for 
the sake of knowledge and not for commercial ends. As we were saying, 
it has a great power of leading the mind upwards and forcing it to reason 
about pure numbers, refusing to discuss collections of material things 
which can be seen and touched. Good mathematicians, as of course you 
know, scornfully reject any attempt to cut up the unit itself into parts: if 
you try to break it up small, they will multiply it up again, taking good care 
that the unit shall never lose its oneness and appear as a multitude of 
parts... 
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eir^Y°wSee’ thuen’that this study is real|y indispensable for our Duroose 
though, 085 ,h9 mind ,0 arrive at pure '"u,h bV,he exercise o, puT ' 
n=,.„^e y^"®“?8d' too, how people with a talent for calculation are 
£ rSc 2 cf* gaming almost any other subject; and how a training in 
it makes a slow mind quicker, even if it does no other good? 9 
Also, it would not be easy to find many branches for study which 
requ're more effort from the learner. For all these reasons we cannot do 
Cornford) °rm °f training for the most gifted natures- (R- 525 B - 526 C: 
Geometry 
After arithmetic, Socrates identifies geometry as another study that would 
train the soul to direct its vision toward where the essential form of good is.54 
He believes that geometry "can facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good 
and compel the soul to contemplate essence,” thus, it is a suitable study.55 
Socrates explains why geometry can be a right subject of study as follows. 
The real object of the entire study is pure knowledge... That it is the 
knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some 
time comes into being and passes away... for geometry is the knowledge 
of the eternally existent... [Moreover] it would tend to draw the soul to 
truth, and would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind. (R: 527 
A - C: Shorey) 
Like the study of arithmetic, Socrates says that even the by-products of 
the study of geometry are valuable for its uses in war and "for the better 
reception of all studies there will be an immeasurable difference between the 
student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not."56 
Therefore, he concludes, those who dream of building an ideal state should not 
neglect geometry. 
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Astronomy and Harmonics 
After arithmetic and geometry, Socrates now lists astronomy and 
harmonics as two other important subjects his future guardians must study 
before entering the last stage of moral training in dialectics. 
His reasons for picking astronomy and harmonics are briefly explained in 
the Republic as follows. 
It is indeed no trifling task but very difficult to realize that there is in every 
soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled 
afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our 
ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand 
eyes; for by it only is reality beheld. (R: 527 D-E: Shorey) 
To Glaucon's question of how it ought to be taught to meet the expected result, 
Socrates answers: 
[T]hese sparks that paint the sky since they are decoration on a visible 
surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of 
material things: but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth, 
the movements, namely, of real speed and real slowness in true number 
and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of 
the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by 
reason and thought, but not by sight... Then, we must use the blazonry of 
the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities. (R: 529 C - 
E: Shorey)57 
What about harmonics? "As the eyes are framed for astronomy," says 
Socrates, "so the ears are framed for the movements of harmony."58 He 
explains his reason for endorsing harmonics as a valuable study contrary to its 
current use as follows. Having agreed with the Pythagorians who consider 
astronomy and harmonics to be sister sciences, Socrates says: 
[0]nly we must constantly hold by our own principle, not to let our pupils 
take up any study in an imperfect form, stopping short of that higher 
region to which all studies should attain, as we said just now in speaking 
of astronomy. As you will know, the students of harmony make the same 
sort of mistake as the astronomers: they waste their time in measuring 
audible concords and sounds one against another. 
Yes, said Glaucon, they are absurd enough, with their talk of 'groups 
of quarter-tones' and all the rest of it. They lay their ears to the instrument 
125 
Svl'hlcansWMofJ? over,hear >he conversation from next door. One 
can ^tin detect a note in between, giving the smallest possible 
J®^3 ’ .whlch ought to be taken as the unit of measurement, while 
Bo?hhnrplflSI?i!,S that thGre is now no difference between the two notes Both prefer their ears to their intelligence. 
. „ f800^68 says:] You are thinking of those worthy musicians who 
torture the stnngs, racking them on the pegs. I will not push 
the metaphor so far as to picture the musician beating them with the 
plectrum and charging them with faults which the strings deny or brazen 
out. I will drop the comparison and tell you that I am thinking rather of 
those Pythagorians whom we were going to consult about harmony 
They are just like the astronomers - intent upon the numerical properties 
embodied in these audible consonances: they do not rise to the level of 
formulating problems and inquiring which numbers are inherently 
consonant and which are not, and for what reasons. (R- 531 A - C- 
Shorey) 
In short he calls these studies useful, but "only when pursued as a means to the 
knowledge of beauty and goodness."59 
In the Dialects 
According to Socrates, all the studies so far mentioned are invaluable for 
the future leaders of state, but not all aspirants are successful in cultivating in 
themselves a certain philosophic mind that can pursue the ultimate object of all 
studies, the Good. Although these are important as preparatory disciplines 
before search for the knowledge of the Good in the next and final stage or moral 
education, none of these studies can make the student grasp any absolutely 
self-evident and unconditional principle, because of the inherent defect of these 
studies. According to Socrates the various studies are not taken synoptically as 
one connected whole, but studied separately based on the assumption of its 
own fixed premises, thus producing a separate chain of deductive reasoning, 
self-evident but not linked at the upper end to any self-evident principle.60 
Therefore, he is compelled to come up with a new discipline which will secure 
this synoptic view of all mathematical knowledge in connexion with the whole of 
reality. For Socrates this consummate discipline is dialectics. He is certain that 
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’this course of study will... contribute to the end we desire and not be labour 
wasted, only if it is carried to the point at which reflection can take a 
comprehensive view of the mutual relations and affinities which bind all these 
sciences together." (Esq.: 531 C - D: Cornford)6i 
Dialectic is not only the study of the nature of the good, but also the 
method of getting the knowledge of the Good. The Good belongs to the realm 
of the eternal, unchanging, real, and intelligible worlds ihe knowledge of the 
Good, therefore, can be attained only by those who are proven to be most richly 
endowed with the ability to pursue the knowledge all the way until they get it 
with love and devotion after the successful completion of the mathematical 
studies. Socrates says: 
The summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discussion 
by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason unaided by any of 
the senses, to make his way in every case to the essential reality and 
perseveres until he has grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of 
Goodness itself. This journey is what we call Dialectic. (R: 532 B: 
Cornford) 
He asserts that the highest of all realities, the Good, "can be revealed only to 
one who is trained in the studies we have discussed, and to him only by the 
power of dialectic."63 The method of dialectic and what it does are explained in 
the Republic in the following way. Socrates says: 
No one will maintain against us that there is any other method of inquiry 
which systematically attempts in every case to grasp the nature of each 
thing as it is in itself. The other arts are nearly all concerned with human 
opinions and desires, or with the production of natural and artificial 
things, or with the care of them when produced. There remain geometry 
and those other allied studies which, as we said, do in some measure 
apprehend reality; but we observe that they cannot yield anything clearer 
than a dream-like vision of the real so long as they leave the 
assumptions they employ unquestioned and can give no account of 
them. If your premise is something you do not really know and your 
conclusion and the intermediate steps are a tissue of things you do not 
really know, your reasoning may be consistent with itself, but how can it 
ever amount to knowledge? (533 B - C: Cornford) 
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Furthermore, on the method of dialectic, he says that it is "the only one which 
takes this course, doing away with assumptions and traveling up to the first 
principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there."64 Socrates describes 
a master of dialectic in the following quote. 
...He must be able to distinguish the essential nature of Goodness 
isolating it from all other Forms; he must fight his way through all 
criticisms, determined to examine every step by the standard not of 
apPearances and opinions, but of reality and truth, and win through to the 
end without sustaining a fall. If he cannot do this, he will know neither 
Goodness itself nor any good things; if he does lay hold upon some 
semblance of good, it will be only a matter of belief, not of knowledqe 
(534 C: Cornford) a ' 
Therefore, he concludes that this discipline, which will make those who are 
selected to be in the final stage of moral education masters of the technique of 
asking and answering questions, is the most important of all studies. 
The Four Cardinal Virtues and the Good Itself 
Now, as the select few are mastering the technique of dialectic, they are 
at the same time pursuing the knowledge of the Good or the Form of the Good 
using the technique.65 Having declared the Form of the Good or the Good itself 
to be the highest object of knowledge, Socrates is certain that one can attain 
that knowledge through dialectic, because the Form of the Good dwells in the 
intelligible world which no other studies including mathematics can explore.66 
For repeatedly insisting that all virtues, whether individual or civic, are 
only varied and derived expressions of the timeless, immutable and ultimate 
Good, Socrates is pressed for the definition of the Good. He confesses his 
inability to render it, but agrees to engage in a dialectical pursuit after it until 
they come as close as they can to the clearest possible understanding of the 
Good. "Socrates," asks Glaucon, "what is your own account of the Good?...We 
should be quite content with an account of the Good like the one you gave us of 
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justice and temperance and the other virtues."*? Socrates responds with the 
following words. 
...I am afraid it is beyond my powers; with the best will in the world I 
should only disgrace myself and be laughed at. No, for the moment let 
us leave the question of the real meaning of good; to arrive at what I at 
any rate believe it to be would call for an effort too ambitious for an 
inquiry like ours. However, I will tell you, though only if you wish it what I 
picture to myself as the offspring of the Good and the thing most nearlv 
resembling it. (R; 506 D - E: Cornford) y 
Before proceeding to the inquiry of the "offspring of the Good," Socrates 
reminds Glaucon of the existence of the two realms of cognition: one, the 
visible realm of sensible appearances with changeable beliefs and the other, 
the intelligible realm of timeless and immutable Forms, dominated by the Good 
Accordingly, the things that can be seen are not objects of rational thought, but 
the invisible Forms are.68 The following quote from the Republic will show the 
way a philosophical discussion is conducted and at the same time what 
Socrates means by the "offspring of the Good" and its relationship to the Good 
itself. 
And we see things with our eyesight, just as we hear sounds with our 
ears and, to speak generally, perceive any sensible thing with out sense- 
faculties. 
Of course. 
Have you noticed, then, that the artificer who designed the senses 
has been exceptionally lavish of his materials in making the eyes able to 
see and their objects visible? 
That never occurred to me. 
Well, look at it in this way. Hearing and sound do not stand in need 
of any third thing, without which the ear will not hear nor sound be heard; 
and I think the same is true of most, not to say all, of the other senses. 
Can you think of one that does require anything of the sort? 
No, I cannot. 
But there is this need in the case of sight and its objects. You may 
have the power of vision in your eyes and try to use it, and colour may be 
there in the objects; but sight will see nothing and the colours will remain 
invisible in the absence of a third thing peculiarly constituted to serve this 
very purpose. 
By which you mean —? 
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Naturally I mean what you call light; and if light is a thinq of value the 
sense of sight and the power of being visible are linked together by a 
very precious bond, such as unites no other sense with its object V 
No one could say that light is not a precious thing 
And of all the divinities in the skies is there one whose light, above all 
t e rest, is responsible for making our eyes see perfectly and making 
objects perfectly visible? 9 
There can be no two opinions: of course you mean the Sun 
And how is sight related to this deity? Neither sight nor the eve 
^CLCH°f^S rt*u thG Sun’ but 0f al1 the sense-organs it is the most sun- 
like, and further, the power it possesses is dispensed by the Sun like a 
stream flooding the eye. And again, the Sun is not vision, but it is the 
cause of vision and also is seen by the vision it causes 
Yes. 
It was the Sun, then, that I meant when I spoke of that off-spring 
which the Good has created in the visible world, to stand there in the 
same relation to vision and visible things as that which the Good itself 
bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and to intelligible objects 
How is that? You must explain further. 
You know what happens when the colours of things are no longer 
irradiated by the daylight, but only by the fainter luminaries of the night: 
when you look at them, the eyes are dim and seem almost blind, as if 
there were no unclouded vision in them. But when you look at things on 
which the Sun is shining, the same eyes see distinctly and it becomes 
evident that they do contain the power of vision. 
Certainly. 
Apply this comparison, then, to the soul. When its gaze is fixed upon 
an object irradiated by truth and reality, the soul gains understanding and 
knowledge and is manifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it 
looks towards that twilight world of things that come into existence and 
pass away, its sight is dim and it has only opinions and beliefs which shift 
to and fro, and now it seems like a thing that has no intelligence. 
That is true. 
This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to 
him who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential 
nature of Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth and to him 
who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of 
Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while you may 
think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well to regard it as 
something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, 
of still higher worth. And, just as in our analogy light and vision were to 
be thought of as like the Sun, but not identical with it, so here both 
knowledge and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify 
either with the Good is wrong. The Good must hold yet a higher place of 
honour. 
You are giving it a position of extraordinary splendour, if it is the 
source of knowledge and truth and itself surpasses them in worth. You 
surely cannot mean that it is pleasure. 
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. ^Hea^en for?d’ 1 exclaimed- B|Jt I want to follow up our analoov still 
fVr!['f1r- You Wl11 a9ree that the Sun not only makes the things we see 
visible but also brings them into existence and gives them growth and 
nounshment: yet he is not the same thing as existence. And so, with the 
objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of 
being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the 
poweVTR' *507WB?cSrnfoT SUrpaSSi"9 * in 
In short, Socrates makes it clear that the offspring of the Good can be 
known by the soul’s reasoning power illuminated by the Good itself, but the 
Good itself remains beyond the grasp of human reason and defies description. 
But it can be seen by a leap of the mind. This process can be called intuition. 
This flash of insight or self-revelation of the Good itself comes only to those who 
have made a persistent inquiry about the Good for the love of it. This is what 
Socrates means by supreme knowledge. 
Good as a virtue is variously described in many dialogues. For instance, 
in the Philebus. Socrates describes the Good as being perfect and sufficient 
and he goes on the declare that "no one can deny that all percipient beings 
desire and hunt after the good, and are eager to catch and have the good about 
them, and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by 
good."69 The Good is mentioned as having three components: Beauty, 
Symmetry, and Truth, all intermixed in the Good itself to make it truly good.70 In 
the Laws, goodness is said to be of two kinds, human and divine. The human 
goods are health, beauty, bodily strength, swiftness in running and agility, and 
wealth. The divine goods are wisdom, temperance, justice from the union of 
wisdom and temperance, and fourth in the scale, courage.71 Contrasting the 
powers of good and evil, Socrates says "that which destroys the corrupt in every 
case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits it the good."72 
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The divine kinds of the Good mentioned above are extensively discussed 
throughout the dialogues, although none of the so-called Four Cardinal Virtues 
is dealt with separately in a conclusive way. 
In the BfiClMc. they are discussed as the indispensable qualities of the 
individuals composing the state in their public capacity as citizens first, and 
then, as equally important moral qualities to be had by the private citizens. 
Wisdom 
Wisdom {crofCct ) is mentioned in the Republic as the only 
virtue of the four which is not acquired by habit, but is "of a more divine quality, a 
thing that never loses its potency,"™ innate, and the gift of God, of whom it is the 
peculiar attribute and prerogative.74 The man with wisdom is described as one 
who knows himself, being capable of examining what he knows or does not 
know, and see what others know and do not know. In the Charmides. Socrates 
says: "This is the state and virtue of wisdom, or temperance, and self- 
knowledge, which is just knowing what a man knows, and what he does not 
know."75 
In the Phaedo. Socrates says that "true virtue exists only with wisdom, 
whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken 
away... Truth is in fact a purification from all these things.”76 A few passages 
later in the same dialogue, wisdom is said to be the virtue which purges the soul 
from her wanderings and helps her to settle with the timeless and constant 
truth.77 And it is this virtue that effects the soul's progress from darkness to light 
and makes her see the Good, and in fact, wisdom is said to be very much like 
the Good, "because it has a large share of the three elements of the Good, 
namely Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth."78 
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The following passages in the MenQ seem to express Socrates' view of 
wisdom most clearly. He says: 
in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when 
guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides in the 
opposite... 
Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other 
things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend 
upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable 
will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable. (88 C & E: Lamb) 
Finally, it is stated repeatedly in the Flepublic and the Laws in particular 
that the virtue of wisdom must be present in the guardians. For the ideal state 
the guardians, who must counsel wisely in order to maintain harmonious 
relations among people and states, the virtue of wisdom is the most important of 
the four, simply because without a knowledge which advises, "not about any 
particular thing in the state, but about the whole and for the best,"79 no guardian 
would be able to perform his duty. Thus, wisdom is for the philosopher-kings, 
whose number may be the smallest, but who comprise the most important class 
in the state. 
Temperance 
The virtue of o'uxfporvvy, variously translated in English as 
"temperance," "sobriety," "prudence," "modesty," "self-control," etc., is what 
restrains men "by the advice of the proverbial expression 'nothing too much,' 
which guides their actions."80 
In the Charmides. many definitions of this virtue are mentioned. 
Temperance is defined as "quietness," "modesty," "minding one’s own 
business," and "self-knowledge - knowing what we know and what we do not 
know.”81 Socrates does not consider these definitions to be adequate. In his 
understanding, the virtue of temperance is what gives the health and order to 
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the soul,82 because it brings harmony to all other elements that make the soul 
sound and healthy.8^ Hg says; 
...Viewed from hors it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and 
nfHpr0rnHthan th+e °ther ™nues did- Soberness is a kind of beautiful 
order and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they sav 
using the phrase ’master of himself I know not how.P But, the intended 
meanmg of th's way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a 
man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression 
?RTscke C0r?tr01 0f the WOrse by the natural|y better part, (n. 430 t - 431 A: Shorey) 
The virtue of temperance can be cultivated by habit and practice,84 by 
partaking in common meals,85 in gymnastic exercises and the study of simple 
harmonious music.86 
In the Lavys, temperance is described as "the inseparable companion of 
all the other parts of virtue."87 As the virtue of courage, for example, separated 
from temperance or justice devoid of temperance cannot be true courage or 
justice. In a way, this aspect of temperance makes it rather an appendage or 
condition to make other virtues truly excellent than itself a virtue.88 Temperance 
is further discussed in the Laws as the quality which gives control over self. 
Together with courage, temperance is the strength that not only makes us 
endure physical sufferings without losing our self-possession, but also 
overcome the temptation of self-destructive and excessive pleasure.89 
In the Republic, temperance in an individual is said to be the quality that 
makes the three elements of the soul work in harmony and cooperation; and in 
the state, like wisdom, it assures that those who are superior by nature rule over 
the inferior in order to produce a perfect working harmony among the different 
classes. In this respect, it is unlike wisdom or courage, but more like justice in 
that it is not the exclusive possession of a class of citizens within the state, but a 
virtue which needs to be cultivated by all.90 
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Courage 
In the Laches, courage (&v8f&ia ) is defined by Laches, 
first, as "anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does 
not run away,”91 and secondly, as "a certain endurance of the soul."93 Nicias 
introduces a third definition saying that courage is "the knowledge of what is to 
be dreaded or dared, either in war or in anything else."93 He says: 
I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has 
no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. 
Or do you suppose I describe all children as courageous that have no 
fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the 
courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are 
endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and 
fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number 
of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and 
most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent acts which I 
speak of that are courageous. (197 A - C: Lamb) 
Advancing Nicias' idea of courage which is combined with 
thoughtfulness, Socrates states in the Republic that courage is that element or 
quality or power in man which makes him preserve under all circumstances the 
wisdom which knows what ought or ought not to be feared. In his view, to know 
what is good or evil is to be wise. Therefore, courage exhibited without the aid 
of wisdom cannot be accepted as courage. Laches' view of courage, that is, to 
stay at one's post and face the enemy and endure all sufferings, too, is not 
enough without wisdom to be called truly courageous.94 
Courage, as one of the essential qualities of the guardianship, is never 
questioned. In fact, Socrates points out that a true guardian must be "keen of 
perception, quick in pursuit of what he has apprehended, and strong too if he 
has to fight it out with his capacity," and "he must further be brave if he is to fight 
well,"95 but without the philosophic power or wisdom in his soul working with the 
spirited element also in the soul, he will not be truly courageous. 
135 
In the Statesman, courage and temperance are defined as two distinctly 
different parts of virtue. "In a way," says the Stranger,96 "they are in a condition 
of great hostility and opposition to each other in many beings."^ Generalizing 
the nature of each of these two qualities as understood by most people, he 
says: 
When we admire, as we frequently do in many actions, quickness and 
energy and acuteness of mind or body or even of voice, we express our 
praise of them by one word, courage. (306 E: Lamb) 
[And] don’t we always say "How quiet!” and "How restrained!" when we 
are admiring the workings of the mind, and again we speak of actions as 
slow and gentle, of the voice as smooth and deep, and of every rhythmic 
motion and of music in general as having appropriate slowness; and we 
apply to them all the term which signifies, not courage, but decorum? 
(307 A: Lamb) 
He then points out that if these qualities go their separate ways and beyond a 
certain limit, they will become either violent and brutal or cowardly. Therefore, 
these two must be made mutually supportive of each other with the help of 
wisdom, so that they can be true courage and temperance. Warning against the 
extremities of courage and temperance, he also says: 
In the nature of things courage, if propagated through many 
generations with no admixture of a self-restrained nature, though at first it 
is strong and flourishing, in the end blossoms forth in utter madness. 
But the soul, on the other hand, that is too full of modesty and 
contains no alloy of courage or boldness, after many generations of the 
same kind becomes too sluggish and finally is utterly crippled. (310 D - 
E: Lamb) 
Therefore, the future guardians and auxiliaries must learn the art of blending of 
these two virtues in the school, which is supervised by the philosophic rulers 
who know the true meanings of honor, justice, and goodness. 
It is also pointed out in the same dialogue that courage separated from 
other virtues in a ruler can cause misery and destruction on his own and other 
states by his constant warring desire and unbridled aggressiveness, because 
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such courage is nothing but wanton brutality. Yet, if it is blended with other 
virtues, it can produce gentleness, love, and justice.98 
In the Republic, Socrates defines courage as "the power of preserving in 
all conditions." Asked for his meaning, he says: 
I am saying that courage means preserving something. 
Yes, but what? 
The conviction, inculcated by lawfully established education about 
the sort of things which may rightly be feared. When I added ’in all 
circumstances,' I meant preserving it always and never abandoning it 
whether under the influence of pain or pleasure, of desire or of fear... 
Such a power of constantly preserving, in accordance with our 
institutions, the right conviction about the things which ought, or ought not 
to be feared, is what I call courage. (429 C - D & 430 B: Cornford) 
The conviction that must be preserved is, of course, the knowledge of what 
really is, or is not, to be feared. Therefore, courage is the power that can 
preserve true knowledge in all circumstances. 
The following passages in the Laws describe yet another power, which 
courage can exercise. 
Ath. But how ought we to define courage? Is it to be regarded only 
as combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and 
pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous 
power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like 
wax? 
Mea. I should say the latter. 
Ath. Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is 
overcome by pleasure or by pain? 
Cle. I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men 
deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who 
is overcome by pain. 
Ath. But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not 
legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet 
attackers which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious 
flatteries which come from the right? 
Cle. Able to meet both, I should say. (633 C - 634 A: Jowett) 
It is clear that courage, to be true to its name, must not only endure pains, but 
also resist pleasures of all sorts. 
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Justice 
In the HspufrMc, where the virtue of justice {butctiorCv^) is 
most extensively discussed, it is defined variously by Socrates' interlocutors. 
Justice is first defined by one as "not to cheat any man even unintentionally or 
play him false, nor remaining in debt to a god for some sacrifice or to a man for 
money."99 It is also defined as the act of rendering "to each his due," meaning 
"to do good to friends and evil to enemies."1™ Still another definition is given 
by Thrasymachus as "the interest or advantage of the stronger." Asked by 
Socrates to elaborate on his statement, he says: 
Don’t you know that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others 
democracy rules, in others aristocracy?... And each form of government 
enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy 
democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and others likewise, and by so 
legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for 
their - the rulers’ - advantage and the man who deviates from this law 
they chastise as a lawbreaker and a wrongdoer... [TJhe just is the same 
thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger. (338 D - 339 A: 
Shorey) 
Although Thrasymachus admits that the stronger sometimes command 
the weaker subjects to act against their interests by mistake, meaning that the 
men in power are not always infallible, he is adamant in claiming that justice 
means doing what is to the interest of the stronger.101 In short, for 
Thrasymachus, justice is the exclusive possession of men in power and 
whatever they do to protect their own interests must be accepted as just. To 
support his contention, he goes so far as to declare that justice, fairness, and 
honesty never pay, but injustice is always more profitable. He says to Socrates: 
You must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: 
that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with 
the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint 
undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the 
advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he 
always has the worst of it. (343 D: Shorey) 
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Socrates disagrees. He confutes Thrasymachus' view on three points 
first, that the just is superior to the unjust in virtue and wisdom; second, that 
justice is a source of strength; and third, that it brings happiness. "Justice is " 
says Socrates, virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance."102 
Having established this, he then asserts that justice is in truth stronger than 
injustice. He explains: 
For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds 
and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love... If 
it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will 
it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to 
hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of 
effective action in common? 
The justice in the state, then, not only generates oneness that makes it 
strong, but also brings happiness, benefit, and harmony among citizens.103 To 
make his last point Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether or not "there is a 
specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is 
appointed."104 For example, whether or not the eyes or ears have specific 
virtue and excellence to perform their functions. Thrasymachus' answer is 
affirmative. Socrates, then, asks whether or not the soul has a specific virtue or 
excellence and its peculiar work to perform. The answer is yes. The discussion 
goes on as follows: 
Soc. Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its 
own virtue, or is this impossible? 
Thra. It is impossible. 
Soc. Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things 
badly while the good soul will in all these things do well. 
Thra. Of necessity. 
Soc. And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of the soul is 
justice and its defect injustice? 
Thra. Yes, we did. 
Soc. The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust 
ill? * 
Thra. So it appears by your reasoning. 
Soc. But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and 
he who does not the contrary. 
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Thra. Of course. 
SfiQ. Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable 
Um So be it. (353 E-354 A: Shorey) 
In Socrates' view, justice has two distinct applications; one to the state 
and the other to man or the soul of man. The state is comprised of a class of 
rulers, a class of auxiliaries, and a class of artisans, farmers, and the rest of 
citizenry. In parallel fashion, the soul has three parts: the reasoning, the 
spirited, and the appetitive part. Given this view, Socrates believes that in both 
cases, justice is the condition which exists when each class in the state or each 
part in the soul performs the task to which it is naturally suited. 
Accordingly, justice in the state means the three social classes are kept 
distinct and the members of each class are left to perform their one task or 
service for which their nature is most adapted for the welfare of the entire state. 
Simply put, "justice is,” in Socrates' words "to do one's own business and not be 
a busybody.’’105 The following quote, one of the many explanations he gives to 
support his view, shows his way of thinking. He says: 
When I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money¬ 
maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily 
strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the 
soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counselors and guardians, 
for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their 
honours or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, 
then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and 
meddlesomeness is the ruin of the state. The interference with one 
another's business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of 
the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most 
rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it harm. 
Again, let us put it in this way. The proper functioning of the money¬ 
making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in 
the state, being the reverse of that just described would be justice and 
would render the city just. (434 B - C: Shorey) 
Justice in the individual man exists when the reasoning, the spirited, and 
the appetitive parts in his soul perform their functions, with the condition that the 
reasoning part play the dominant role. Socrates says: 
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A man is just in the same way that a state is just. And we have surelv 
not forgotten that justice in the state meant that each of the three orders in 
it was doing its own proper work. So we may henceforth bear in mind 
that each one of us likewise will be a just person, fulfilling his proper 
function, only if the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs. 
And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom and 
forethought on behalf of the entire soul; while the spirited element ouqht 
to act as its subordinate and ally. The two will be brought into accord as 
we said earlier, by that combination of mental and bodily training which 
will tune up one string of the instrument and relax the other, nourishing 
the reasoning part on the study of noble literature and allaying the other's 
wildness by harmony and rhythm. When both have been thus nurtured 
and trained to know their own true functions, they must be set in 
command over the appetites, which form the greater part of each man’s 
soul and are by nature insatiably covetous. They must keep watch lest 
this part, by battening on the pleasures that are called bodily, should 
grow so great and powerful that it will no longer keep to its own work, but 
will try to enslave the others and usurp a dominion to which it has no 
right, thus turning the whole of life upside down. (441 C, E - B: Cornford) 
When the three parts of the soul are working together in a just person, he 
would not cheat, steal, be disloyal to his friends and the state, commit adultery, 
dishonour his parents, or neglect his religious duties.106 Socrates declares that 
"justice is the power which produces states or individuals of whom this is 
true."107 Before concluding the discussion on justice, Socrates makes the 
following conclusive recapitulation: 
Soc. And so our dream has come true... Our principle that the born 
shoemaker or carpenter had better stick to his trade turns out to have 
been an adumbration of justice; and that is why it has helped us. But in 
reality justice, though evidently analogous to this principle, is not a matter 
of external behaviour, but of the inward self and of attending to all this is, 
in the fullest sense, a man's proper concern. The just man does not 
allow the several elements of his soul to usurp one another's functions, 
he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and 
discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune 
those three parts, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the 
highest and lowest notes and the mean between them, with all the 
intermediate intervals. Only when he has linked these parts together in 
well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, 
will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do, whether it be 
making money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or 
the affairs of state. In all these fields when he speaks of just and 
honourable conduct, he will mean the behaviour that helps to produce 
and to preserve this habit of mind; and by wisdom he will mean the 
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knowledge which presides over such conduct. Any action which tends to 
break down this habit will be for him unjust; and the notions governina it 
he will call ignorance and folly. y 
Gla. That is perfectly true, Socrates. 
Good. I believe we should not be thought altogether mistaken 
if we claimed to have discovered the just man and the just state, and 
wherein their justice consists. 
Gla. Indeed we should not. 
Shall we make the claim, then? 
Gla. Yes, we will 
Justice is mentioned and discussed numerous times in the Laws, no less 
than in the Republic, and is given a high place among the virtues. A few 
representative passages from the dialogue deserve to be quoted. Athenian 
Stranger, the protagonist of the dialogue, says: 
For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of 
evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, and immortal 
conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and 
in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their 
property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and 
justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of 
these latter is in the life of Gods, although some vestige of them may 
occasionally be discerned among mankind. (906 A: Jowett) 
There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach 
evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble, which 
has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocater of 
justice be other than noble? (937 E: Jowett) 
In summary 
Organized education involving a large number of students with the 
clearly defined aim of producing a new class of future rulers began with 
Confucius in the East and Socrates in the West. For making education a matter 
of fundamental importance in improving the quality of human life and 
implementing it with a carefully selected curriculum and methods, they must be 
recognized as the earliest pioneers of modern educational theories and 
practices. 
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Some courses of study offered by both groups are identical with strikingly 
similar rationales, while some other courses are offered only by one group. For 
instance, the Confucian courses called Wen ) and the Athenian course 
called^ooJ-.icj both include the study of poetry, music, and history. However, 
only Wen requires the study of Li (7f^) and only requires the 
study of fine arts in painting and sculpture. The purpose of Wen and 
is the same, that is, to make their students broadly educated and cultured. The 
Athenian group requires gymnastics as a separate course to be given with 
/ 
juovdTiK^ for their young students, but the Confucian group does not. 
When the students reach the age of twenty and are selected to receive 
the second stage or higher education, the Athenians require courses in 
advanced arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonics with the singular 
purpose of preparing them for the final stage or highest education in dialectics, 
if they pass the last selection process when they reach the age of thirty. 
Dialectic, a separate course of study offered only by the Athenians, not only 
develops the technique of philosophical discussion to grasp the substance of 
the knowledge of moral excellence, but explores simultaneously, using the 
developing technique, the substance of that knowledge itself. The Confucians 
use the dialectical method freely to gasp the same in their normal study of 
music, poetry, history, and Li, as it is the only best method, therefore needing no 
identification of it by name. 
Having declared their educational goal as the making of future rulers of 
moral excellence, both groups engage their students heavily in a critical 
examination of all virtues of the old and the new; and conclude that "all virtues 
are one." According to their investigation, all virtues must be interdependent 
and complementary to be genuine. The virtue of 'courage,' for example, in 
order to be genuine, also must be wise, just, temperate, humane, sincere, 
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constant, and so on. Moreover, both groups believe that there is a Cosmic 
Moral Principle, whether it is called the Way of jen-yi or the Form of the Good, 
from which all genuine virtues flow. Therefore, all virtues flowing from the one 
source are one. 
The study of //, considered very important by the Confucians, is not only 
knowing ’good manners’ and proper ways of doing things, but is a power that 
makes every human behavior and action truly human and moral. To have the 
knowledge of virtue is essential to be virtuous, but the knowledge of // is equally 
essential, because an improperly applied virtue can be dehumanizing and 
immoral. Accordingly, a man may have all the knowledge of justice, love, and 
courage, but if he does not know //, he cannot be a man of true justice, love, and 
courage. 
The Confucian emphasis on the ceremonial aspect of //, too, must not be 
overlooked. A ceremony, carefully organized and beautifully performed with 
special words, music and even dance appropriate to whatever occasion it is 
celebrating or commemorating, can affect the participants profoundly. Li, as 
ceremony, is open and public and can make the participants become aware of 
their common bond of humanity, capable of appreciating together with others 
common values that can reward them with a sense of community and 
happiness. 
Li, that also teachers 'good manners' and 'proper conduct' can make all 
human institutions, whether of the family or state, ordered and civilized. In their 
view, the fundamental human institution is the family, and it can be a 
harmonious and happy place, if the head of the family performs his role as 
proper father/husband, his spouse her role of proper mother/wife, and their 
children their roles as proper sons/daughters and brothers/sisters. To the 
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Confucians, the family is a microcosm of the State. Therefore, the study of li is 
vital for the future rulers of the state. 
To the Confucians, the family is very important for its effect on the moral 
education of man. The family is where children's earliest moral training can 
take place and also provides a place for them to practice what they learn. 
According to the Confucians, the virtue of hsiao (^) or honoring one's 
parents and elders, considered by them as the root of all other virtuous 
practices, must begin in the family. It is there that children must find their proper 
places in the family hierarchy, which is inevitable and indispensable for any 
institution, and learn to conduct themselves properly to have a happy 
relationship with each member of the family for the unity, harmony, and 
happiness of the whole. 
Socrates/Plato, too, mention the family as the place where children’s 
virtue of honoring their parents should begin, but the family does not play an 
educational role for those who are selected to be the future rulers or Guardians. 
That role belongs to the state. Moreover, the future rulers and Guardians of 
their ideal state are not to have their own families and the children, produced by 
the union between the rulers or Guardians and the women who are selected 
and matched by the state for procreation, are the property of the state. The 
children so produced are, therefore, without their own families to practice the 
virtue of filial piety. Socrates/Plato, too, considered the root of honoring all 
honorable things and other virtues. 
Before concluding this summary, a brief comment on the censorship 
imposed so severely by the Athenians on curriculum materials needs to be 
made. The Confucians are as aware of the existence of bad materials for the 
study of poetry, music, and history as the Athenians are, but they do not attempt 
to expurgate them as zealously as the Athenians do. The Confucians display 
145 
greater confidence in the quality of their curriculum materials than the 
Athenians. They even seem to feel the necessity of exposing students to bad 
materials to help them develop their own ability to see, compare, and choose 




KOHLBERG AND THE ANCIENTS 
This chapter will examine today's best known, albeit highly controversial, 
moral education theory of Lawrence Kohlberg to compare it with the theories 
forwarded by the classical thinkers of Greece and China and see what progress 
has been made in the field of moral education. More specifically, Kohlberg's 
philosophical, psychological, and educational theories will be examined to see, 
first, in what respects he is a modern heir of Socrates/Plato and second, in what 
other respects he is an explorer of new territories which his Athenian mentors 
had not covered. 
Philosophically, Kohlberg draws heavily both from Socrates/Plato and 
John Dewey. This he admits in one of his more important papers as follows. 
It is surely a paradox that a modern psychologist should claim as his 
most relevant source not Freud, Skinner, or Piaget but the ancient 
believer in the ideal form of the good. Yet as I have tried to trace the 
stages of development of morality and to use these stages as the basis of 
a moral education program, I have realized more and more that its 
implication was the reassertion of the Socratic faith in the power of the 
rational good.1 
Accordingly, Kohlberg's view of the nature of virtue does not differ at all from the 
way Socrates/Plato viewed it and Kohlberg summarizes the Athenians' view in 
the following way. 
First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same 
ideal form regardless of climate or culture. 
Second, the name of this ideal form is justice. 
Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. 
He who knows the good chooses the good. 
147 
Eaurth, the kind of knowledge of the good that is virtue is 
philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the qood not 
correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs. 
Eifih, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain 
sense be philosopher-kings. 
the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all 
along dimly or at a low level and its teaching is more a calling out than an 
instruction. y 
Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because 
the same good is known differently at different levels and direct 
instruction cannot take place across levels. 
.Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and the 
pointing of the way, not the giving of answers. Moral education is the 
leading of people upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledqe that 
was not there before.2 
Kohlberg agrees with Socrates/Plato on all points summarized above except on 
one aspect of the definition of justice. He understands justice as equality 
indicating his indebtedness to Dewey, while Socrates/Plato understand it as 
hierarchy. Defining justice as "a matter of equal and universal human rights," 
Kohlberg says: 
Justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle. By a moral 
principle, I mean a mode of choosing that is universal, a rule of choosing 
that we want all people to adopt always in all situations... A moral 
principle is a principle for resolving competing claims: you versus me, 
you versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for 
resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every person's claims 
impartially regardless of the person. A moral principle is not only a rule 
of action but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called 
respect for people.3 
In short, Kohlberg's conception of justice is a Bill of Rights that recognizes the 
equality or the equal rights of individuals. 
Having accepted justice as the most important moral principle, which he 
defines as "equal and universal human rights" that include the child's right to 
exercise his own reason to attain moral maturity, the bag of virtues must not be 
given to the child. Kohlberg thinks that the bag of virtues approach equates the 
teaching of virtue with indoctrination of conventional or social consensus 
morality and it will not allow the child to learn values on his own, using his own 
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power of reason to attain moral excellence. Moreover, he thinks that the bag of 
virtues approach is inevitably relativistic, for each person and each society 
would have his and its own bag.4 
Although Kohlberg draws heavily from Dewey in developing his own 
philosophical and psychological theories on moral education, he criticizes 
Dewey's partial agreement with Aristotle, which produced a bag of virtues. 
Aristotle stated in his Ethics, that: 
Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. While intellectual virtue 
owes its birth and growth to teaching, moral virtue comes about as a 
result of habit. The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we 
become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave 
by doing brave acts.5 
"Dewey," says Kohlberg, "of course, does not distinguish the intellectual from 
the moral and objects to lists of virtues and vices in either area. Nevertheless, 
Deweyite thinking has lent itself to the Boy Scout approach to moral education, 
which has dominated American practices in the field."6 In his view, the Boy 
Scout approach to moral education is to depend on the bag of virtues and vices 
and his objections to it are: first, for its demand on obedience, thus denying the 
child's right to reason out the validity of each virtue in the bag; and second, the 
so-called virtues in the bag are mere labels from praiseworthy behaviors or 
habits, which does not help the child develop his own reasoning power to make 
his own moral decisions when situations demand. 
As an inheritor of virtually all the major philosophical, psychological, and 
educational ideas of Socrates/Plato and Dewey, Kohlberg criticizes and rejects 
any moral education strategy or approach that accepts indoctrination and moral 
relativism and any other extreme and one-sided ideology. He rejects the 
cultural transmission strategy, because it "maintains that values are determined 
by each particular society. Teaching is the process of imparting such values to 
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children, who are viewed as passive learners,"7 meaning it is value relative and 
indoctrinative. The romantic ideology of education is unacceptable to him, 
because it "sees the educational process as one that should free the individual 
for natural inner-directed growth based on the psychological theory of 
maturationism, which conceptualizes the individual as possessing in an 
embryonic form all the important elements necessary for growth,"8 therefore, it is 
too self-centered. The values clarification approach, too, is unsatisfactory, 
because it recognizes that values are relative and tolerates the divergences of 
individual value hierarchies, although its basic premises are commendable.9 
Kohlberg calls his own strategy the cognitive-developmental approach, 
acknowledging the fact that it is built upon the stages theory of cognitive- 
developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and the educational views of Dewey. 
"Developmental," says Kohlberg, "because it is a psychology of stages, 
cognitive because the stages involve forms of thinking. This psychology is 
interactional: it holds that stages do not mature biologically but develop through 
interaction between the child’s structuring capacities and the intellectual and 
social stimulation of the environment.”10 
According to Kohlberg, the criterion to judge a person's moral 
development is the knowledge of justice and the level of his moral maturity as 
measured by the level of his understanding of the principles of justice. His 
typology of moral development contains three levels of moral reasoning and 
each level has two stages. 
I. Preconventional 
II. Conventional 
1 The Punishment & Obedience 
Orientation 
2 The Instrumental Relativist Orientation 
3 The Interpersonal Concordance or 
'Good Boy/Nice Girl' Orientation 
4 The 'Law and Order' Orientation 
5 The Social Contract Orientation 
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III. Post-conventional 
6 The Universal Ethical Principle 
Orientation 
Kohlberg claims that these stages have the following characteristics. They are 
structured wholes that are universal; follow an invariant, irreversible, and 
increasingly integrative sequence; and the last stage of the progression is the 
most adequate. This means all movement is forward in sequence and does not 
skip stages. No one in Stage 2, for example, has gone through Stage 3, but the 
Stage 3 person has gone through Stage 2.11 
The six stages are defined and validated, according to Kohlberg, after his 
longitudinal and cross-cultural studies over a long period of time. One study 
involved fifty Chicago-area boys of the middle- and working-class. Initially 
asking them to respond to a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas at ages ten 
through sixteen, then repeating the process at three-year intervals thereafter for 
twenty years. Another longitudinal study conducted in Turkey involved a small 
number of village and city boys of the same age, asking them to respond to 
another set of moral dilemmas. Then, a variety of other cross-cultural studies in 
Canada, Britain, Israel, Yucatan, Honduras, and India.12 
To help a person move forward or become morally mature, Kohlberg 
says that the person's reasoning faculty must be stimulated by a number of 
things. He uses most heavily hypothetical moral dilemmas to stimulate the 
person's moral thinking for the following reasons. He is convinced that: 
1. Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior, is the 
single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral 
behavior. 
2. While other factors influence moral behavior, moral judgment is 
the only distinctively 'moral' factor in moral behavior. 
3. Moral judgment change is long-range or irreversible; a higher 
stage is never lost. Moral behavior as such is largely situational and 
reversible or 'losable' in new situations.13 
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Moral discussion, however, constitutes only one portion of the conditions 
stimulating moral growth. For school children, moral discussion can be 
incorporated into various academic courses, such as social studies to stimulate 
their thinking.14 According to Kohlberg the moral atmosphere of the home, the 
school, and society itself, too, is very important in stimulating their moral 
thinking, for the role-taking opportunities it provides and also the justice 
structure each of the perceived rules or principles for distributing rewards, 
punishments, responsibilities and privileges among its members. He reports 
that his studies suggest that a higher level of institutional justice is a condition 
for individual development of a higher sense of justice.15 
Accepting another Socratic conviction which implies that "the knowledge 
of the good is always within but needs to be drawn out like geometric 
knowledge in Meno's slave,"16 Kohlberg says: 
In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is a natural product of a 
universal human tendency toward empathy or role-taking, toward putting 
oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a 
universal human concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the 
relation of one person to another.17 
The first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of creating 
dissatisfaction in students about their knowledge of the good. This we do 
experimentally by exposing the students to moral conflict situations for 
which their principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose them 
to disagreement and argument about these situations with their peers. 
Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict in students 
and point the way to the next step up the divided line, they will tend to 
see things previously invisible.18 
In other words, the task of moral education is "to draw the child's perceptions of 
justice from the shadows of the cave step by step toward the light of justice as 
an ideal form. And like Meno's slave, children are initially quite confident of 
their moral knowledge, of the rationality and efficacy of their moral principles. 
The notion that children feel ignorant and are eager to absorb the wisdom of 
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adult authority in the moral domain is one that teacher or parent will know is 
nonsense.”19 
Kohlberg asserts that his developmental approach is different from 
indoctrinative approaches "because it tries to move student’s thinking in a 
direction that is natural for the student rather than moving the student in the 
direction of accepting the teacher's moral assumptions. It avoids preaching and 
didacticism linked to the teacher’s authority.”29 Elaborating this point further, he 
says: 
Because there are culturally universal stages or sequences of moral 
development, stimulation of a child's development to the next step in a 
natural direction is equivalent to a long-range goal of teaching ethical 
principles. 
Because the development of these principles is natural, they are not 
imposed on the children - they choose principles themselves... 
According to the cognitive developmental'^ view, there is an important 
analogy between scientific and ethical patterns of judgment or problem 
solving, and there are overlapping rationales for intellectual and ethical 
education. In exposing the child to opportunities for reflective scientific 
inquiry, teachers are guided by the principle of scientific method that the 
teachers themselves accept as the basis of rational reflection. Reference 
to such principles is nonindoctrinative if these principles are not 
presented as formulas to be learned ready-made or as rote patterns 
grounded in authority. Rather, they are part of a process of reflection by 
students and teachers.21 
The goal of Kohlberg's approach to moral education, then, is to stimulate a 
person's natural moral tendency to develop step by step through the stages to 
its highest attainable maturity. 
Kohlberg says that the majority of adults of American society are at 
conventional Stages 3 and 4, and only about ten percent of the adult population 
are at Stages 5 and 6.22 Kohlberg names Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau, and 
Martin Luther King, individuals who "tend to speak without confusion of tongues, 
as it were,’’23 among those very few Americans whom he considers to have 
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attained Stage 6 in moral development. His reasons for including, for example, 
Martin Luther King are as follows. 
Because morally mature people are governed by the principle of 
justice rather than by a set of rules, there are not many moral virtues but 
one. Let me restate the argument in Plato's terms. Plato’s argument is 
that what makes a virtuous action virtuous is that it is guided by 
knowledge of the good. A courageous action based on ignorance of 
danger is not courageous; a just act based on ignorance of justice is not 
just; and so on. If virtuous action is action based on knowledge of the 
good, then virtue is one, because knowledge of the good is one. I have 
already claimed that knowledge of the good is one because the qood is 
justice. 
...At the highest stage [of moral development], however, is regard for 
law a regard for universal moral law and regard for rights a regard for 
universal human rights. At this point, both regard for law and regard for 
human rights are grounded on a clear criterion of justice that was present 
in confused and obscure form at earlier stages.24 
King's acts of civil disobedience were, then, clearly dictated by his autonomous 
moral judgment based on the principles of justice. 
According to Kohlberg, "justice is not a character trait in the usual sense... 
One cannot make up behavior tests that would indicate that Martin Luther King 
and Socrates were high on a trait of justice. The reason for this is that justice is 
not a concrete rule of action such as that underlying virtues like honesty.25 He 
elaborates this point as follows: 
To be honest means "Don't cheat, don't steal, don't lie." But justice is not 
a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle. By a moral principle, I mean 
a mode of choosing that is universal, a rule of choosing that we want all 
people to adopt always in all situations. We know it is all right to be 
dishonest and steal to save a life because it is just, because one 
person's right to life comes before another person's right to property. We 
know it is sometimes right to kill, because it is sometimes just. The 
Germans who tried to kill Hitler were doing right because respect for the 
equal values of lives demands that we kill someone who is murdering 
others, in order to save lives. There are exceptions to rules, then, but no 
exception to principles.26 
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To further prove that Martin Luther King’s moral reasoning was at Stage 
6, Kohlberg quotes King's own words from his ’Letter from a Birmingham Jail.' 
King wrote: 
There is a type of constructive nonviolent tension which is necessary 
for growth. Just as Socrates felt it was necessary to create a tension in 
the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of half-truths so 
must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension 
in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and 
racism. 
One may well ask, "How can you advocate breaking some laws and 
obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of 
laws, just and unjust. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility 
to disobey unjust laws. An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in 
eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is 
just, any law that degrades human personality is unjust. An unjust law is 
a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority 
group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference 
made legal. 
I do not advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid 
segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust 
law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the 
penalty. An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is 
unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to 
arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality 
expressing the highest respect for law.27 
Commenting on King's way of moral reasoning, Kohlberg says: "King makes it 
clear that moral disobedience of the law must spring from the same root as 
moral obedience to law, out of respect for justice."28 
By necessity, the above description of Kohlberg's cognitive 
developmental theory of moral education is brief, but a fuller discussion will 
follow as it is compared with the theories of classical thinkers of China and 
Greece. 
First, on human nature, Kohlberg does not analyze human nature as did 
the classical thinkers, who understood it as being composed of distinctly 
different parts or elements, such as, the appetitive, the reasoning, or the spirited. 
He does not raise objection to their understanding of it, but seems to agree with 
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them on one important point, namely, the reasoning part of man’s nature is what 
makes him different from other creatures. Kohlberg believes like the classical 
thinkers that man’s desire to be moral is his natural tendency or inclination and 
with the help of education, man can develop his most important gift, that is, his 
reasoning power, to acquire the knowledge of the absolute and universal moral 
value or justice in Kohlberg's philosophy, and live with others morally according 
to the dictates of the knowledge. Kohlberg says: 
In the cognitive-development view, morality is a natural product of a 
universal human tendency toward empathy or role-taking, toward putting 
oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a 
universal human concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the 
relation of one person to another.29 
In the view of the classical thinkers, however, although all human beings 
come with a mind that can reason, only those who are additionally endowed 
with special intellectual and emotional qualities necessary to explore the 
knowledge of moral excellence or the highest moral values should receive 
moral education to be the future rulers and teachers. Therefore, the classical 
moral education was elitist, while Kohlberg’s is not. Although his research 
findings indicate that only about ten percent of the adult population reaches the 
fifth or the sixth stage of moral maturity, Kohlberg believes that moral education 
should be given to all in school, either as an independent course or as part of 
other courses. 
In and for a democratic nation like ours, Kohlberg's call for a universal 
moral education is understandable. Here we all claim our equal rights and 
know that our rights are protected by the Constitution. But isn't it also true that 
there must be leaders and the led in every social group and institution? And 
we, in fact, demand that the leaders should be more moral that the rest. The 
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classical thinkers had no illusions about this and made it their mission to see a 
class of moral rulers come through their education. 
Second, as for the aim of moral education, Kohlberg's is not and cannot 
be essentially different from the classical thinkers’, because philosophically, he 
aligns with Socrates and Plato. Like the classical thinkers of both groups, 
Kohlberg asserts that there is an objective moral value, which is absolute and 
universal, and humans can know it. As the absolute and universal moral value 
belongs to the intelligible realm, one can acquire the knowledge of it only with 
the use of his reason. Therefore, the aim of his moral education, too, is to 
"stimulate" the student’s innate power of reason in such as way that he will 
develop his reasoning power on his own volition, supported by his natural 
human tendency for justice, from one stage to the next all the way to the sixth 
stage, which is of the highest moral maturity, where moral excellence of justice 
becomes his own value to guide his moral judgment and behavior. 
Although the classical thinkers did not produce an elaborate stages 
theory of moral development like Kohlberg's, they all understood that, like 
everything else that grows in the world, human moral reasoning, too, grows 
gradually from one stage to the next if it is correctly guided. With this 
understanding, Plato was particularly careful in his educational planning to 
make his student's moral development attain its highest level of maturity by 
offering different courses of study, which were considered appropriate to the 
student's intellectual, emotional, and physical maturity and age at each of the 
evolving stages of his growth, with one ultimate purpose of making his 
reasoning capacity thoroughly prepared to obtain the knowledge of moral 
excellence when he entered his final stage of study in dialectics. 
The classical Confucian thinkers did not produce a stages theory of 
moral development either. But the following quotation from the Analects is 
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enough allow us to assume that they, too, knew that man’s moral maturity 
developed gradually, from one stage to the next. Confucius said, reminiscing 
on his own progress: 
At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty I 
had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty my ear 
was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could 
follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was riqht (II 4- 
Legge) 
Neither Confucius nor the Greek thinkers, however, claimed, as Kohlberg does, 
that developmental stages are structured wholes that are universal, follow an 
invariant, irreversible, and increasingly integrative sequence, and that the last 
stage is also the most adequate morally. Perhaps such claims, some of them 
quite indefensible, never entered their minds.30 
Like the aim of moral education of the classical thinkers, Kohlberg’s aim 
is also twofold. One part of the aim is to help the student’s reasoning power to 
develop to its maximum to know what is and is not justice and the other part is to 
help him become a moral man who would fulfil his obligation to his society 
according to the principles of justice. By citing Socrates, Lincoln, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. among a few others whom he designates as the achievers of 
the highest moral maturity or as morally "principled" people, Kohlberg, too, 
wants his students to become socially conscious men and women who would 
do morally positive things in an immoral world. 
However, by declaring the aim of his cognitive-developmental approach 
to be different from the aims of other approaches to moral education, Kohlberg 
sets himself apart from other theorists and educators of moral education. Like 
the classical thinkers, especially the Athenians, Kohlberg is intolerant towards 
moral indoctrination and moral relativism. He criticizes almost all conventional 
approaches as indoctrinative because they aim to form moral characters with 
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"the bag of virtues," and rejects the popular modern program known as "values 
clarification" as relativistic. To claim his own approach that emphasizes 
stimulation of movement to the next stage of reasoning as not indoctrinate, he 
gives the following reasons among others. First, "Change is in the way of 
reasoning rather than in the particular beliefs involved," and second, "the 
teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked as authoritative. It enters 
in only as one of many opinions, hopefully one of those at the next higher 
stage."31 His is not relativistic, because "the moral development approach 
restricts value education to that which is moral or, more specifically, to justice."32 
"Moral psychology describes what moral development is as studied 
empirically," says Kohlberg.33 Because he is a moral psychologist, the aim of 
his approach, too, is that of a scientist-researcher, whose chief concern is to 
learn more about the pattern of the maturing process of his students' moral 
reasoning than the content of moral value itself, towards which his students' 
reasoning ought to be growing and developing. In Dennis Krebs' words, the 
aim of Kohlberg's approach is "to decipher the logic of moral decisions made by 
people at different stages of cognitive and social maturity. He is not concerned 
with what people believe is right or wrong (the content of moral thought, or 
moral attitude); he is concerned with the rules they use to arrive at conclusions 
about what is right or wrong (the structure of thought)."34 James Rest explains it 
in the following way: 
Kohlberg has contended that moral education should not be aimed at 
teaching some specific set of morals but should be concerned with 
developing the organizational structures by which one analyzes, 
interprets and makes decisions about social problems. ...The Cognitive 
developmental approach aims not at producing mere conformity with the 
state's, teacher's, or the school's values, but at developing capabilities in 
decision making and problem solving.35 
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By setting forth the development of capabilities in analyzing, interpreting, 
and decision-making to solve moral dilemmas as his prime aim of moral 
education, Kohlberg makes the means to attain the end more important than the 
end itself. His chief concern and interest appears to be with the pattern or the 
structure of reasoning more than the content of value, or the end of reasoning. 
On this, both the Confucians and the Athenians differ from Kohlberg. Although 
they also believed that by reasoning one could learn what moral excellence is, 
they were not interested in studying how their students' moral reasoning 
developed, but in the object of reasoning, the universal moral value or 
excellence itself. This is because they considered the aim of moral education to 
be to help the student acquire the knowledge of moral excellence, which alone 
would make him live and act morally. They didn’t think everyone acquired the 
moral knowledge in the way Kohlberg's stage theory of development describes. 
According to them, some were born with the knowledge and others acquired it 
in different ways. 
Another difference is in the teacher-student relations. By emphasizing 
the stage development of moral reasoning, the Kohlbergian teacher distances 
himself from his student. He is a morally neutral interrogator and judge of his 
student's progress in moral reasoning. The classical thinkers as teachers were 
fellow-seekers after moral excellence and their relations with their students 
were intimate and personal, freely and openly questioning and answering, and 
sharing their ignorance and knowledge. 
Third, regarding the methods: Kohlberg accepts the dialectical methods 
of the classical thinkers. The main objective of this method is to help the student 
acquire the knowledge of moral excellence all on his own. The core of their 
theory is the existence of a reasoning power in every human being that can 
develop when stimulated in the direction of an increasingly more 
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comprehensive and satisfactory understanding of the principles of the universal 
value. The dialectical method is the one that most successfully stimulates the 
student's reasoning closer to the knowledge of that value. 
On the use of the method, Kohlberg differs from the classical thinkers. 
While Kohlberg recommends the method for children and adults alike, even 
though he admits that even some high school students are found not ready to 
carry on a truly productive dialogue on moral questions, the classical thinkers 
recommended it only for those who were ready for philosophical dialogues. 
According to Kohlberg, the application of the method requires the trained 
teacher or discussion leader. The teacher's task is to stimulate the student's 
thinking with questions and suggestions without disclosing his own moral 
views, so that the student will make his own reasoned progression 
independently to the next higher stage of moral maturity. In James Rest's 
words, "Since the teacher is no longer primarily an answer-giver but a process- 
facilitator, the chief activity of these value education programs then is the 
student's search rather than the teacher’s answers."36 Kohlberg recommends 
that the teacher must be at least one stage above the student in moral maturity 
to be able to lead discussion, so that he can provide models of thinking which 
are one stage above the student's current level of thinking.37 But, isn’t it 
possible that the teacher's own stage of reasoning can be at the stage lower 
than the student’s, if we recall Kohlberg’s own finding that only ten percent of 
the population reaches the highest or "principled" Stage 5 or 6? And also, how 
does the teacher accomplish his task of stimulating the student’s reasoning 
without somehow convincing the student that his current level of reasoning is 
not morally mature enough, and according to what or whose criterion? On the 
matters of teacher's qualifications and functions as discussion leader, Kohlberg 
is unconvincing. 
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The qualifications set by the classical thinkers of their teachers were very 
high. Ideally, only those who have the knowledge of the highest moral 
excellence should be the teachers, chun-tzu and the philosopher kings. In the 
absence of those, the thinkers themselves became teachers and by implication 
they would have approved as teachers of moral education those who (1) 
believed in the existence of universal moral value; (2) knew that the acquisition 
and practice of that value by the future leaders alone would make the world 
moral; and (3) were totally devoted to the search for that value for the happiness 
it would give them and the world. They were not process-facilitators or graders 
of their students’ moral maturity while leading discussions, but teachers who, 
humbly acknowledging their ignorance of the true and complete knowledge of 
the highest and universal moral value, wanted to seek it together with their 
students who would be leaders of the future. 
Fourth, on curriculum: The only education the classical thinkers felt 
important was moral education for the future rulers, for the happiness of the 
people within the state depended totally on its rulers' moral excellence. In 
constructing their curriculum, therefore, they selected courses of study they 
considered to be essential to the wholesome growth of their students' whole 
being. Having analyzed human nature encased in the body as composed of 
reasoning, spirited, appetitive, and feeling elements, their curriculum was 
designed to cultivate them all and the body also in a balanced way. Although 
the development of a human mind that reasons was the most important, 
because it alone distinguishes man from all other creatures, and it alone could 
acquire the knowledge of moral excellence, An ideal man of moral excellence 
was not simply a possessor of the knowledge, but a man whose other human 
elements also were cultivated purposefully and were able to render concerted 
support when his knowledge had to be put into practice. 
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The Confucians put poetry, history, music, rituals, and ethics in their 
formal curriculum. Aware of the complexities of human problems in the real 
world, they felt it was of absolute importance to expose their future rulers as 
liberally as possible to the courses which recorded and reflected the past and 
present human experience for critical study and reexamination. The Athenians, 
too, included many courses in their curriculum, such as music, gymnastics, 
mathematical sciences, and dialectics, but were not as liberal as the Confucians 
in that they censored certain forms of art and historical literature as 
unacceptable. The students were required to study these courses in depth, 
some for a few years while others for a longer period of time, depending on the 
ages of their students, all for a common objective of producing men and women 
with the knowledge of moral excellence and the power to apply it in real life. 
Compared with the curriculum offered by the classical thinkers, 
Kohlberg's program offers virtually none. If his "discussion of moral dilemmas" 
can be called a course, it has been used by him and his experimenters as an 
independent discipline or as part of other academic courses, such as English or 
history in various schools. It appears primarily in the form of research projects 
to gather scientific data to formulate a new academic discipline called cognitive 
developmental psychology. Such subjects as music, gymnastics, or 
mathematical science, which demand disciplined work habits to attain their 
projected objects, are not included in his curriculum. 
The nature of his moral dilemmas themselves, are limited in scope. All 
his hypothetical dilemmas are designed to stimulate the student's moral 
reasoning to reach the highest stage of moral maturity, where the knowledge of 
justice will guide his judgment and action. But, is the knowledge of justice 
alone enough to solve the immensely complex human problems his students 
will encounter in the real world? Granted that Kohlberg agrees with the 
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classical thinkers that "all virtues are ultimately one," therefore, justice does 
include other moral values and qualities, such as love, courage, moderation, 
human-heartedness, and so on. Nevertheless, his hypothetical dilemmas are 
not inductive to the discussion of these other values and qualities. Kohlberg’s 
exposition of justice, however, is brilliant. Neither the Athenians nor the 
Confucians could have done any better, especially when he defends its position 
of primacy above all other values, in complete agreement with Plato. 
Plato's argument is that what makes a virtuous action virtuous is that it is 
guided by knowledge of the good. A courageous action based on 
ignorance of dangers is not courageous; a just act based on ignorance of 
justice is not just; and so on. If virtuous action is action based on 
knowledge of the good, then virtue is one. Because knowledge of the 
good is one. I have already claimed that knowledge of the good is one 
because the good is justice.38 
But, Kohlberg neither proposes in his curriculum a course that is designed to 
involve students in the discussion of what "just" love, "just" courage, "just" 
moderation, and so on, are, nor does he attempt to elucidate them himself. 
Having rejected the "bag of virtues," which have been used by 
conventional agents of moral education as indoctrinative, and therefore, harmful 
to children's moral reasoning and natural development, Kohlberg's program is 
short of virtues to study, especially for children. In spite of Kohlberg's fear of 
indoctrination, such simple virtues as honesty, kindness, respect for other's 
rights, and so on, can and must be explained to them even before their 
reasoning capacities are developed enough to explore independently and 
understand the concept of justice. 
Unlike Kohlberg, the classical thinkers were deeply interested in 
discussing openly and freely, all values big or small, old or new, which drew 
their attention in order to acquire the true knowledge of universal moral 
excellence. 
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Kohlberg’s three most frequently cited moral heroes are Socrates, 
Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King. One wonders whether or not these 
principled" men of morality did not begin their development of moral reasoning 
with the "bag of virtues," which has been successfully used universally for 
centuries in the family, the church or temple, the schools, and other civic 
organizations. Moreover, one can also question whether or not these men 
matured morally by developing their reason alone. Were they not men of 
universal human love and forgiveness more than justice? Were they not men 
who understood a certain higher moral law or principle than the principle of 
justice? Were they not religious besides being rational? Did their religions or 
religious experiences have any influence on their moral development? 
Kohlberg discusses all these questions without altering his basic approach to 
moral education that capitalizes the orderly development through stages of 
moral reasoning stimulated by discussions of moral dilemmas, although he 
acknowledges the close relationship between religious thinking and moral 
reasoning, and what the power of religious faith can do to a person’s moral 
judgment and action. 
Citing Socrates and Martin Luther King, "two great moral educators who 
willingly sacrificed their lives to their mission as educators for justice," Kohlberg 
states: 
Socrates, like Martin Luther King, was a profoundly religious man who 
held a natural law theory of the relations between morality and religion. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that either King or Socrates would have calmly 
faced his own death, or sacrificed his life for principles of justice if his 
principles did not have some religious support. Their willingness to die 
for moral principles was partly based on their faith in moral principles as 
an expression of human reason and partly on their faith in justice, which 
had religious support. This support was not the support offered by divine 
command theory, which equates "higher law" with God's 
commandments. Rather, the support comes from seeing principles of 
justice as not only a social contract to resolve conflicts in a civil society 
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but as the reflection of an order inherent in both human nature and in the 
natural or cosmic order.39 
I wonder why Kohlberg does not say, like the classical thinkers would have, that 
these men of moral excellence and action did what they did in obedience to 
God's, cosmic, or Heaven's command. 
Kohlberg notes that "there are universal religious issues as problems that 
all people attempt to answer. However, these issues are limiting issues that 
entail some reflection on life in relation to the infinite, unlimited, or eternal. With 
regard to morality, the fundamental issue that religious thinking may address is 
'Why be moral? Why be just in a universe that is not manifestly just?'"40 He 
admits that his moral stages alone cannot provide a sufficient answer to the 
question, "Why be moral?" As early as in 1973, Kohlberg says, he suggested a 
need for a new stage he would call "Stage 7" or a religiously oriented stage of 
love or agape to answer the question "Why be moral?" 
In Kohlberg's view, "religion is a conscious response to, and an 
expression of, the quest for an ultimate meaning for moral judging and acting. 
As such, the main function of religion is not to supply moral prescriptions but to 
support moral judgment and action" by providing a transcendent or infinite 
ground for purposeful and rational activities. In order to perform this function, 
one's religious thinking must comprehend Stage 6's moral conception of justice 
first to go beyond it. The dominant value of "Stage 7" in his mind is agape or 
responsible love or compassion which is first, "nonexclusive and can be 
extended to all including one's enemies; second, it is gracious and is extended 
without regard for merit."41 Kohlberg says that a man's decision to live agape 
and to love even his enemies comes with or as a result of religious experiences 
of union with deity, whose central concern is love and justice. Therefore, the 
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experience of union or oneness with deity gives man the reason to live a moral 
life and act morally.42 
Kohlberg talks about Spinoza, who, according to him, reached "Stage 7" 
with his experience of the union of the mind with the whole of nature," which 
enabled him to see "nature as an organized system of natural laws and to see 
every part of nature, including oneself, as parts of that whole." Kohlberg further 
explains: 
This act of insight is, however, not purely cognitive. One cannot see 
the whole or the infinite ground of being unless one loves it and aspires 
to love it. Such love, Spinoza tells us, arises first out of despair about 
more limited, finite, and perishable loves. Knowing and loving God or 
Nature as the ground of a system of laws knowable by reason is a 
support to our acceptance of human rational moral laws of justice, which 
are part of the whole. Furthermore, our love of the whole or the ultimate 
supports us through experiences of suffering, injustice, and death. 
...Central to his view is the idea of the cosmos as evolving to higher 
levels of consciousness and organization. The principle or end of this 
evolution is love.43 
According to Kohlberg, Martin Luther King is one who belongs to "Stage 7" of 
agape, because he went beyond the highest moral stage of justice by breaking 
unjust human laws out of his love of fellow human beings. It was his religion 
that made him see the eternal and true justice of God, who is love, after his 
moral reasoning acquired the knowledge of justice in Stage 6, and enabled him 
to resolve even to die for that knowledge as his loving service to God and his 
fellow human beings. 
Kohlberg also refers to two other figures who achieved the highest moral 
development through their religion or religious experiences. The first one is 
Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, "by nature a philosopher who hated war 
and killing," who found himself surrounded by those who had no understanding 
of his principles, was betrayed by those who were closest to him, and yet, found 
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his way not only to forgive but also to love his detractors and betrayers. 
Kohlberg explains: 
The content of faith of Marcus Aurelius starts with the belief that the 
universe is lawful, knowable, and evolving. In referring to the ultimate 
lawful, rational, and evolving principle of the universe, Marcus Aurelius 
does not attempt to separate God from nature. Sometimes he calls the 
principle God, sometimes nature. From this belief, he derives a natural 
law view of morality that gives him the strength to act in terms of universal 
principles of justice in an unjust world. It also gives him the peace that 
comes from sensing oneself as a finite part of an infinite whole.44 
Kohlberg quotes from the Meditations, which reveal what Marcus 
Aurelius has to say regarding the place of the individual person in the cosmos. 
Mortal life cannot offer you anything better than justice and truth; that is, 
peace of mind in the conformity of your actions to the laws of reason. 
Your destiny you cannot control. Even the vagaries of chance have their 
place in nature's scheme. You yourself are part of that universe. 
Remember always what the world-nature is and what your own nature is 
and that your nature is such a small fraction of so vast a whole. Then you 
will recognize that no man can hinder you from conforming each word 
and deed to that nature of which you are a part.45 
Kohlberg concludes: 
...the cosmic vision has a larger influx of union, love, joy, and grace as 
well as moral force. Marcus Aurelius, however, in stating the cosmic 
perspective in its starkest, simplest form, we think succeeds in 
illuminating how, in any culture, a person without special gifts or inner 
light, but with the courage and thoughtfulness to think through the human 
condition, can achieve moral and spiritual maturity 46 
The other person is Andrea Simpson, an American mental hospital and 
social worker, whose religious experience elevated her life to "Stage 7" of 
agape beyond Stage 6 of justice. According to Kohlberg, Andrea Simpson, 
who was deeply despaired about the meaning of life, due to her mother's death, 
her brother's psychosis, and her own failure to form a stable, intimate 
relationship with a man, had religious experiences through Indian Vedantic 
meditation which made her aware of the existence of "it doesn't matter what you 
call it - 'God' or 'Jesus’ or 'Cosmic flow' or 'reality' or 'love' or 'the power greater 
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greater than ourselves.”’47 Kohlberg quotes Simpson’s own words elaborating 
the experience. 
We start by seeking a power that is greater than ourselves. I don’t think 
anyone can fail to recognize that there is a power beyond themselves 
when they look out at the scene of their own neighborhood, to say 
nothing of the cosmos. I don't think it matters a bit what you call this 
power, but it is within every mind, and experience and makes one aware 
of this oneness, not only of all people but all of life.48 
This awareness or oneness with the power that is greater than ourselves 
moves her out of despair, makes her accept life's mystery, which defies human 
comprehension, and starts her awakened life of devotion and caring not only for 
her brother, "’who was a pure, inless,but also other patients. Simpson 
describes her coming out of despair as follows. 
I came out of it life this: human life is but a brief moment in eternity. I 
studied astronomy, and you get a broadened vista if you study 
astronomy, it opens out to incredible degrees. I've also studied 
anthropology, and you get some idea of the development of the human 
being on the planet Earth. If a human being’s life is his moment in 
eternity, [my brother] William's life may be the cocoon stage, to use a 
figure of speech, in his evolving into a spiritual butterfly. We think of life 
and death as a pair of opposites - you make your entrance and you make 
your exit from this material place - and that's death. But life is something 
contained in the hand of life.49 
Kohlberg concludes as follows: 
The case of Andrea Simpson illustrates "mystical" experience of 
identification with the eternal, or with the whole of what she says can be 
called God or reality. She exemplifies the striving for a cosmic or infinite 
perspective to answer the problems and questions raised but left 
unsolved by principled (Stage 5 or 6) morality itself, the problem of 
undeserved injustice and suffering. 
In these ways, Andrea Simpson is an example of "Stage 7" ...as is 
Marcus Aurelius... First, for Andrea Simpson religious thinking and 
experience not only support a moral orientation but inform it, unite with it, 
or give it new direction. Second, the moral principle to which this 
thinking and experience leads is agape, something differing from, or 
more than, our Stage 6 principles of justice.50 
Should principles of agape, then, replace principles of justice of Stage 6, 
because the rational principles of justice can neither answer the question Why 
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be moral?" nor motivate their knowers to go beyond them to love fellow human 
beings equally and unconditionally? Or should there be "Stage 7," "a 
metaphoric post-conventional stage of religious orientation" attained after the 
achievement of principled morality? At this point, Kohlberg does not seem to 
have the answer. The following questions prove his ambiguity on this issue. 
He says: 
Although an ethic of agape goes beyond justice to supererogation, it still 
requires principles of fairness to resolve justice dilemmas. Furthermore, 
our Stage 6 principles of reversible fairness are the only principles on 
which the ethic of agape could rest. Agape, then, is not a principle 
competing with the principle of fairness.51 
Rather than replacing principles of justice, agape goes beyond them in 
the sense of defining or informing acts of supererogation (acts beyond 
duty or beyond justice), acts that cannot be generally demanded or 
required of all people, acts that freely give up claims the actor may in 
justice demand.52 
Agape, unlike justice, arises out of a religious or metaphysical notion of 
the ideal unity of people with each other and with God or Nature. This 
religious perspective is then the basis for a mode of action in which the 
interests of the self and the other are no longer seen as antagonistic but 
as being in profound harmony.53 
Then, he says: 
In our view, there are problems, experiences, and thinking that are 
centrally religious and metaphysical, although the problems depend in 
part on moral structures for their formulation. 
This view we are able to most clearly elaborate in terms of the 
experience and judgments of people at what we think to be "Stage 7," the 
highest stage of religious judgment. The center of the highest stage is 
experiences that are most distinctively religious experiences of union 
with deity, whether pantheistic or theistic.54 
In our view, then, a psychological theory of religious stages, 
particularly a highest stage, rests on a philosophic theory, a set of 
metaphysical and religious assumptions consistent with, but not 
reducible to, rational science and morality... In the case of morality, we 
claim that there is a single definable structure defining a sixth or highest 
stage and that this structure can be interpreted and justified... 
In the case of "Stage 7," a highest level of ethical and religious 
thinking, the structure is much less unitary and undefinable. 
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Correspondingly, speculative theories... arising from and justifying this 
structure are more diverse and less rigorous than moral theories 
These theories, however, derive from a qualitatively new insiqht and 
perspective we call "Stage 7." The speculative philosophies that 
formulate this insight are not meaningless metaphysics, then, as 
positivism holds, but constructions essential for understanding human 
development.55 
Kohlberg discusses extensively what religious experience can do to a 
man's moral development and suggests strongly the possibility of a "Stage 7" of 
religious or agape orientation into his system of moral stages, but he has not yet 
formally endorsed it. Kohlberg's recognition of religious thinking and 
experience as a powerful agent or force in the making of men and women of the 
highest moral maturity comes later when his six stages theory of cognitive moral 
development is found insufficient to explain the moral actions or behaviors of 
such persons as Martin Luther King or Andrea Simpson. 
As a developmental psychologist, Kohlberg tries hard to separate moral 
reasoning from religious thinking and experience by defining the former as 
scientific reasoning to moral maturity and the latter as speculative metaphysical 
intuiting and experience of oneness with such abstractions as God, Cosmic 
Order, Reality, or the Whole, and so on. Only reluctantly, it appears, does 
Kohlberg contemplate adding a "Stage 7” that enables a man of justice to act in 
justice for his love of it. 
The classical thinkers of both China and Athens did not carry the illusion 
of thinking that universal and absolute moral values are entirely within the 
range of human reason alone to apprehend. Rather, these values were the 
"ways of Heaven" according to the Confucians and in the intelligible realm of 
"Ideas" according to the Athenians. As moral educators, therefore, the classical 
thinkers were the trainers not only of their students' reasoning capacity, but also 
of their beyond- or extra-rational perceptivity to comprehend the "ways of 
Heaven" or the "Ideas.” To them, moral education was the search for the 
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absolute, universal, and eternal moral values that should prevail in the cosmos, 
therefore, it was a rational as well as religious mission, which, they believed, 
they were assigned to carry out by Heaven or God. They would not separate 
cognitive moral reasoning from religious thinking in stimulating moral 
development, because in their view, cognitive and religious reasoning were not 
separable and should be developed together. 
Confucius, for instance, firmly believed that his moral power and his 
mission as a moral educator were endowed by Heaven. Even though Heaven's 
ways were often perplexing and inscrutable, to him Heaven was the cosmic 
source of moral order and the only way to make the human world moral was to 
learn from the ways of Heaven. His Heaven ordained mission was, therefore, to 
love the ways of Heaven himself as always and help his students, too, acquire 
the knowledge of them so that they would make them prevail in human society 
as they once had prevailed under the sage kings of the past.56 
Our Athenian thinkers, too, believed that the world was made in 
accordance with the absolute, eternal, and fundamental values, Ideas, which 
even the Olympian gods could not change, because the Ideas existed before 
the creation of gods. They also believed that the soul of man is immortal and it 
had seen or known the everlasting, unchanging, and absolute values of the 
good, the beautiful, the just, the true, and the holy, before it came to the world in 
human form, therefore, their mission as moral educators was to help it reason 
and recollect the knowledge it always had. And they took this mission humbly 
and reverently because it was the divine command.57 
Socrates was accused as a "criminal and busybody" by Meletus for 
performing exactly this mission. One of Meletus' many charges against 
Socrates was for his "investigating the things beneath the earth and in the 
heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these 
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same things."58 Socrates defended himself most movingly as follows. In the 
Apology we read: 
Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather 
than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up 
philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of 
you whom I may meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen... For know 
that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good 
ever came to pass to the city than my service to the god... 
And so, men of Athens, I am making my defense not for my own sake, 
as one might imagine, but more for yours, that you may not by 
condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you... 
Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or 
not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my 
conduct even if I am to die many times over... 
But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in 
mind this one truth that no evil can come to a good man either in life or 
after death, and God does not neglect him... 
...Now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but 
which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.59 
In concluding this portion of study it is clear that all those who attained 
the highest moral maturity are not only men and women of reason, but also of 
faith in what is higher than themselves and in the absolute, universal, and 
immutable values human reason alone cannot fully comprehend. It is 
significant to note that all those persons Kohlberg cited as the achievers of the 
highest moral excellence with the knowledge of the absolutes are without 
exception men and women of profound religious faith of one sort or another. 
Indeed, Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Mother Teresa 
of Calcutta, Janusz Korczak, and Confucius, too, were all clear thinkers who 
upheld justice in making their moral judgments, and then went further to act 
justly for their love of and service to Heaven, God, Nature, or whatever one may 
call it, in whose agape all human beings are equal. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The absence of moral authority in the rulers and the general deterioration 
of moral quality in people's lives, which made our thinkers of the Chou China 
and the City-State of Athens deeply concerned about the future of their 
respective states some twenty-three centuries ago, are what make us again 
today apprehensive for the future not only of this country, but of the whole world. 
Since the end of World War II a few industrial powers have raised their 
living standards to an unprecedented height, thus widening the gap between 
themselves and the underdeveloped nations of the "have-nots." In today's 
world, however, modern technology in communication and transportation has 
brought all human races closer to each other and made the world a much 
smaller place than ever before. Thus, one nation's problems are no longer 
confined to that nation, but affect the rest of the world. Now more than ever, the 
few "have" nations must take up their moral responsibility to help the many 
"have-not" nations, instead of exploiting them as in the past, in order to avoid 
tragic and global conflict. 
We are now compelled to be aware that all human races must cooperate 
with and care for each other to live happily on this planet, for we are fated to 
coexist whether we want to or not. Yet, even after the two World Wars, we have 
not been freed from large and small scale wars to the present. The future of the 
world looked even bleaker when the two super-powers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, having divided up the world into two hostile camps, 
174 
threatened each other by stockpiling nuclear weapons. To our great relief, 
however, they finally seem to have realized that in a nuclear war there will be 
no winners and appear to be intent on resolving their differences with the use of 
reason. And indeed, it is the moral obligation of the super powers to liberate 
human beings from the fear of nuclear war. The United States should assume 
her share of leadership in a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons once 
and for all. 
There are many problems, in addition to nuclear war, which now threaten 
the survival of this planet and everything on it. Environmental pollution, over¬ 
population and hunger are other problems of global proportions which can and 
must be solved through the cooperative effort and moral commitment of the 
leadership of all countries. Nations such as the United States, which is founded 
on the universal values of justice, freedom, equality, and happiness for all 
human beings, must now hold themselves accountable. 
Ironically, however, the United States of all nations is deeply troubled by 
loss of a moral standard. When a nation’s rich, well educated, and privileged, 
who occupy positions of leadership are morally confused and violate even 
basic moral values, how can we expect its poor, undereducated, and under¬ 
privileged to act otherwise? It is essential, therefore, to restore the nation's 
moral health from the top down, for without a morally healthy leadership, we will 
not have a morally healthy nation. 
If we examine the current moral climate in the United States, we find that 
our young people in particular exercise reckless violence on themselves and 
others. They behave as though they have never learned to think or have given 
up thinking. Their behavior indicates that they have lost faith in the nation's 
leadership and in most human institutions, which seem to accept double¬ 
standards. Many of our young people, including children, who "are often 
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stronger and tougher than we think, and are capable of more moral reflection 
and political savvy than we give them credit for, and also know about moral 
hypocrisy,'"1 seem to have turned inward, jealously protecting their own privacy 
and right to get a maximum amount of self-centered happiness out of their lives 
by any means. Even those who clearly have violated other people's 
'inalienable Rights' to 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,' demand 
respect for their own rights. One can seriously question also whether or not this 
nation's justice system is indeed serving justice for all the citizens equally 
regardless of their racial, economic, and social backgrounds. 
Of all human enterprises, education has been the most powerful in the 
development of human civilization. Of all branches of learning that have 
contributed to that development, moral education has been the most important, 
for it makes human individuals become aware of their relatedness to each other 
and helps them acquire the knowledge of universal moral values, such as, of 
justice, goodness, love, reciprocity, and trust, which alone can make 
harmonious coexistence possible. 
Keeping in mind what I have learned from the classical thinkers of China 
and Greece and Kohlberg, I would draw the following conclusions. First, I am in 
agreement with all the thinkers I have read for this study, that above and over all 
other educations or trainings which aim to produce specialists for a civilized 
society, moral education must be taken as the most important, for without moral 
standards, a society cannot be considered truly civilized. Although a universal 
moral education is our ultimate goal, a special emphasis must be placed on the 
moral education of the future leaders in government, business, industry, and the 
legal profession. I wonder as Derek Bok of Harvard does why "somehow the 
whole question of moral development, the development of character, is not 
thought to be a central aim of most universities."2 
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Second, I believe that moral education should start with adult members 
of society for the following reasons. Adults play various and important roles in 
their children's lives for at least the first eighteen years, as their parents, 
teachers, and above all as their role-models. Parents are children's first and 
most intimate teachers of morality. The classical thinkers felt that moral 
education should begin even from the day the children are conceived and 
accordingly, admonished expectant mothers to speak, think, and behave 
morally lest they may impart morally undesirable influence on the unborn. 
Hopefully most parents are morally maturer than their children. Even so, they 
must not force their values on their children, because forcing on children even 
good and sound values can damage that most important relationship between 
parents and their children. The parents must do their best to provide a family 
environment that is natural, loving, and just, for the children learn much about 
what is right or wrong at home. 
As children enter the period of formal education, the next group of adults 
come into their lives, the teachers. The teachers can help the children improve 
their moral reasoning. Some important qualities all teachers must have are: (1) 
Besides having a competent knowledge of the subject each of them teachers, 
they must seek the knowledge of universal moral values and consider them the 
most important elements for the wholesome growth of their children. (2) The 
teachers must care, love, and respect the students, because the future of society 
and its moral quality are dependent on them. (3) To establish a good and 
trusting relationship with the students, the teachers must be completely honest 
with himself and with the students. They must be willing to admit their 
ignorance if they does not know and acknowledge their mistakes when noted. 
(4) The teachers must have their own moral standard, even if it may have to be 
altered later. For there are clearly justice and injustice, good and evil, right and 
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wrong in the world, therefore, no teacher can be value-neutral. Teachers 
without their own moral standards will not be able to help their students’ moral 
development. (5) The teachers must become skillful users of various methods 
of moral education, knowing that there is no one method successfully 
applicable to all students at all times. (6) A person's moral maturity is not simply 
a matter of saying the right things, but is a matter of acting upon them as well. 
Therefore, they should make this clear to their students, and at the same time 
practice themselves what they believe to be just and good. For people, 
including young children, are not blind to a man or woman of moral excellence 
and can most readily learn from him or her. 
Third, although all three grounds used the dialectical method, the 
classical thinkers recommended other methods more suitable to those students 
whose capacity for philosophical reasoning on moral problems was not yet 
ready. Kohlberg's approach endorses only the dialectical method for all 
students of moral values, regardless of age. 
The dialectical method according to Kohlberg is democratic, non- 
relativistic, and non-indoctrinative. It is democratic, because the method 
involves everybody in the group discussing moral problems and values. It is 
non-relativistic, because it specifically aims at acquiring the universal moral 
values upon which everybody can agree. And it is non-indoctrinative, because 
it makes students seek these values independently using their own reasoning 
minds so that the values so acquired will be their own. 
The classical thinkers, recognized, as does Kohlberg, that dialectics is 
the best method, for it stimulates the students' own reasoning minds to their full 
development, so that they can see on their own the values of moral excellence. 
In contrast to Kohlberg, however, the classical thinkers did not attempt to use it 
with little children, but only with adult students who were intellectually mature 
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and capable of carrying on philosophical discussions. Children, too, think, but 
they are certainly not yet "philosophers." And, as Kohlberg’s own research 
findings indicate, the method is not effective even with high school students, for 
they are not mature enough to carry on an intellectual discussion on moral 
issues. 
By dismissing other methods, especially conventional methods, as 
indoctrinative, Kohlberg severely limits his approach. His fear of indoctrination 
is excessive and unwarranted. In today’s world, even people who live under 
the most totalitarian regimes are not easily indoctrinated. They may not say 
what they really think, but they do think and will never cease to think. The voice 
of reason that demands respect for universal moral values in the U.S.S.R., 
Poland, Tibet, South Africa, and elsewhere, cannot be silenced by force. 
Teachers do not indoctrinate their students by introducing someone 
else's moral values, for example, of Confucius, Socrates, Jesus, Martin Luther 
King, or their own, as long as they do not deny students' rights to accept or 
reject any of the values presented. Moral values, such as love, justice, 
temperance, truthfulness, and so on, are absolutely essential to civilized society 
and must be defended. Presenting these proven moral values with the reasons 
that underlie them to students for their critical evaluation is an important method 
of moral education. Moreover, no one, including children, accepts externally 
imposed moral values blindly. Sooner or later, when they face problems that 
require moral judgments and decisions, they will examine and reexamine the 
validity of these values. 
In Kohlberg’s view, any method that imparts predetermined moral values 
to children, who are viewed as passive learners, is indoctrinative. Accordingly, 
what he labels as the "bag of virtues," the "Boy Scout," and "Sunday School" 
approaches are not acceptable, because they propound virtues which have 
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been determined by a particular religion, culture or society and therefore do not 
help the development of children’s own moral reasoning. He also points out 
that "a vague consensus on the goodness of these virtues, such as honesty, 
truthfulness, and so forth, "conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over 
their definitions."3 Finally, citing the studies by Hartshorne and May (1928- 
1930) and others, he concludes that the "bag of virtues" approach does not 
make children moral. 
Regarding the definitions of each of the virtues in the bag, I agree with 
Kohlberg that the definitions vary. Even Confucius and Socrates could not 
provide a definition of jen or justice that satisfied everyone, confessing man’s 
humble and limited capacity to describe the ultimate "Moral Reality, 
"Principles," "Way," or "Forms." However, no one can miss the simplest and 
purest meaning of a virtue such as honesty or truthfulness. Certainly not all 
children who attend Sunday School or are boy or girl scouts will grow up to be 
moral individuals, but I believe that for most, their affiliation with these groups, 
will make them more aware of the existence of moral conflicts in the world, and 
will teach them that "good" or moral behavior does not always entail getting 
what one wants or receiving the praise and approval of others. 
Over the centuries, all civilized cultures have accepted as universal and 
enduring the virtues included in the bag such as, honesty, temperance, 
truthfulness, moral courage, self-control, and so forth. As marts nature and the 
nature of his moral problems and dilemmas have not changed over the 
centuries, people in today's world can learn a great deal from the past 
experiences of men and women, whose collective wisdoms contributed to the 
making of more humane and moral communities. In addition, we must explore 
Iflethods o, moral education used by different culture, such as — 
cultures, for their methods could definitely enrich our pedagogical resources. 
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Fourth, any suggestion of unifying our educational efforts or imposing 
censorship on educational materials by a central authority frightens most 
Americans. But a set of moral guidelines or standards, must be adopted to 
ensure the nation's moral health and well-being. As the arms race of the 70s 
and early 80s proved to us, military strength ultimately does not make a nation 
strong. Moreover, in our unrestrained materialism and desire for excessive 
material comfort, we have neglected or lost sight of gains we should have made 
on the moral front. Somehow, the United States needs to regain its values- 
reestablish the moral grounds upon which it was founded. Laws which protect 
the people of this country, including its youth, already exist, such as laws on 
drinking, the use of drugs, and the control of pornography. A national effort 
must be made to see that the laws are observed. For in the final analysis, it is a 
nation's moral ideals and commitment to those ideals which makes it strong. A 
nation without a moral backbone cannot last long. It is my belief that the 
enormous task of restoring this nation's values is the job of moral education. It 
requires the cooperative effort of all concerned and the federal government 
must do its part. 
Freedom of choice and freedom of action are the fundamental requisites 
for the democratic way of life. While these values must be preserved, they can 
make America a difficult place for children to grow up free and be moral and 
remain moral throughout their lives. But America, a microcosm of the world, is 
one place where a serious moral education must start, not only for the future of 
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mountain lost its trees, 
of its beauty then? 
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"However as the days pass he grows, and, as with all men in the still 
air of the early hours his sense of right and wrong is at work. If it is barelv 
perceptible, it is because his actions during the day have disturbed or V 
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Chapter III 
1* 'Jen-yi' is extensively discussed in Chapter V. 
2. In Mencius III. A. 3. X we read the following passages: 
;Hsiang'4 , 'hsu'^ , ’hseuh’ and 
hsiao %were set up for the purpose of education 'Hsianq' 
means rearing , 'hsiao' means 'teaching' and 'hsu' means 'archery' In 
the Hsia Dynasty it was called 'hsiao', in the Yin 'hsu' and in the Chou 
'hsiang', while 'hsueh' was a name common to all Three Dynasties 
They all serve to make the people understand human relationships. 
When it is clear that those in authority understand human relationships 
the people will be affectionate. Should a true King arise, he is certain to 
take this as his model. Thus he who practices this will be tutor to a true 
King. 
The Book of Odes says, 
Though Chou is an old state, 
Its Mandate its new. 
This refers to King Wen. If you can put heart into your practice you would 
also be able to renew your state, (trans. D.C. Lau, Mencius, pp. 98-99) 
3. W.E. Soothill, The Analects, p. 242. 
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5. Analects. VII. 29: Legge. 
6. Mencius. VII. A. 3. i: Lau. 
7. In the Laws we read: 
CLIN. What is that, Stranger? Are we to prescribe most exercise for 
new-born babies and tiny infants? 
ATH. Nay, even earlier than that, - we shall prescribe it for those 
nourished inside the bodies of their mothers. 
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talking of?21^' Wha‘ d° V°U mea"' my d6ar Sir? ls 11 unborn babes you are 
... 11 iS' StMI 11 is by no means surprising that you know nothinn nf 
this pre-natal gymnastic... (789 A - B: Bury) 9 ot 
Plato says further on the matter: 
For because of the force of habit, it is in infancy that the whole 
character is most effectually determined. I should assert further - were it 
not that it would be taken as a jest - that women with child above all 
others should be cared for during their years of pregnancy, lest any of 
them should indulge in repeated and intense pleasures or pains instead 
of cultivating, during the whole of that period, a cheerful, bright and calm 
demeanour. (Laws: 792 E: Bury) 
8. Laws. 810 A - B. 
9. On final selection of the future guardians for the highest education 
see Republic, 498, 503 E - 504 B, 537 A - E; Laws. 817 E, 961 A - C 964 E 
965 A. 
10. Republic. 373 D - 374 E. 
11. Ibid-, 414 B - 415 D, 545 C - 547 C. 
12. Ibid.. 401 D- 403C. 
13. Ibid.. 520 D - E, 521 A: trans. Shorey. 
190 
Chapter IV 
1 • ln the Analects we also read: The Master said, "In letters I am 
perhaps equal to other men, but the character of the superior man carrvinn out 
in his conduct what he professes, is what I have not yet attained to." (VII 32- 
Legge) The Master said, "As to being a Divine Sage of even a Good Man far 
be it from me to make any such claim. As for unwearying effort to learn and 
unflagging patience in teaching others, those are merits that I do not hesitate to 
claim." (A: VII. 33: Waley) Cf. Mencius: II. A. 2. xix. 
2. 
309. 
W E. Soothill's translation of VII. 19 of the Analects in his Analects p. 
3. The Master said, "I am not one who was born in the possession of 
knowledge; I am one who is fond of antiquity and earnest in seeking it there " 
(A: VII. xix: Legge) The Master said, "A transmitter and not a maker believina 
in and loving the ancients..." (A: VII. i: Legge) 
4. James Legge quotes Sze-ma Ch'ien who "makes Confucius say: - 
The disciples who received my instructions, and could themselves comprehend 
them, were seventy-seven individuals. They were all scholars of extraordinary 
ability.'" Legge himself lists eighty-eight "whose names have come down to us, 
as being his followers." James Legge, Confucian Analects. The Great Learning 
and The Doctrine of the Mean, p. 112. H.G. Creel. Confucius and the Chinese 
Way, Harper Torchbooks ed. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960), p. 
63. Creel wrote: "Even when men are cited in the Analects as having asked 
questions of Confucius, it is not easy to be certain whether or not they were 
disciples. That work mentions some twenty-two persons who, it seems 
reasonable to believe, were disciples, but of these only a few stand forth as 
distinct individuals." About Mencius' disciples, Legge notes that "the disciples 
of Mencius were much fewer in number, and of less distinction than those of 
Confucius. The longest list does not make them amount to twenty-five." See 
James Legge, The Works of Mencius, p. 76. 
5. Analects. I. 1, V. 21, VII. 28, XIII. 21; and Mencius VII. B. 37. ii. 
6. Analects. VII. 7. 
7. The Master said, "When I walk along with two others, they may serve 
me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad 
qualities and avoid them." (A: VII. 21: Legge) 
8. Also see Analects. IX. 18. Admonishing his disciples not to give up 
their search for knowledge in the middle of their pursuit, Confucius said: 
"Suppose I am raising a mound, and, while it is still unfinished by a basketful, I 
stop short, it is I that stops short. Or, suppose I begin on the level ground, - 
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although I throw down but one basketful and 
make progress." (A: IX. 18: Soothill) continue to do so, then it is I that 
9. See Mencius, VII. A. 41, also VII. B. 5. 
ie tJ?' A‘ 7‘ v says: "Heaven’s plan in the production of mankind 
^ th's. - that they who are first informed should instruct those who are later in 
being informed, and they who first apprehend principles should instruct those 
who are slower to do so. I am one of Heaven's people who have first 
apprehended; -1 will take these principles and instruct this people in them If I 
28 t?em’ Wh° Wl11 d° S°?" ^Le"e^ AIS0 See’ D M~: xxv- 3; A: VI. 
.. V ,FA°r *?n excellent study on this question, see "On Mencius’ Use of the 
Analogy in Argument" in Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, Appendix 5, pp. 
12. If the ruler is moral, so the people, too, will be. SeeGL IX 8&9-A- 
VIII. 2. ii, II. i, XV. 9; M: II. A. 8. iii and v. ' ~ 
13. About friends, see A- IV. 17. About places to live, see M '- II. A. 7. ii. 
On choosing neighbors Mencius quotes Confucius: "Confucius said, ’It is 
virtuous manners which constitute the excellence of a neighbourhood. If a man, 
in selecting a residence, does not fix on one where such prevail, how can he be 
wise?" (M: A. 7. ii: Legge) 
14. Ancient sage-rulers whom both Confucius and Mencius considered 
wise, good, and just are succinctly described in H.G. Creel, Confucius and the 
Chinese Way, pp. 144-147, 185, 186, 188, 193. Also see, A: VI. 28, VIII. 19, 
XIV. 45, XX. 1; M: II. A. 2. 8, B. 2; IV. A. 1.2. 26. 28, B. 1. 19. 28. 32; V. A. 1 -7, B. 
1. 3. 6; VIII. A. 16. 25. 30. 35. 46, B. 6. 32. 37. 38. 
15. "Socrates does not speak of his 'pupils,' and refuses to be called 
anyone's 'teacher'" (Ap. 33 A). He has only an 'association' 
( cTui/oocrca , cf ol crovov'res) with other men, of 
whatever age, and 'converses' with them (Sta'Xc <r0At). 
Therefore, he does not take money, as the sophists do (AU- 33 B); his poverty 
(ib. 23 C)." from Werner Jaeger, Paideia - The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. II 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), note 141, p. 380. 
16. Laws. 788 ff. 
17. Werner Jaeger, Paideia. vol. 2, p. 302. 
18. Ibid., p. 63. 
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oc7. wa|J"e?ge; g?nfHC'an ,AnqlectR, P- 202’ Soothill, Analects of Confucius p. 
357, Waley, Analects fllganiuciua, p. 128; Lau, Confucius- The Analects p 89. 
196 on th^'w'off'yeh^^0)'^' PP' 357'359; Le9"' CfltltUCian *™'<*<*- P- 
3- Waley, Analects of Confucius pp. 39-40. 
. 4: Jlaid- PP- 39-41 ■ The passages in the Analects where the term ’wen’ 
(jC) is used to mean literary studies or literature are: I. 6 VI 25 VII 24 3? 
IX. 10. ii, XI. 2. ii, XII. 15. 24. ' 
5. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 4 The She King or the Bonk 
QlPoetry (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 1-7 Also 
Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way pp. 101 -103. 
6. Analects. IX. 14. 
7. Commenting on Analects XVII. 10 Legge notes: "Chau-nan and 
Shao-nan are the titles of the first two Books in the Songs of the States, or first 
part of the Shih-ching. For the meaning of the titles, see the Shi-Ching, I. i. and 
I. ii. They are supposed to inculcate important lessons about personal virtue 
and family government." Legge, Confucian Analects, p. 323. 
8. By the time of Mencius the Shang Dynasty was no longer a legendary 
dynasty. 
9. Analects, n. 23, m. u. 
10. Mencius. V. A. 6. iii says: "To bring to the throne he whom no man 
can bring, that rests with Heaven's ordinances. One who, being a commoner, 
becomes the Son of Heaven, must be a man whose virtue is of the order of 
Shun's and Yu’s and, too, he must have a Son of Heaven to propose him. It 
was for this reason (i.e., because no Son of Heaven was in a position to 
propose him), that Confucius did not become the Son of Heaven." Dobson, 
Mencius, p. 63. 
11. Mencius. III. B. 9. viii and xi. 
12. Wolfgang Bauer, China and the Search for Happiness, trans. Michael 
Shaw (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), p. 22. 
13. Mencius. IV. B. 22. ii. 
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unH^tS.H68 S,ze-m,a Ch'ien’s account, which s^Ts tha^enciurSie^ 
the disdplles of Tsze-sze.' Mencius said: "Although I could not bp p 
?'snclP e,of Confucius myself, I have endeavoured to cultivate my character and 
knowledge by means of others who were." (M: IV. B. 22: Legge) ^ 
15. Dobson. Mencius, p 14Q 
16. Chen, The Confuoian vy^y pp. 53.54. 
17 Harley Farnsworth MacNair, ed. China, United Nations series 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 31,49^5-59. 63; CreeL The Sfnh n, 
r J®' Apal'?':1SS- Cp"f|lpi|1^ PP' 54_59' 64-69; Dona« J- Munro The Qoncapt Qf Man in Early China Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press iorS? 
pp. 26-28, 32-35; and also Noah Edward Fehl, Li; Rite° anHSZ' 1969)' 
Ljtaratbrg an<j Lifp (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1971) 
x rsi \9*/o Fun? Yu“!?n’. A^'stQrY Qf, Chinese Philosophy trans. Derk Bodde, 
vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 66-68. 
20. Analects. 11.11, III. 15. 17. 20, VI. 20. 
21. Yet, the observation of all the proper rules are considered important 
by Confucius. See The Doctrine of the Mean. XXVII. 3 and Analects. VIII. 4. 
22. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 73. 
23. Lau, Confucius - The Analects, p. 100. 
24. Mencius. II. A. 6. v. 
25. James Legge, trans. Li Chi: Book of Rites, vol. 1 (New York: 
University Book, 1967), Introduction xli. 
26. Burton Watson, trans. Basic Writings of Mo Tzu. Hsun Tzu. and Han 
Fei Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 112-117. 
27. Creel, The Birth of China, p. 331. 
28. D.C. Lau suggests to read Analects XIII. 37, which he renders: "The 
Master said, There is no one who understands me... If I am understood at all, it 
is, perhaps, by Heaven.'" (A: XIV. 35) See also Analects XIV. 42, where 
Confucius' frustrated mood was detected in his playing of the stone chimes. 
29. Waley, Analects of Confucius, p. 191. Waley translates the poem: "If 
the water is deep, use the stepping-stones; if it is shallow, then hold up your 
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sa,d m the text, that is indeed an easy way out, but it was not for Con,uclus 
••Qho« n°u6S commenting on Analects III. 25 and XV. 10 v that 
Shao (-fro) was the name of the music made by Shun l%) oerfect in 
me ody and sentiment. Wu (^) was the music of King Wu tlso perfect in 
melody but breathing the martial air, indicative of its author." "The shao was the 
music of Shun; the ’dancer,’ or 'pantomimes,' who kept time to the music See 
the Shu-ching, II. u. 21." Legge, Confucian Analerts pp. 164, 298. 
Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, pp 4in dio 
32. The philosopher Tsang said, "...’Perfect virtue (jen-/-) is the 
burden which he considers it is his to sustain; - is it not heavy'? Only with death 
does his course stop;- is it not long?"’ (A: VIII. 7. ii: Legge) "The Master said 
hand^’’16 J6n 3 thm9 remote? 1 wish t0 be virtu°us, and lo! virtue is at’ \/ll. 29. Legge) 
33. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Wav p. 89. 
34. Also see Analects. XIII. 19. 
35. Some scholars argue that the correct character for the text was 
misplaced with 'M/ which is its homophone. Therefore, the passage, they say 
should read to ’renew the people ($<r&),’ instead of to ’love the people 
Jk).' See Legge’s extensive discussion in his Confucian Analects p. 
356. 
36. Doctrine of the Mean. XX. 20. 
37. ibid., xxi. 
38. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 120-121 Bodde’s 
translation of M: II. A. 6. The word ’tuan’ ) is translated as "germ" by 
Lau, "the principle" by Legge, and "the first sign" by Dobson. 
39. Pu tung hsin ( 'f- ty/\cr ) is variously translated by others. 
Lau renders it as "a heart that cannot be stirred," in his translation of Mencius. II. 
A. 2. i. ii. iii. ix. x. Legge translates as "an unperturbed mind," and Dobson as 
"the mind that remains unmoved." 
40. Ch’i ( ) is rendered by Legge as "passion nature," and by 
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can function properly. As the heart is the seat of this refined chi it is necessa^ 
to have a regiment for the heart in order to be healthy and to IhTe to a ripe old ^ 
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is, in the highest degree, vast and unyielding.' The point of contact between the 
frao |gn qhih ch’i and physical qWx is courage. Courage is believed to depend 
on cm. This no doubt has something to do with the fact that courage is 
accompanied by a state of heightened tension in the body in which breathing is 
quickened and the activity of the heart stimulated. But for Mencius, genuine 
courage, instead of being sustained by a state of heightened tension in the 
body, can only be sustained by the sense of being morally in the right. The hao 
jan phih ch'j 'is a £hl which unites rightness and the Way. Deprive it of these 
and it will collapse..." Lau, Mencius, pp. 24-28 passim. 
41. More on tLSiaQ. ( ), see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese 
Philosophy, pp. 357-361. 
42. Finazzo, The Principle or Tien, p. 55. 
43. Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
44. Paul Shorey, Plato: The Republic. The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 175, note e. 
45. Plato, The Republic. 386 A - 392 C passim. 
46. Julius Portnoy, Music in the Life of Man (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1963), p. 124. 
47. Republic. 398 D - E. 
48. 399 E. 
49. M., 424 C; Laws. 700 A passim. 
50. Laws. 802. 
51. Ibid.. 766 A-B. 812 A-E. 
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52. Ibid., 700 C, 764 C - D; Republic. 424 B - D. 
53. Shorey, Republic. 523 A, p. 153. 
54. Ml., 526 E, p. 169. 
mathLo^'’ n0te f on 527 A’ p- 169- !t states that "geometry [and 
nHhp Pi tCS' 'S 'nevitabl7 less abstract than dialectics. But the special purpose 
abstract on°n"C educatlon values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in 
56. idid., 527 C, p. 173. 
. . 5^' p- 1 ®3' note f> commenting on 529 C - D, states that "No material 
object perfectly embodies the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These 
mathematical ideas are designated as the true, , and the real, 
••• 'be visible stars are in and are carried by their invisible 
mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking Plato, it is true, disregards the 
apparent difficulty that the movement of the visible stars then ouqht to be 
mathematically perfect..." y 
58. idid , 530 D, p. 189. 
59. Ml-, 531 C, pp. 193-195. 
60. Cornford, The Republic of Plato, p. 251. 
61. Shorey, Republic, 531 E, pp. 194-195. Shorey says that "though 
mathematics quickens the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a 
matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good 
reasoners on other subjects..."; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology pp. 187- 
188: "...a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of 
thought...provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal 
which the pupil values that he had "hardly ever known a mathematician who 
was capable of reasoning.’" 
62. Cornford explains what Dialectic means in the Republic as follows: "It 
simply means the technique of philosophic conversation (dialogue) carried on 
by question and answer and seeking to render, or to receive from a respondent, 
an 'account' (logos) of some Form, usually a moral Form such as a Justice in 
this dialogue. At this stage visible illustrations are no longer available, and the 
movement at first is not downward, deducing conclusions from premisses, but 
upward, examining the premisses themselves and seeking the ultimate 
principle on which they all depend. It is suggested that, if the mind could ever 
rise to grasp the Supreme Form, it might then descend by a deduction 
confirming the whole structure of moral and mathematical knowledge. This 
state of mind is called intelligence or rational intuition (noesis) and knowledge 
(episteme, 533 E) in the full sense." Cornford, The Republic of Plato, p. 223. 
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64. Haft, 533 C, p. 254. 
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in Plato." Shorey, Republic, vol. 2, p. 104. and 
51 /I °n "thG intelligible world where the good is," see Republio 509 D - 
67. Cornford, The Republic of Piqfn 506 B - D, pp. 216-217. 
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